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To tax the sum invested, and afterwards to tax also the proceeds of the 
investment, is to tax the same portion of the contributor's means twice 
over. The principal and the interest cannot both together form part of his 
resources; they are the same portion twice counted; if he has the interest, 
it is because he abstains from using the principal; if he spends the 
principal, he does not receive the interest. Yet, because he can do either 
of the two, he is taxed as if he could do both, and could have the benefit 
of the saving and that of the spending, concurrently with one another.1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
A. Loomings 
Perhaps we should blame it all on Mill. A great deal and possibly 
all of the mind-numbing complexity of America's largest and least 
popular tax follows from the decision to have a progressive personal 
income tax.2 Proponents wanted an individual income tax 
notwithstanding - indeed, in large part because of - such a tax's 
1. JOHN STUART MILL, 5 PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY. ch. II,§ 4, at 179-80 
(Jonathan Riley ed., Oxford University Press 1998) (1848). 
2. See EDWARD]. MCCAFFERY, FAIR NOT FLAT. at 1 (2002) [hereinafter MCCAFFERY, 
FAIR NOT FLAT] ("[O]ur tax system is a disgrace . . . .  complicated. inefficient, and unfair.'"): 
Greg M. Shaw & Stephanie L. Reinhart. The Polls - Trends: Devolution and Confidence in 
Government, 65 PUB. OPINION Q. 369. 382 (2001) (poll results from 1999 showing that a 
plurality chose the "federal income tax" as the "worst tax, that is, the least fair''). 
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"double taxation" of savings. This double-tax argument is an analytic 
point generally attributed to Mill's classic 1848 treatise, Principles of 
Political Economy.3 Historically, much of the support for the Sixteenth 
Amendment, ratified in 1913, came from Southern and Midwestern, 
progressive, agricultural interests, who wanted, in general, to 
implement a redistributive tax and, in particular, to collect some tax 
from East Coast financiers.4 After all, the Supreme Court had ruled 
that the income tax of the late nineteenth century was unconstitutional 
only insofar as it fell on the fruits of capital; no constitutional 
amendment would have been necessary to retain or implement a 
national wage or sales tax.5 The legal raison d 'etre of the income tax 
was to get at such returns to savings as dividends and interest. 
To this day, liberals and moderates insist on retaining the structure 
of an income tax precisely because it gets at the returns to saving in 
addition to labor earnings.6 Consumption taxes of all sorts are set in 
contrast to the income tax, on another side of a great divide, as taxes 
that fail to get at the yield to capital - that deliberately avoid Mill's 
"second" tax.7 Prominent commentators on the case for consumption 
3. MILL, supra note 1 .  
4. For some among several good sources of the political history, see SHELDON D. 
POLLACK, THE FAILURE OF U.S. TAX POLICY 45-53 (1996); ROBERT STANLEY, 
DIMENSIONS OF LAW IN THE SERVICE OF ORDER: ORIGINS OF THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX 
(1993); and Steven A. Bank, The Progressive Consumption Tax Revisited, 101 MICH. L. REV. 
2238 (2003) (reviewing EDWARD J. MCCAFFERY, FAIR NOT FLAT: How TO MAKE THE TAX 
SYSTEM BETTER AND SIMPLER (2002)). See also KEVIN PHILLIPS, WEALTH AND 
DEMOCRACY (2002).  Another and somewhat related reason to go with an individual income 
tax was the failure to think through the possibilities of a progressive consumption tax; this 
failure of imagination was understandable, given the relatively low dollar stakes involved, 
and the Jack of both theory and real-world experience pertaining to large comprehensive tax 
systems. See STEVEN WEISMAN, THE GREAT TAX WARS (2002); Erik M. Jensen, The 
Taxing Power, the Sixteenth Amendment, and the Meaning of "Incomes, " 33 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 
1057 (2001 ). 
5. See Pollock v. Farmer's Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429 (1895), modified by 158 U.S. 
601 (1895). 
6. See, e.g., MICHAEL J. GRAETZ, THE DECLINE (AND FALL?) OF THE INCOME TAX 
(1997); LIAM MURPHY & THOMAS NAGEL, THE MYTH OF OWNERSHIP: TAXES AND 
JUSTICE (2002); Anne L. Alstott, The Uneasy Liberal Case Against Income and Wealth 
Transfer Taxation: A Response to Professor McCaffery, 51 TAX L. REV. 363 (1996); Michael 
J. Graetz, 100 Million Unnecessary Returns: A Fresh Start for the U.S. Tax System, 112 YALE 
L.J. 261 (2002); see also BILL BRADLEY, THE FAIR TAX (1984). 
7. See, e.g. , Noel B. Cunningham, The Taxation of Capital Income and the Choice of Tax 
Base, 52 TAX L. REV. 17, 17 (1996) ("Both bases include consumption; the difference is that 
an income tax also includes changes in wealth, or savings. Whether or not it is appropriate or 
desirable to tax savings has been at the core of the debate."); Barbara H. Fried, Fairness and 
the Consumption Tax, 44 STAN. L. REV. 961, 961 (1992) ("Under a plausible set of 
assumptions, the two forms of consumption tax - a tax on consumption only and a tax on 
wages only - impose an equivalent tax burden in present value terms."). David A. 
Weisbach & Joseph Bankman, The Superiority of a Consumption Tax Over an Income Tax 
(draft on file with author) ("The only difference between an income tax and a consumption 
tax and hence the only issue governing the choice between the two tax systems is the 
taxation of the riskless return to savings."). A particularly clear statement of the traditional 
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taxation - both those in favor and those opposed - continue to cite, 
as the "best" or "most sophisticated" argument for adopting a 
consumption-based tax, the analytic facts that consumption taxes do 
not overly burden capital or its yield, and as such do not distort the 
savings-consumption decision, or, equivalently, do not favor present 
over deferred consumption.8 The literature for and against 
consumption taxation is strewn with stock "horizontal equity" models, 
comparing savers and spenders, Ants and Grasshoppers: the idea is 
that income taxes punish savers, like the mythical Ant, vis-a-vis 
spenders like her friend Grasshopper.9 On the other side of the great 
divide, supporters of redistributive taxation argue that retaining an 
income tax base is a central task of maintaining or obtaining fairness 
in tax in large part because it, alone, gets at the return to capital, the 
nearly exclusive province of the economically fortunate. 10 
The idea that income taxes and only income taxes effectively get at 
the yield to capital, and, as explained further below, that consumption 
taxes of either of two broad types, prepaid and postpaid, do not, 
constitutes the traditional view of tax.11 The traditional view has 
view comes from the recent philosophical tract by Liam Murphy and Thomas Nagel: "This 
equivalence allows us to say, furthermore, that any consumption tax scheme, in taxing not 
accretions to wealth as such, but rather only consumption, exempts from taxation normal 
returns to investment." MURPHY & NAGEL, supra note 6, at 101; see also JOEL SLEMROD & 
JON BAKIJA, TAXING OURSELVES 231-34 (2d ed. 2000).  Of course, most of these fine 
scholars note the assumption of flat, constant, or proportionate rates. See, e.g., Fried, supra 
note 7, at 961 n.2. A way to understand the present Article is that it takes seriously the idea 
of nonconstant tax rates, and attempts to build a normative theory around them, taking the 
tax rates themselves as the prior, foundational commitment of tax. This proposed 
rearrangement in the political epistemology of tax is a central theme of this Article. 
8. See, e.g. , William D. Andrews, A Consumption-Type or Cash Flow Personal Income 
Tax, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1113 (1974) [hereinafter Andrews, Personal Income Tax]; see also 
DAVID F. BRADFORD ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, BLUEPRINTS FOR BASIC TAX 
REFORM (2d ed. 1984); Fried, supra note 7, at 963; Mark Kelman, Time Preference and Tax 
Equity, 35 STAN. L. REV. 649 (1983). 
9. See, e.g., Joel B. Slernrod & William G. Gale, Overview, in RETHINKING ESTATE AND 
GIFT TAXATION 1, 30-32 (William G. Gale et al. eds., 2001); c. EUGENE STEUERLE, 
CONTEMPORARY U.S. TAX POLICY 10 (2004). For deep critiques of the horizontal equity 
norm, see Thomas D. Griffith, Should "Tax Norms" Be Abandoned? Rethinking Tax Policy 
Analysis and the Taxation of Personal Injury Recoveries, 1993 WIS. L. REV. 1115,  1155 
("Horizontal equity is, perhaps, the most widespread norm underlying traditional tax policy 
analysis. It is also the least helpful. [It] cannot provide the answer to [any] . . .  important tax 
policy question."); and Louis Kaplow, Horizontal Equity: Measures in Search of Principle, 42 
NAT'L TAX J. 139 (1989). 
10. See, e.g., Bank, supra note 4 at 2256-58. 
11 .  At least the "traditional view" as referred to within the mainstream of legal 
academic discourse, and in the law school classroom. The economics profession has typically 
had a more sophisticated, nuanced perspective. See, e.g. , William M. Gentry & R. Glenn 
Hubbard, Distributional Implications of Introducing a Broad-Based Consumption Tax, 11  
TAX POL'Y & ECON. 1 (1997) [hereinafter Gentry & Hubbard, Distributional Implications]; 
Louis Kaplow, Human Capital Under an Ideal Income Tax, 80 VA. L. REV. 1477 (1994); 
Louis Kaplow, Taxation and Risk Taking: A General Equilibrium Perspective, 47 NAT'L TAX 
J. 789 (1994) [hereinafter Kaplow, Taxation and Risk Taking]. Even the economics 
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extended well beyond the academy to influence the popular 
understanding of tax and its possibilities, as well as practical political 
decisionmaking. This traditional view has generated an impoverished 
choice set for tax, consisting of a badly flawed status quo on the one 
hand and a flat consumption tax of some sort on the other. Under the 
guiding light of the traditional view, we are heading ever closer 
towards a flat wage tax. 
The traditional view is wrong. 
This Article sets out a new understanding of tax. The key insight is 
that the canonical understanding of consumption taxes changes under 
consistently progressive tax rates.12 No longer are prepaid and 
postpaid consumption taxes - taxes on wages and spending, 
respectively - equivalent. Postpaid consumption taxes can and do 
burden the yield to capital, and not in an arbitrary, random way. Far 
from it: A progressive postpaid consumption tax emerges as the fairest 
and least arbitrary of all comprehensive tax systems, precisely because 
it chooses to make its decisions about the appropriate level of 
progressivity at the right time. In doing so, it burdens some but not all 
uses of capital and its yield, and for normatively attractive reasons. 
These points follow from a simple statement of the analytics of tax. 
This then raises an obvious question from the start: Why has the 
traditional view persisted for so long, virtually unchallenged? It is true 
enough that an ideal income tax including all sources of income -
both labor earnings, or the yield to human capital, and savings, or the 
yield to financial capital - is a "double tax" on savings that burdens 
literature, however, refers to the prevalence of the standard view, see, e.g., Gentry & 
Hubbard, supra, at 5 n. 4 (referring back to Mill), and also typically suffers some limitations 
in its analysis and recommendations on account of the continued prevalence of this view. 
12. A word on terminology is in order. What matters for most purposes for claims of 
justice is progressive average or (equivalently) effective tax rates, wherein taxes as a percent 
of total income (or consumption. or wealth, or whatever the base might be), rise in that base. 
See A. 8. ATKINSON, PUBLIC ECONOMICS IN ACTION: THE BASIC INCOME/FLAT TAX 
PROPOSAL (1995); Joseph Bankman & Thomas Griffith. Is the Debate Between an Income 
Tax and a Consumption Tax a Debate About Risk? Does it Matter?, 47 TAX L. REV. 377 
(1992) [hereinafter Bankman & Griffith, Debate]; Joseph Bankman & Thomas Griffith, 
Social Welfare and the Rate Structure: A New Look at Progressive Taxation, 75 CAL. L. REV. 
1905 (1987) [hereinafter Bankman & Griffith, Social Welfare]; Marcus Berliant & Paul 
Rothstein, Possibility, Impossibility, and History in the Origins of the Marriage Tax, 56 
NAT'L TAX J. 303 (2003); James A. Mirrlees, An Exploration in the Theory of Optimum 
Income Taxation, 38 REV. ECON. STUD. 175 (1971); MCCAFFERY, FAIR NOT FLAT, supra 
note 2, at 78-87. The United States tax system relies, and has always relied, on progressive 
marginal tax rates. This is one but not the only means to progressive average taxation; a 
better way, per the optimal tax tradition, is to rely on relatively flat, even declining marginal 
tax rates, coupled with a "demogrant" or lump-sum transfer to effect progression. See 
Bankman & Griffith, Social Welfare, supra at 1967; Mirrlees, supra; Joel Slemrod, Optimal 
Tax and Optimal Tax Systems, 41. ECON. PERSP. 157 (1990). For the most part, this Article, 
following traditional tax policy discussions. shall conflate progressive marginal and effective 
taxation; later it shall comment on how the new understanding of tax ought to change the 
analysis of progressivity, too. 
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savers relative to spenders. This is accurate both within the income 
tax's own framework, in which savers are treated more harshly than 
spenders, and also compared to a hypothetical no-tax world, with the 
income tax destroying the pretax financial equivalence between 
present and deferred consumption.13 It is also analytically correct that 
a prepaid, yield-exempt, or (all equivalently) wage tax categorically 
exempts the yield to savings, preserving the relation whereby savers 
and spenders under normal circumstances have equal material 
resources in present value terms. But under progressive tax rates, a 
postpaid, cash-flow, or (all equivalently) spending tax is not equivalent 
to a yield-exempt or wage tax; that is, it is not equivalent to an 
"income" tax with a zero rate of taxation on savings, which is itself a 
semantic paradox.14 This is a point that the traditional tax-policy 
literature has sometimes stated, but only in a passing manner.15 
13. Alvin C. Warren, Jr., Fairness and a Consumption-Type or Cash Flow Personal 
Income Tax, 88 HARV. L. REV. 931, 933-36 ( 1975). 
14. William A. Klein, Timing in Personal Taxation, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 461, 461 n.2 (1977) 
("The choice between income and expenditure can be regarded as a timing question because 
an expenditure base can be thought of as income minus a deduction for savings, and a 
deduction for savings can in tum be regarded as a deferral of tax on the income set aside as 
savings . . . .  The choice [of income or consumption taxation] can also, and for some purposes 
more usefully, be thought of as a zero tax rate on the income from invested savings. " 
(citations omitted)). 
15. An especially good statement of the qualification in the traditional view comes from 
Anne Alstott, in her response to some of my earlier work. See Alstott, supra note 6. Alstott 
first sets out the traditional view, stating: 
The defining characteristic of a consumption tax is that it removes from the tax base income 
that is saved or invested (for example, in financial instruments like stocks or bonds or in real 
investments like plant or equipment). A consumption tax, by definition, taxes only income 
spent on current, personal consumption (for example, on cars, food and travel). By deferring 
tax on saved income until the money is spent, a proportional consumption tax essentially 
exempts the earnings on investment from taxation. A progressive consumption tax of the 
kind Professor McCaffery advocates would offer significant tax benefits to savers while 
penalizing those with high levels of consumption spending. 
Id. at 364-65 (footnote omitted). Professor Alstott adds a footnote explaining (in more detail 
than typical of the literature) the relevance of rates: 
A proportional consumption tax exempts from tax the income from savings . ... This familiar 
"yield exemption " result holds only if tax rates are constant, however, and under a 
progressive consumption tax, the exclusion may save tax at a rate that is higher or lower than 
the subsequent tax rate paid on consumption . . . .  In general, the tax rate on investment 
income will be positive where the saver faces a lower marginal tax rate than the consumer, 
negative where the saver faces a higher marginal tax rate than the consumer and zero where 
the two marginal rates are equal. 
Id. at 365 n. 11. For a related point, see Slemrod, supra note 12, at 159. See also Eric 
Rakowski, Can Wealth Taxes Be Justified?, 53 TAX L. REV. 263, 349-50 (2000). 
Professor Alstott wrote these thoroughly correct analytic words on the occasion of a 
symposium on some of my earlier articles, after considering my own reply to criticisms, part 
of which follows: 
Professor Alstott likes income taxes because they capture the yield to savings. But so does a 
back-ended progressive consumption tax. The equivalence of the yield-exempt and the cash­
flow consumption tax models depends on constant marginal rates; as I point out in my 
articles, this fact has led many to advocate flat-rate consumption taxes. But a progressive 
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On the occasions when scholars have paused to reflect over the 
idea that varying progressive rates destroy the equivalence of prepaid 
and postpaid consumption taxes, they have taken one of two 
subsequent turns. 
Some scholars simply note that the interaction of progressive rates 
and a postpaid consumption tax is more or less random. They state 
that taxes will go up, and hence there will be a "penalty" for savers if 
consumption occurs in a higher rate bracket than initial earnings; taxes 
will go down, and hence there will be a "subsidy" for savers if 
consumption occurs at a lower level than initial earnings.16 This 
language of subsidy and penalty is not helpful: It tends to confuse 
matters, perhaps because of an innate or intuitive aversion to 
nonneutral sounding rules, a belief that neutrality per se is an end.17 
More deeply, this first move does not take the analytical 
understanding of tax far enough. When savings or the yield to capital 
will decrease or increase a taxpayer's burden of taxation under a 
consistent, progressive postpaid consumption tax is not random. The 
burden of taxation will decrease when a taxpayer uses capital 
transactions (borrowing, saving, investing) to smooth out the pattern 
of her lifetime labor earnings, and thereby to consume, in any given 
year, at the level of her average annual lifetime labor earnings in 
constant dollar terms. The burden will also decrease when capital 
transactions result in diminished consumption, again measured against 
the average annual labor earnings as the baseline. The burden of 
cash flow or (equivalently) back-ended consumption tax consciously hits at wealth that is 
spent as it is spent, whether it is taken out of earnings or capital. There is no reason, dictated 
by political liberal theory alone, to link flat rates with consumption taxes. A progressive 
consumption-without-estate tax is not a consumption tax in the sense that a consumption tax 
never taxes the yield to capital. But I do not necessarily care about that, because no part of 
my analysis turned on prior definitions. 
Edward J. McCaffery, Being the Best We Can Be (A Reply to My Critics), 51 TAX L. REV. 
615, 630-31 (1996) (footnotes omitted) [hereinafter McCaffery, Being the Best]. The present 
Article grew out of my continued thinking about the relevance of variable and progressive 
rates to the income-versus-consumption debate. Not only did I notice the continued iteration 
of the view that consumption taxes do not reach the yield to capital in the popular political 
culture and in tax policymaking circles, but I also came to see that my own earlier work was 
incomplete in that I had not developed a suitably general theory of how, precisely, varying 
rates affected the choice of tax base, and of the normative basis for the argument. In time, I 
came to see that the reason for the repetition of the traditional view was having the wrong 
argument structure supporting a consistent consumption tax, a theme throughout this 
Article. Working on these issues over several years led to the present Article. 
16. See, e.g. , Alstott, supra note 6, at 386-87; William D. Andrews, Fairness and the 
Personal Income Tax: A Reply to Professor Warren, 88 HARV. L. REV. 947, 954 (1975) 
[hereinafter, Andrews, Reply to Professor Warren]; Warren, supra note 13, at 940-51 .  
17. See, e.g. , Edward J. McCaffery & Jon Baron, Framing and Taxation: Normative 
Evaluation of Tax Policies Involving Household Composition, 25 J. ECON. PSYCHOL. 679 
(2003) (discussing, inter alia, experimental results showing a "neutrality bias"); see also 
Michael Livingston, Risky Business: Economics, Culture and the Taxation of High-Risk 
Activities, 48 TAX. L. REV. 163, 229 (1993) (criticizing naive neutrality norms in tax policy 
scholarship). 
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taxation will increase when capital transactions are used to finance 
enhanced, or greater, consumption than this level. This pattern is not 
random, as this Article demonstrates. 
Other scholars point out that the potential nonequivalence of the 
two consumption taxes leads to an argument for flat or proportionate 
consumption tax rates, because they presume - or presume that 
consumption tax supporters presume - that the best argument for a 
consumption tax is one of preserving the "neutrality" between savers 
and spenders, or of avoiding Mill's second tax, or, other times, of 
promoting savings on an individual or social aggregate level.18 This 
move puts the cart before the horse: it rests the case for consumption 
taxation on weak normative foundations. To counter this move, we 
need to explore portions of the intellectual history of tax so as to 
develop new arguments for old ideas. It turns out that the best 
argument for a consumption tax of the right sort is not a simple 
horizontal equity argument at all, as this Article develops. 
The new understanding of tax embraces three, not two, choices of 
comprehensive tax bases.19 A consistent, progressive postpaid 
consumption tax stands between an income tax, which double taxes all 
savings by including the yield to capital in its base, and a prepaid 
consumption or wage tax, which never taxes the yield to capital. A 
consistent, progressive postpaid consumption tax burdens some but 
not all of the yield to capital, and does so in a principled way, by 
design. There is no need for ad hoc deviations from an analytically 
sound understanding of the comprehensive tax ideal to achieve the 
result, as there is, for an important example, under the "income" tax 
so as to remove the double-tax sting from retirement (or medical or 
education-related) savings. A progressive postpaid consumption tax 
relatively lightens taxation on the use of capital transactions to move 
uneven labor market earnings into even cash flows in constant dollar 
terms. But the very same tax falls more heavily on the use of capital 
transactions to increase one's lifestyle above this level. There is 
nothing arbitrary about this. 
This analytic theme of the new understanding of tax opens the way 
for a rethinking of the normative grounding of tax. A consistent, 
progressive postpaid consumption tax is appealing, in part precisely 
because it corresponds with widely held and independently reasonable 
ordinary moral intuitions in regard to the taxation of capital and its 
18. For a good example, see Warren, supra note 13, at 934-41 (responding to Andrews, 
Personal Income Tax, supra note 8). Warren saw clearly that "[t)he only relevant difference 
between a consumption-type personal income tax and a wage tax is thus the disparity that 
arises when tax rates are not constant." But he went on to argue, on account of Andrews's 
"most sophisticated" argument for consumption taxation, that this fact argued against 
progressive rates. 
19. See Edward J. McCaffery, Three Views of Tax, 18 CAN. J.L. & JURISPRUDENCE 153 
(2005) (hereinafter McCaffery, Three Views]. 
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yield. To be clear, this is not the only, or even necessarily the best 
argument for a consistent, progressive postpaid consumption tax: 
Writing on a blank slate, one might simply cut to the chase and argue 
that this tax is the fairest, most efficient, and simplest to administer of 
any comprehensive tax plan.20 But history and a considerable amount 
of tax-policy scholarship, at least since Mill, have conflated the case 
for consumption taxes of any sort with the case against taxing some or 
all of the yield to capital. Given that this is where matters stand, it 
becomes important to see that, among all the major alternatives, a 
progressive postpaid consumption tax best gets at the yield to capital 
in just the way that ordinary moral intuitions seem to want to get at 
such yield. The most decisive evidence for this claim comes from an 
examination of a near century of experience with tax. Looking at tax 
policy through the lens of the new understanding of tax, with its three, 
not two, types of tax, we can see that the actual income tax is not an 
income tax at all because it is inconsistent in its taxation of the yield to 
savings. But this inconsistency is not without principle. We can see the 
income tax attempting to differentiate between "ordinary" savings 
that effectuate smoothing and all else. Coining two further normative 
terms, the new understanding refers to the idea that those savings that 
are used to even out cash-flows, such as retirement savings, should not 
be double taxed as the "ordinary-savings" norm, and refers to the idea 
that the yield to capital is an increment of value that ought to bear 
some tax as the "yield-to-capital" norm. The uneasy coexistence of 
these two norms under the income tax has led to incoherence, 
inefficiency, and unfairness. But the two norms, by design, come into 
perfect harmony under a consistent, progressive postpaid consumption 
tax. 
The best argument for a postpaid consumption tax is not, 
therefore, about the "horizontal equity" of savers and spenders, or 
about the principled nontaxation of the yield to capital. It is not an 
argument about the aggregate capital stock, or even about the 
importance of savings on individual or national levels: depending on 
the choice of tax rates, we can have more, less, or the same amount of 
savings under a consumption as under an income tax. Rather, the best 
argument for a consistent, progressive postpaid consumption tax is 
that the moment of actual consumption represents the best - namely, 
the fairest and most efficient - time to make the decisions about the 
appropriate level of taxation, in large part because this allows us to get 
to some but not all of the yield to capital: only that yield which 
enhances lifestyles, and no other. 
20. This is what I have attempted to do in Fair Not Flat. See MCCAFFERY, FAIR NOT 
FLAT, supra note 2. 
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In all this, I more or less posit that progressivity - getting the 
better able-to-pay to pay more, to some degree, than the less able - is 
an attractive end for tax. I shall say a few words about this end later. 
But for the most part, I presume that we want a progressive, 
redistributive tax system.21 Partly, this is a matter of ordinary moral 
intuitions and our collective history, as I read them, as well as 
independent political and moral theory. But it is also analytic. Under a 
flat-rate tax, prepaid and postpaid consumption taxes are indeed 
largely equivalent, and neither reaches the yield to capital.22 If we do 
not want progressive tax rates, many far simpler alternatives to the 
status quo are available; if we do not want to reach the yield to capital, 
ever, then we can choose a prepaid or a flat-rate postpaid 
consumption tax. I proceed on the assumption that "we" - at least a 
good many contemporary citizens and readers - do want 
progressivity and some taxation of the yield to capital, and in fact that 
these ends are prior to any preference over more particular forms of 
taxation. I write to show that a progressive postpaid consumption tax 
is the best - indeed, the only practicable - way to obtain these goals. 
The new understanding of tax paves the way for extensive tax 
reform and opens up an important line of critique on current political 
proposals. The real and pressingly practical question for tax is not 
whether to have an income or a consumption tax, but what form of 
consumption tax to have. The stakes in this battle are clear and 
dramatic: the fate of progressivity in tax lies in the balance. 
Contemporary conservative leaders have signaled a desire to move tax 
towards a prepaid consumption tax. Such a tax, falling exclusively on 
wages, jeopardizes America's historic commitment to at least 
moderate progression in the distribution of tax burdens. The path 
towards maintaining that commitment lies in taxing at the opposite 
21. There are, of course, compelling moral and political theoretic arguments for 
progressivity. See HARVEY ROSEN, PUBLIC FINANCE (6th ed. 2002); Andrews, Reply to 
Professor Warren, supra note 16; Bankman & Griffith, Social Welfare, supra note 12; Fried, 
supra note 7; STEUERLE, supra note 9. I also largely accept the argument of Louis Kaplow 
and Steven Shavell, tracking the two welfare theorems, that the general legal system should 
be evaluated vis-a-vis the goal of welfare maximization or allocative efficiency, leaving the 
tax system to redistribute wealth. See LOUIS KAPLOW & STEVEN SHA YELL, FAIRNESS 
VERSUS WELFARE (2002). But this sensible bifurcation of normative labors puts more 
pressure on getting progressivity in tax down right. See Edward J. McCaffery & Jonathan 
Baron, The Political Psychology of Redistribution, UCLA L. REV. (forthcoming Aug. 2005); 
see also, Jonathan Baron & Edward J. McCaffery, Masking Redistribution (or Its Absence), 
in BEHAVIORAL PUBLIC FINANCE (Edward J. Mccaffery & Joel Slemrod, eds., forthcoming 
2005). In fact, most Americans support the notion of progressivity and oppose a flat tax. 
See Will Lester, Poll: Americans Say Taxes Too Complicated, Associated Press, Apr. 12, 
2005, available at http://staging.hosted.ap.org/dynamic/stories/T/T AXES_AP _IPSOS_ 
POLL?SITE=AP&SECTION=HOME&TEMPLATE=DEFAULT&CTIME=2005-04-ll-
14-49-05 (noting that 57 percent of respondents to AP poll oppose a flat tax regime, while 
only 40 percent support it). 
22. See infra Part 11.C. 
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time,. of ultimate outflow, not inflow - which the postpaid 
consumption tax model, alone among major alternatives, does. It is 
time to get the fair timing of tax down right. 
The rest of this Article makes good on these opening claims. 
B. The Road Ahead 
Reconsidering tax policy more or less from the ground up has its 
advantages, for the traditional view has made certain wrong turns 
along its· way. Thus, an intellectual history merges with an analytic 
discussion of tax to generate a critique of the status quo on the way to 
a specific programmatic proposal for normative improvement. Here is 
a brief summary of the path through the argument. 
Part II sets out the traditional understanding of the income and 
both forms of consumption taxes. 
Part III begins to translate the analytic facts of tax into a normative 
theory. It explores some of the intellectual history of tax to lay the 
foundation for a reconceived normative argument structure. 
Part IV introduces a new vocabulary and analysis to support the 
new understanding of tax. Most importantly, it develops more 
formally two norms about the taxation of capital: the yield-to-capital 
norm, which holds that the return to capital is an increment of value 
that ought to be taxed, and the ordinary-savings norm, which holds 
that savings that merely shift labor earnings within a lifetime or 
between taxpayers ought not to be excessively burdened. These two 
norms are in fatal tension under an income tax; in contrast, a 
consistent, progressive postpaid consumption tax accommodates both 
norms by design. 
Part V begins to look at and critique contemporary practice by 
explaining that, in reality, the so-called income tax is effectively a 
prepaid consumption or wage tax. 
Part VI continues the examination of tax practice beyond the 
income tax. The overall skew of the present system towards wage and 
away from capital taxation becomes more dramatic when other taxes 
join the mix. 
Part VII completes the journey by arguing that the right choice is a 
consistent, progressive postpaid consumption tax. It sets out a better 
argument structure for supporting this tax; notes issues of transition, 
implementation, and objections to the tax; and points out how the new 
understanding of tax underscores some persistent errors in the popular 
understanding of tax. The Part, and the Article, concludes by noting 
why it all matters. 
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There are three major choices of broad-based tax systems in ideal 
theory: the income tax, and prepaid and postpaid consumption taxes.23 
The traditional view of tax has contrasted the income tax with both 
forms of consumption tax, which forms it has equated. But the 
traditional view has gone awry in overlooking some of the lessons 
from the analytics of tax. The new understanding turns on the 
uniqueness of each of the three forms of tax. It is worth beginning with 
the basics. 
A. An Example 
A simple numeric example helps to illustrate the more technical 
discussion to follow. 
Suppose that Ant and Grasshopper each earn $200 in wages, the 
tax rate is 50 percent (for simplicity), and the interest rate on savings is 
10 percent. 
Grasshopper, as is his way, spends all of his available money at 
once. Under any tax - income, prepaid or postpaid consumption -
the government takes its 50 percent cut, or $100, and Grasshopper 
consumes the remaining $100. This illustrates an important point: A 
good deal of this discussion has no direct impact on most Americans 
for the simple reason that they do not save.24 Income is consumption 
for those who do not save.25 
Ant, in contrast, does save, as is her way. The choice of tax does 
matter to her. Suppose Ant saves for two years, at the conclusion of 
which she consumes all that she has amassed. How do the three 
different taxes treat her? 
An income tax reduces Ant's $200 to $100 right away, which she 
puts in the bank. Ant earns 10 percent on her savings, or $10, in Year 
1, but the income tax taxes this, too - Mill's double tax - taking 
23. This is before bringing transaction costs into the story, which push the income tax to 
an income-with-realization tax, and generate other types of "hybrid" taxes. Edward J. 
McCaffery, Tax Policy Under a Hybrid Income-Consumption Tax, 70 TEX. L. REV. 1 145 
(1992) [hereinafter McCaffery, Hybrid] . See discussion in Parts V and VI, infra. Part of the 
argument of this Article is that unprincipled "hybrids" can lead to perverse, counter­
productive results; the current hybrid income-consumption tax, for an important example, 
ends up being a prepaid consumption or wage tax. See infra Part V. A consistent progressive 
postpaid consumption tax, in contrast, is mixed in its effects on capital on the individual 
level, as I argue throughout, but is not a "hybrid." 
24. This is not to say that the subject does not matter indirectly, of course; the savings 
and consumption behavior of the wealthy affect the whole society. See Edward J. McCaffery, 
Must We Have the Right to Waste?, in NEW ESSAYS ON THE LEGAL AND PHILOSOPHICAL 
UNDERSTANDING OF PROPERTY 76 (Stephen R. Munzer ed., 2001) [hereinafter Mccaffery, 
The Right to Waste?]. 
25. See infra Part 11.B (explaining the Haig-Simons definition of income). 
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away $5, leaving her with $105 at the end of Year 1 .  In Year 2, this 
$105 again earns 10 percent, or $10.50; again the income tax strikes, 
taking $5.25; this leaves Ant with $110.25 to consume at the end of 
Year 2. If the 10 percent interest rate simply compensated Ant for 
inflation - if the cost of goods were rising at 10 percent per year -
Ant would be losing real value, or actual purchasing power, over time 
under the income tax: $110.25 at the end of two periods of 10 percent 
inflation is worth - that is, has the same real purchasing power as -
$91 at the start of the two periods.26 
Consider next the two forms of consumption tax. First, the prepaid 
model: Ant is taxed right off the bat under this system, reducing her 
$200 to $100. But she is not taxed again: consumption taxes are single 
taxes, escaping Mill's double-tax label. The $100 grows by the full 10 
percent interest rate, to $110, after Year 1 .  In Year 2, the $110 grows 
another 10 percent, or $11,  to $121 , and Ant is left to consume this 
much at the end of Year 2. Unlike the case with the income tax, this 
end of Year 2 consumption is worth the same as $100 at the start of 
Year 1, under a 10 percent inflation rate. 
Under the postpaid consumption tax model, Ant can save her 
entire $200 because she pays no tax up front. This grows by 10 percent, 
or $20, in Year 1, to $220. The $220 grows by another 10 percent, or 
$22, to $242, in Year 2. When Ant goes to consume this, the 
government collects its 50 percent share, leaving Ant with $121 to 
consume. The result is equivalent to that under the prepaid model. 
And what Ant has left is more than what is left over under an income 
tax. There are no smoke and mirrors here. There are only two critical 
assumptions needed to make out the equivalence of prepaid and 
postpaid consumption taxes: that the interest and tax rates have stayed 
constant in the two periods.27 
Table 1 summarizes the example. Grasshopper's consumption at 
the start of Year 1, set out in the first column, is constant at $100. 
Ant's potential consumption at the end of Year 2, set out in the 
middle column, is $110.25 under an income tax and $121 under either 
form of consumption tax. The final column converts these values back 
into constant initial Year 1 dollars, at a 10 percent discount/interest 
rate. This conversion makes clear that, under constant rates, savers 
lose real value under a true income tax, whereas a constant-rate 
consumption tax is "neutral" as between savers and spenders, present 
and deferred consumption. 
26. The real purchasing power at the start of the two periods is equal to 110.25/(l+r)' = 
110.25/1.21= 91.  
27. See infra Part 11 .D for further discussion of these assumptions. 
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TABLE 1: INCOME, PREPAID AND POSTPAID 
CONSUMPTION TAXES COMPARED 
Grasshopper Ant 
Tax Year 1 Year2 Value in 
Consumption Consumption Year 1 $ 
Income $ 1 00 $ 1 1 0.25 $9 1 
Prepaid $ 1 00 $ 1 2 1  $ 1 00 
Consumption 
Postpaid $ 1 00 $ 1 2 1  $ 1 00 
Consumption 
821 
The Ant-Grasshopper example stands at the center of the 
traditional view of tax. The income tax is a double tax on value that is 
not immediately consumed, which has led many conservatives to 
oppose it as an unfair burden on the noble Ant, but liberals to support 
it as a necessary means of capturing some of the return to capital - a 
benefit that inures almost exclusively to the wealthy. Both forms of 
consumption tax get put on the other side of a great divide, as not 
reaching the yield to capital. It becomes a matter of either indifference 
or administrative convenience which of the two forms is chosen.28 
B. The Income Tax 
This and the following sections present the analytics of the income 
and consumption taxes more formally than the numeric example of 
Ant and Grasshopper. The formal analysis helps to reveal some more 
subtle points. 
Traditional income tax theory begins, and sometimes ends, with 
the Haig-Simons definition of income.29 Simons took many more 
words to get the idea across, but his definition is a very simple identity, 
stating in essence that: 
Income= Consumption+ Savings. [1] 
28. Like many elements in the traditional view, Andrews was among the first best 
spokespersons for this idea. See Andrews, Personal Income Tax, supra note 8, at 1 114-19; see 
also BRADFORD ET AL., supra note 8, at 10; SLEMROD & BAKIJA, supra note 7, at 221-22. 
29. The definition is named after Henry C. Simons and Robert Haig who, along with 
several others, derived it independently. Robert Murray Haig, The Concept of Income -
Economic and Legal Aspects, in THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX 1, 7 (Robert Murray Haig ed., 
1921); HENRY C. SIMONS, PERSONAL INCOME TAXATION: THE DEFINITION OF INCOME AS 
A PROBLEM OF FISCAL POLICY 50 (photo reprint 1980) (1938) ("Income may be defined as 
the algebraic sum of the market value of rights exercised in consumption plus the change in 
value of the store of property rights between the beginning and end of the period in 
question."). 
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This is no more and no less than the accounting truth that: 
Sources = Uses, [la] 
or, even more simply, the truism that: 
All Income is either spent (Consumption), or not (Savings). [lb] 
This is not profound. But simple principles often underlie complex 
structures. The Haig-Simons definition of income has been 
enormously influential in analyzing tax. An especially common use of 
the definition of income has been to show, by rearranging terms, that a 
consumption tax does not include savings in its base, while an income 
tax does: 
Consumption = Income - Savings. [2] 
The idea here is simple. Since all you can do with your available 
wealth is spend it or not (Equation [lb]), and since what you do not 
spend you save - by the semantic definition of "saving" - the 
government can come up with any particular taxpayer's consumption 
for any given period simply by subtracting savings from income. If you 
know two components of an identity relationship involving three 
terms, the third can be derived. This leads to the important practical 
point that a postpaid consumption tax need not proceed along an 
administrative line requiring tallying up precise consumption items; 
subtracting savings from income will do the trick perfectly well. 
Hence, a postpaid consumption tax is sometimes called a "consumed 
income tax," blurring the ideal distinctions, while attempting to mute 
opposition to the "consumption" tax label.30 Traditional individual 
retirement accounts (IRAs) and qualified pension plans work this 
way: as subtractions from (or noninclusions in) what would otherwise 
be "income."31 The unsaved portion of income is - by definition -
consumed. 
30. See David A. Hartman, The End of Income Taxes, CHRONICLES, May 2003, at 42; 
Laurence Seidman, A Better Way to Tax, PUB. INT., Winter 1994, at 65; Al Ehrbar, 
Consumption Tax, in THE CONCISE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ECONOMICS, at 
http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/ConsumptionTax.html (last visited Jan. 14, 2005) ("A 
consumption tax - also known as an expenditures tax, consumed-income tax, or cash-flow 
tax - is a tax on what people spend instead of what they earn."). 
31. l.R.C. § 408 (traditional IRAs} (2004}; § 401 (qualified pension plans) (2004). In a 
qualified pension plan that works on the "defined benefit" model, the employer's 
contribution to the employee's plan never enters into the employee's income in the first 
place. This is equivalent, of course, to including the value in income and then allowing a 
deduction for savings. 
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Mill's criticism of the income tax, quoted in the opening epigraph 
and discussed in greater detail below, is that any income tax is a 
"double" tax on savings. To understand this point analytically, 
consider the basic financial equation defining the future value (FV) of 
a present value (PV) invested over time (n) at any given interest rate, 
(r) : 
FV = PV (1 + r)." [3] 
This is a simple relation. Recall the case of Ant. She saved the sum of 
$100 for two periods at an interest rate of 10 percent, or . 10, per 
period. After one period, the $100 grew to (100)(1 + . 10), or $110. In 
the second period, this $110, that is (100)(1 + . 10), again grew by 10 
percent, becoming (100)(1 + . 10)(1 + .10) = (100)(1 + .10)2 = $121. And 
so on. 
Consider what happens when the government imposes a tax. A tax 
takes t away from a taxpayer, leaving her to keep (1 - t).32 Suppose for 
example the tax rate were 30 percent; the government would take this, 
leaving the taxpayer with 70 percent of whatever was being taxed. A 
fundamental principle of economic "neutrality" is that tax should not 
distort the nontax allocation of resources or the relative price system.33 
So we would expect, in a "neutral" tax world, as a first cut, that 
Equation [3] would become: 
(1 - t) FV = (1 - t) PV (1 + rr [4] 
At a 30 percent tax rate, Equation [4] illustrates the fact that a 
taxpayer keeps 70 percent of her initial resources. By multiplying each 
side of Equation [3] by .7, the equality is maintained. 
The problem that Mill identified was that an income tax is not 
neutral, because it falls again on the yield to capital, or r(PV) in 
Equations [3] and [4] .  An income tax looks like the right-hand side of 
the equation below: 
(J - t) FV > (1 - t) PV (1 + (1 - t) r)." [5] 
The income tax is not neutral because two minus ts appear on the 
right hand side of this equation. The left-hand side of this relation, 
32. In these examples, for simplicity, the text uses a single flat-rate tax. But nothing of 
any consequence changes if one imagines instead a vector of taxes, as befits the step function 
approach to tax rates found in today's income tax. See infra Part IV.C. 
33. Don Fullerton & Yolanda Kodrzycki Henderson, The Impact of Fundamental Tax 
Reform on the Allocation of Resources, in THE EFFECTS OF TAXATION ON CAPITAL 
ACCUMULATION 401 (Martin Feldstein ed. 1987); Don Fullerton & Diane Lim Rogers, 
Neglected Effects on the Uses Side: Even a Uniform Tax Would Change Relative Goods 
Prices, 87 AM. ECON. REV. 120 (1997). 
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that imposes a single tax on the FV of Equation [3] ,  is no longer equal 
to the right-hand side as it had been under the "neutral" tax system 
posited in Equation [4]. What is actually left by the income tax - the 
right-hand side of Equation [5] - is less than this amount. The "=" 
sign of Equation [4] must now become a ">" sign. This is what Table 1 
had shown, using the canonical Ant-Grasshopper example: Income 
taxes hurt savers compared to nonsavers. 
C. Two Forms of Consumption Tax 
The same equations just set out also illustrate the broad 
equivalence of the two basic forms of consumption taxation. Consider 
again Equation [4]: 
(1 - t) FV = (1 - t) PV (1 + r)." [4] 
This equation had set out the "neutral," or one tax, condition: in 
order to maintain the equivalence of present and future values for a 
given increment of wealth, a single tax ought to be levied on the flow, 
however long the underlying wealth persists in the taxpayer's hands. 
Now it does not matter, under the commutative principle of 
multiplication (which holds that ab = ba),  where, or, better put, when, 
one levies the consumption tax's single tax. That is: 
(1 - t) FV = ((1 - t) PV} (1 + r)" =  {PV (1 + r)" } (1 - t). [6] 
The middle form of consumption taxation in Equation [6], where 
the minus t is levied up front, is the prepaid or yield-exempt model.34 It 
is, in essence, a wage tax, like social security. The single tax is levied 
when dollars are first earned - the (1 - t) is applied to the PV - and 
never again. One does not pay a "second" social security tax on 
dividends and interest; the yield to capital is exempt. The recently 
added "Roth" IRAs work this way, and contemporary proposals from 
the Bush Administration would move tax policy even more decisively 
in this direction.35 
The second form of consumption tax, where the minus t is levied 
on the back-end, is the postpaid, qualified account, or cash-flow 
model. This is how traditional IRAs and qualified pension plans are 
taxed under the so-called income tax. More simply, it is like a sales 
tax. You do not pay taxes when money is first earned: the (1 - t) lies in 
wait to apply to a bigger nominal sum later on down the road. Under 
34. See BRADFORD ET. AL., supra note 8, at 31-33. 
35. I.RC. § 408A (2004) (Roth IRA); see also John Cassidy, Tax Code, NEW YORKER, 
Sept. 6, 2004, at 70 (discussing contemporary proposals from Bush Administration). 
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the current income tax, you get a deduction (or noninclusion) for 
contributions to an IRA or a pension plan (or for the employer's 
contribution thereto). You pay the single tax when the money is 
withdrawn, in the case of a pension plan, or actually spent, in the case 
of a literal sales tax. 
The dramatic insight is that the two taxes are - or can be - the 
same, as in the simple Ant-Grasshopper example summarized in Table 
1 .  Equation [ 6], relying only on the commutative principle of 
multiplication, shows this fact more formally. 
D. Two Conditions of Equivalence 
Equation [6],  and thus the equivalence of the prepaid and postpaid 
consumption taxes - of wage and sales taxes - holds under just two 
seemingly innocuous conditions, constant tax rates and constant rates 
of return. 
1. Constant Tax Rates 
The tax rate, t, must be the same in the two possible periods of 
taxation - the period of first labor market earning, and the period of 
subsequent (in the case of any savings) consumption. To help make 
this clearer, Equation [7] simply restates Equation [6] ,  showing the 
equivalence of the prepaid and postpaid models under the traditional 
view, with subscripts on the two t terms: 
(1 - t) FV = ((1 - ti) PV} (1 + r)" = {PV (1 + r)" } (1 - t2). [7] 
This form makes more transparent the mathematical fact, which is 
typically assumed, that ti must be equal to t2 in order for the general 
equivalence of prepaid and postpaid consumption taxes to hold. In the 
Ant-Grasshopper example, the same 50 percent tax must apply at the 
start of Year 1 as at the end of Year 2. In the traditional view of tax, 
explored here and in Part III, these analytics morph into a norm that 
the tax rate should be the same.36 In the new understanding of tax, the 
analytics open up the possibilities of and hopes for deliberately 
variable progressive rates. 
36. Warren pointed out that this should be so if Andrews's "most sophisticated" reason 
for preferring consumption taxation were to hold sway. See Warren, supra note 13, at 944-45. 
Andrews, in his 1975 response to Warren, protested this point a bit, but eventually the 
nuance was lost on the literature. See Andrews, Reply to Professor Warren, supra note 16, at 
955. 
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2. Constant Rates of Return 
Just as the t in Equation [6] must be constant, so must the r. This 
second condition, a more technical one than the first, is that there not 
be "windfall" or "inframarginal" returns to capital, disproportionate 
to the net amount of capital invested - that the rates of return do not 
change between the second and third terms in Equations [6] and [7].37 
It may, at first, seem intuitive that a prepaid consumption tax does not 
capture a windfall or lucky return in the capital markets at all, and 
hence a simpler statement of this second condition - that postpaid 
consumption taxes get at windfalls, while prepaid ones do not - is all 
that is needed.38 But under a prepaid consumption tax model, there is 
less wealth in the taxpayer's hands to invest in the first place. If the 
windfall returns shrink proportionate to the reduced private capital 
stock occasioned by the tax, there is no technical difference between 
the two models, hence the added nuance. Macroeconomic or micro­
level individual behavioral changes can alter the equivalence as well.39 
A simple numeric example again helps to illustrate these technical 
points. Suppose that there are some investments that will yield 
staggering (extraordinary) returns - say that they will double one's 
money in a year, a 100 percent rate of return. Under a prepaid 
consumption tax model, recall that Ant will earn $200, pay $100 in 
taxes right away, and have $100 to invest. With the 100 percent rate of 
return available, this can grow to $200 in a single year. Under the 
postpaid consumption tax model, Ant will have the full $200 to invest 
initially and pay tax later. The question raised by this second condition 
is simply this: Can Ant's $200 grow to $400? If so - this is a case 
where the windfall return possibilities expand with the private capital 
37. See Michael J. Graetz, Expenditure Tax Design, in WHAT SHOULD BE TAXED: 
INCOME OR EXPENDITURE? 161, 172-75, 238 (Joseph A. Pechman ed., 1980); Mccaffery, 
Hybrid, supra note 23, at 1151 n.24; Jeff Strnad, Periodicity and Accretion Taxation: Norms 
and Implementation, 99 YALE L.J. 1817 (1990) [hereinafter Strnad, Periodicity and Accretion 
Taxation]; Jeff Strnad, Taxation of Income from Capital: A Theoretical Reappraisal, 37 STAN. 
L. REV. 1023, 1056-61, 1087-88 (1985). 
38. Cf STEUERLE, supra note 9, at 241 n.4. 
39. See Bankman & Griffith, Debate, supra note 12, at 385-86; Louis Kaplow, Taxation 
and Risk Taking, supra note 11; David Weisbach, The (Non)Taxation of Risk, 58 TAX L. 
REV. (forthcoming 2004); David M. Schizer, Scaling Up and the Taxation of Risky 
Investments: Derivatives and the Search for Practical Applications (Northwestern School of 
Law, Law & Economics Colloquium Series, Oct. 15, 2003), at http://www.law. 
northwestern.edu/colloquium/law_economics/Schizer.pdf (last visited Jan. 14, 2004); 
Lawrence Zelenak, Taxing (or Not) The Returns to Risk-Bearing (Dec. 17, 2003) (draft on 
file with author); Weisbach & Bankman, supra note 7. This literature points out that, with an 
ideal income tax with full loss offsets, the only difference between an income tax and a 
postpaid consumption tax is that the former includes, whereas the latter does not, the real, 
riskless rate of return. Once again, this analysis holds tax rates constant in its models. The 
current income tax has limited capital loss offsets. I.RC. § 1211 (2004). For further 
discussion see infra Part V.C.1. 
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stock - the postpaid tax will collect its 50 percent on withdrawal, 
leaving her with $200, just as under the prepaid model with the 
supranormal 100 percent return. Or, instead, will Ant's "first" $100 of 
savings double, to $200, and her "second" $100 of savings return the 
"normal" 10 percent, growing to $110, leaving her with $310 total? 
This is the case where the opportunities for windfall returns either go 
to the public sector, or are in any event invariant to the net amount of 
private capital invested: there was just one lucky opportunity to be 
had, for $100, whether Ant had $100 or $200 to invest. If that is the 
case, the postpaid tax will collect $155, leaving her with a like amount. 
If this latter case occurs then the postpaid consumption tax - but not 
the prepaid one - will have captured at least some of the high or 
"windfall" returns from the capital markets; Ant will have more value 
to consume in the prepaid world. 
E. The Treatment of Debt 
How the two forms of the consumption tax and the income tax 
treat savings is widely noted and reflected in traditional tax policy 
doctrine, now set out in basic tax textbooks.40 There is far less 
discussion and hence less understanding of the proper analytic 
treatment of debt. This is unfortunate, as a practical matter, because 
debt is of enormous consequence both in everyday life and in 
understanding the appeal of different tax systems. The failure to get 
the tax treatment of debt down right led to an analytic mistake in the 
design of the Nunn-Domenici USA Tax, a progressive postpaid 
consumption tax that almost became American law.41 The 
misunderstanding is also unfortunate, for the proper analytic 
understanding of debt is simple enough if one merely considers debt as 
a form of negative savings, or dissavings. 
An income tax ignores debt under the Haig-Simons definition of 
income in Equation [1] .  There is no genuine accession to wealth - no 
change in one's net worth - when one borrows. The proceeds of debt 
will be put to one of the two basic and mutually exclusive uses of 
income, or some combination thereof - the money will be spent 
(consumed) or not (saved). In any event, the consumption, savings, or 
combined consumption and savings is precisely offset by the dissavings 
that the debt itself represents, a subtraction of Savings on the right­
hand side of Equation [1]. Borrowing is a "wash," as tax lawyers say. 
40. See, e.g. , JOSEPH M. DODGE ET AL., FEDERAL INCOME TAX: DOCTRINE, 
STRUCTURE AND POLICY 67-80 (3d ed. 2004); WILLIAM A. KLEIN ET AL., FEDERAL 
INCOME TAXATION 15 (12th ed. 2000); MCCAFFERY, FAIR NOT FLAT, supra note 2; PAUL 
R. MCDANIEL ET AL., FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 4-20 (5th ed. 2004). 
41. See LAURENCE SEIDMAN, THE USA TAX (1997). See generally USA Tax Act of 
1995, S. 722, 104th Cong. (1995). 
828 Michigan Law Review (Vol. 103:807 
Consistent with the ignoring of the initial incurring of debt, there is no 
general deduction for the repayment of the principal of debt: material 
resources are diminished by the payment, but savings or net wealth is 
increased by the elimination of the liability, resulting in another 
wash.42 
A prepaid consumption or wage tax systematically ignores debt. 
This is because it only falls on labor earnings. Prepaid consumption 
taxes ignore all savings, negative savings included. There is no 
deduction for the repayment of principal or interest. One's credit 
history is irrelevant to the social security or payroll tax authorities. 
A postpaid consumption tax, in contrast, includes debt as a taxable 
inflow. Recall Equation [2]: 
Consumption = Income - Savings. [2] 
A postpaid consumption tax allows a general, unlimited deduction 
for positive savings. Borrowing is negative savings. Subtracting a 
negative means adding it, so debt comes into the postpaid 
consumption tax base in the first instance. Debt that is used to finance 
present period savings, however, will come out as a wash: an inclusion 
qua negative savings, an exclusion qua positive savings. Debt that is 
used to finance consumption, on the other hand, will trigger tax in the 
year of consumption: only the negative savings will appear on the 
right-hand side. In a later period, repayments of principal and interest 
are fully deductible from the consumption tax base. These repayments 
do represent positive savings.43 
42. The deductibility of interest is a separate and more complicated matter. A case can 
be made for deducting all interest under an income tax, because interest payments reflect 
neither present period consumption nor savings, but rather the compensation for consuming 
or saving in some other time period. See Alan J. Auerbach, Should Interest Deductions Be 
Limited?, in UNEASY COMPROMISE 195 (Henry J. Aaron et al. eds., 1988). This was indeed 
generally the law prior to the Tax Reform Act of 1986. l .R.C. § 163 (1982) (amended 1986); 
but cf l .R.C. § 265 (2004) (limitation on interest deduction on debt used to acquire tax­
exempt income). But because the "income" tax is not really an income tax - it looks more 
like a prepaid consumption tax (see infra Part V) - an unlimited interest deduction could 
literally obliterate the tax. Hence, the current law in regard to the deductibility of interest, as 
in many other areas, is rife with uneasy compromises. See l .R.C. §§ 163(a) (general rule), 
163(d) (limitation of deduction of investment-related interest), 163(h) (limitation on 
deduction of personal interest) (2004). 
43. I suspect that much of the misunderstanding of the tax treatment of debt follows 
from a failure to understand that zero is simply a number, merely one point on the spectrum 
of possible wealth. Moving from a negative net wealth to zero, or from a deeply negative 
position to a less deeply negative one, is an accession to wealth. So if a taxpayer is $5,000 in 
debt, and she pays off $1,000 of this, she has "saved" by increasing her net worth from 
negative $5,000 to negative $4,000. This is not analytically different from saving $1,000 to 
increase one's bank account from $4,000 to $5,000. But it seems a fairly durable feature of 
most of our thinking about financial matters that strange things happen to our understanding 
around zero. See Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of 
Decision Under Risk, 47 ECONOMETRICA 263 (1979); Edward J. McCaffery, Cognitive 
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This sounds odd and unfamiliar, but it need not. Consider a 
routine sales tax, the most common form of a postpaid consumption 
tax. Grasshopper pays sales tax when he purchases an item, even if he 
is using borrowed funds to do so, as by putting the purchase on his 
credit card. Later when Grasshopper pays off his credit card balance, 
including any interest that he may have accumulated by then, he does 
not pay another round of sales taxes on the payment. So it would work 
under a broad-based, comprehensive postpaid consumption tax. 
It may seem as if a postpaid consumption tax is to be disfavored on 
this score, but we shall see later that this is not so.44 
III. A PROBLEM OF UNDERSTANDING 
The traditional view of tax opposes income to consumption 
taxation. A better understanding of tax shows that, under progressive 
rates, three distinct forms emerge: income, prepaid consumption, and 
postpaid consumption, each with unique positive and normative 
properties. This Part has two related goals. One, it canvasses some of 
the intellectual history of tax, to better understand where the 
traditional view came from and why certain misunderstandings persist. 
Two, it begins translating the new, better understanding of the analytic 
facts of tax into a normative argument structure; it helps lay the 
foundations for moving from an is to an ought, setting the stage for the 
new understanding of tax. 
A. Means and Ends 
A proper normative argument structure for tax - or any other 
practical political matter - ought to begin with a clear statement of 
the goals to be pursued, setting the ends, at least provisionally, first.45 
We can note at the start that the form of tax, per se, is not plausibly 
such an end: few ordinary persons have strong preferences for income 
versus consumption versus any other particular type of tax, apart from 
the effects of such taxes. It is these effects, of course, that matter. 
On reflection, the principal end of broad-based, comprehensive tax 
systems is to finance the provision of public goods, the central activity 
of the modern democratic state, including, possibly, the distribution or 
Theory and Tax, 41 UCLA L. REV. 1861 (1994) (hereinafter McCaffery, Cognitive Theory 
and Tax).  
44. See infra Part IV.D. 
45. See Louis Kaplow, A Framework for Assessing Gift and Estate Taxation, in 
RETHINKING GIFT AND ESTATE TAXATION 164 (James R. Hines Jr. & Joel Slemrod eds., 
2001). I write "provisionally" because subsequent analysis might reveal that the ends are not 
obtainable, or stand in some tension with one another, and so must be reconsidered. 
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redistribution of income itself, in a fair and efficient manner.46 Fairness 
and efficiency are two broad, compelling ends for tax. For the most 
part, this Article sets aside efficiency concerns;47 the new 
understanding of tax is based on the idea that there are three distinct 
types of comprehensive tax systems, with different claims to fairness 
- most specifically because of how they affect capital as well as labor 
market returns. 
On further reflection, fairness is central to tax and not just, or 
primarily, because of a welfarist argument that efficiency should be 
the principal norm of legal rules, while fairness should be left to the 
tax and transfer system.48 Rather the reason to have a tax system, 
especially an individuated tax system, is to finance the ne·eds of the 
state in a fair and just manner. A printing press - or any of a number 
of far simpler taxing systems than what we have today - could raise 
the finances needed for public goods. In moving to individuated tax 
systems such as the broad-based income tax or any of its usual 
competitors, society must desire individuated justice. 
On still further reflection, this individuated sense of justice must 
stem from a desire for some differentiation or progression in the 
allocation of tax burdens; from some sense that the better able or 
more fortunate should pay more than the less able or less fortunate.49 
"Genuinely progressive taxation is necessarily personal taxation," as 
Vickrey began his classic 1947 Agenda for Progressive Taxation.50 We 
can add that the converse is also compelling: Personal taxation ought 
46. See RICHARD A. MUSGRAVE, THE THEORY OF PUBLIC FINANCE (1959); Lester C. 
Thurow, The Income Distribution as a Pure Public Good, 85 Q.J. ECON. 327 (1971); 
STEUERLE, supra note 9. 
47. But see, e.g., analysis of optimal consumption tax theory in note 347 infra. 
48. This is the argument of Louis Kaplow and Steven Shavell, first pressed in Why the 
Legal System ls Less Efficient Than the Income Tax in Redistributing Income, 23 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 667 (1994), see also KAPLOW & SHA YELL, supra note 21. For partial critiques of the 
Kaplow-Shavell position, see Chris William Sanchirico, Deconstructing the New Efficiency 
Rationale, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 1003 (2001); Kyle Logue & Ronen Avraham, Redistributing 
Optimally: Of Tax Rules - Legal Rules, and Insurance, 56 TAX L. REV. 157 (2003). 
49. Under a flat percent tax, taxpayers with higher incomes pay more in absolute 
dollars, leading to a certain confusion in the understanding of progressivity. See Edward J. 
McCaffery & Jonathan Baron, The Humpty Dumpty Blues: Disaggregation Bias in the 
Evaluation of Tax Systems, 91 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 
230 (2003) [hereinafter McCaffery & Baron, Humpty Dumpty Blues] (discussing the "metric 
effect"). The new understanding of tax aims for a progressive percent tax, that is, 
progressivity in effective tax rates. 
50. WILLIAM VICKREY, AGENDA FOR PROGRESSIVE TAXATION 3 (1947). It is simply 
not compelling, normatively, as a matter of first-best theory, to impose progressive taxes on 
entities, where the ultimate incidence of the tax burden is apt to be uncertain, at best, and 
quite possibly regressive relative to individuals, at worst. See infra Part VI.C. But cf Reuven 
S. Avi-Yonah, Corporations, Society, and the State: A Defense of the Corporate Tax, 90 VA. 
L. REV. 1 193 (2004) (arguing that corporate income tax is important as a check on 
managerial power). 
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to be progressive, or at least somehow individuated, based on ability 
to pay or benefits received or some such principle. In this regard it is 
worth noting that no major policy proposal in the United States at 
least has been for a genuinely flat tax - all so-called flat taxes feature 
"zero brackets," or other accommodations for family size, and so on.51 
Indeed, a persuasive case can be made out under both liberal 
egalitarian political theories, such as those of John Rawls, and 
utilitarian or welfarist conceptions of justice that, at least given fair 
and efficient markets, the tax system is the best or even the only place 
to redistribute material resources (or, perhaps better put, to set the 
fair initial distribution of such resources}.52 
Thus all roads lead to some individuation in tax, which means 
some progression.53 This is a compelling end for tax. But questions 
follow: On what grounds should we determine each individual's fair 
share of the tax burden? In the classic language of tax policy, we look 
to levy taxes on individuals based on the benefits they receive from 
the state, their ability to pay, or both.54 We can, with Adam Smith, 
elide the two principles and finesse the semantics. But in any event, 
the new understanding of tax turns on the insight that this question of 
what to tax is vitally connected to the question of when to tax. Having 
accepted progressivity as an end, we should ask when, in an 
51. MCCAFFERY, FAIR NOT FLAT, supra note 2, at 51-53. Note also that progressivity 
can come from the expenditure side of fiscal policy. See Richard M. Bird & Eric M. Zolt, 
Redistribution via Taxation: The Limited Role of Personal Income Tax in Developing 
Countries, UCLA L. REV. (forthcoming Aug. 2005); Edward J. Mccaffery & Jonathan 
Baron, The Political Psychology of Redistribution, UCLA L. REV. (forthcoming Aug. 2005). 
52. See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 278 (1971); Kaplow & Shaven, supra note 
48; KAPLOW & SHA YELL, supra note 21. For a good statement of the argument that the tax 
system is actually helping to set an appropriate initial normative baseline for ownership or 
command over material resources, see MURPHY & NAGEL, supra note 6. 
53. STEUERLE, supra note 9, at 11, writes that "[A]ny general attack on the progressivity 
principle, in my view, is almost tantamount to an attack on natural law theory." 
54. Adam Smith famously combined the two, reasoning that those who have more 
ability to pay are, on that account, more benefited by the very existence of the state: "The 
subjects of every state ought to contribute towards the support of government, as nearly as 
possible, in proportion to their respective abilities; that is, in proportion to the revenue 
which they respectively enjoy under the protection of the state." ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY 
INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 777 (Edwin Cannan ed., The 
Modern Library 1937) (1776). The first clause points to "ability to pay." The second clause 
conflates this with the benefits-received view, by implying that the revenue enjoyed "under 
the protection of the state" is precisely the measure of one's ability to pay. One has the 
ability to pay, in other words, precisely because one benefits from the very existence and 
structure of society, a point that echoes Amartya Sen's argument that all "individual" wealth 
is in fact a joint product of self and society. See AMARTYA KUMNAR SEN, ON ETHICS & 
ECONOMICS 28 (1987); see also AMARTYA SEN, INEQUALITY REEXAMINED (1992); 
STEUERLE, supra note 9, at 14, 31 n.11 (discussing SMITH, supra, at 777). 
However we come out on the semantics, note that both "ability to pay" and "benefits 
received" are, in traditional tax policy terms, largely vertical equity norms: those with more 
ability, and/or those who benefit more from the state, ought to pay more. MUSGRAVE, supra 
note 46; MURPHY & NAGEL, supra note 6. 
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individual's flow of funds, is it fair and appropriate to levy progressive 
tax rates? In other words, when should we make the social judgments 
necessary to and inherent in a system of individuated progressive 
taxation? 
In short, progressivity in tax burdens is an end, whereas any 
particular tax system for achieving progressivity is a means. Our 
commitment to the income tax is not foundational. It depends on the 
tax as being the best means to the ends we hold. We ought to reverse 
the intellectual process, to ask what tax is the best means to the end of 
fairness and justice. 
B. The Traditional Logic of Tax 
The political and intellectual history of tax have both influenced 
and, in tum, been influenced by, the way we have come to think about 
tax policy. This bidirectionality in reasoning helps to explain how the 
traditional view of tax arose and why it persists.55 This section takes a 
look at the usual way of thinking about tax, in a historical context. 
Who? What? When? How much? are the questions that lie at the 
foundation of all practical tax systems. Each must be answered sooner 
or later, actively or by default, to get a tax system in place. How we 
answer these questions - and, further, in what order we answer them 
- matters a great deal. The new understanding of tax changes the 
order of the questions. 
It is logical enough to begin with the what question: the 
appropriate tax base. Whether we use ability to pay, benefits received, 
or both, we want to know on what basis to levy our social judgment. 
Hence, much of the intellectual history of tax has been consumed with 
asking just this question.56 This has meant, when it comes to broad­
based, comprehensive tax systems, the celebrated income-versus­
consumption debate at the core of the traditional understanding of 
tax. There are important roots of this debate in the writings of Hobbes 
and Smith, both of whom came down on the side of consumption 
taxes, for rather different reasons.57 Then came Mill and his analytic 
55. For a general discussion of bidirectionality in legal reasoning, see Dan Simon, A 
Third View of the Black Box: Cognitive Coherence in Legal Decision Making, 71 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 511  (2004). 
56. See, e.g. , BABEITE B. BARTON ET AL., TAXATION OF INCOME 1992-1993, at 4 
(1992); BORIS I. BITTKER & MARTIN J. MCMAHON, JR., FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF 
INDIVIDUALS 'I[ 2.1 (2d ed. 1 995); MARVIN A. CHIRELSTEIN, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 
(9th ed. 2002); KLEIN ET AL., supra note 40, at 7; JOHN K. MCNULTY & DANIEL J. 
LA THROPE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF INDIVIDUALS 31 (1999). 
57. See THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 386-87 (C. B. MacPherson ed., Pelican Books 
1968) (1651). 
[T)he equality of imposition, consisteth rather in the equality of that which is consumed than 
of the riches of the persons that consume the same. For what reason is there that he which 
laboureth much, and sparing the fruits of his labour, consumeth little, should be more 
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critique of the income tax as a double tax on savings, and the 
seemingly concomitant argument for a proportionate consumption 
tax. This argument has been enormously influential within the domain 
of political theory proper: Rawls has accepted the argument for 
consumption taxation (indeed, proportionate consumption taxation), 
at least in ideal theory, citing to Nicholas Kaldor,58 and the "ultra 
liberal" thinker Roberto Unger has also recently endorsed 
consumption taxation as well.59 
Practical politics, however, have come down decisively on the 
other side of the great divide. Having experimented with income 
taxation in the nineteenth century, America made a firm commitment 
by ratifying the Sixteenth Amendment in 1913 and implementing a 
statute within months, all motivated, at least in large part, by a 
progressive desire to get at the fruits of capital.(j() Policymakers at the 
time rejected a wide range of consumption tax alternatives, in part 
because of the fact that consumption typically forms a higher percent 
of disposable income for the lower- and middle-income classes than it 
does for the upper-income class - in other words, because the rich 
save more.61 This led to a "base argument" for income taxation,62 
charged than he that living idlely, getteth little, and spendeth all he gets, seeing the one hath 
no more protection from the commonwealth than the other? But when the impositions are 
laid upon those things which men consume, every man payeth equally for what he useth, nor 
is the commonwealth defrauded by the luxurious waste of private men. 
Id. Fried, supra note 7, at 962; Warren, supra note 13, at 933-34. SMITH, supra note 54, at 
778. 
Id. 
Every tax ought to be levied at the time, or in the manner, in which it is most likely to be 
convenient for the contributor to pay it. . . . Taxes upon such consumable goods as are 
articles of luxury, are all finally paid by the consumer, and generally in a manner that is very 
convenient for him. He pays them little by little, as he has occasion to buy the goods. As he 
is at liberty too, either to buy, or not to buy, as he pleases, it must be his own fault if he ever 
suffers any considerable inconveniency from such taxes. 
58. RAWLS, supra note 52, at 278, noting the common pool argument. Rawls was quick 
to add that, in practice, "even steeply progressive income taxes" may be the right answer, 
and here he joined with his fellow practical political liberals. Id. at 279. See also NICHOLAS 
KALDOR, AN EXPENDITURE TAX (1955); Kaldor begins his volume with the quotation from 
HOBBES, in note 57, supra. See also Mill, supra note 1. 
59. See ROBERTO MANGABEIRA UNGER, DEMOCRACY REALIZED: THE PROGRESSIVE 
ALTERNATIVE 51-52 (1998). 
60. See Jensen, supra note 4, at 1093-131. Of course, these arguments against a 
consumption tax are based on the traditional view of tax. 
61. See POLLACK, supra note 4; STANLEY, supra note 4; Bank, supra note 4; Jensen, 
supra note 4; Slemrod, supra note 12. The equivalence of the formulations follows from the 
Haig-Simons "definition," or identity, discussed below, that holds, in short, that Income = 
Consumption + Savings. See infra Part 11.B. The variable Savings is, in other words, 
nonconsumption; if a person consumes more, she saves less, if a person saves more, she 
consumes less, all as a percent of income, or available resources. See MCCAFFERY, FAIR 
NOT FLAT, supra note 2, at 14-15. 
62. See McCaffery, Three Views, supra note 19. 
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which predominated early on in the public political thinking about tax, 
and lingers to this day. The income base seems to be a means to the 
ends of tax justice. 
The how much question has been a distant second - in terms of 
quantities of ink expended - to the what question, although much 
important recent work has been done on point. The reasons for the 
historical neglect are not hard to come by: significantly high tax rates 
are a distinctly modem creature, not present until the twentieth 
century and not widespread until the latter half of that century. Smith 
and Mill discussed taxes in the range of 5 to 10 percent.63 The initial 
"progressive" income tax of 1913 had featured a top marginal rate, 
including a surcharge, of 7 percent, and it had applied to far less than 5 
percent of all adult Americans.64 It was thus the very existence of an 
income tax - supplemented by a corporate income tax and, later, in 
1916, by an estate tax - with its deliberate inclusion of dividends and 
interest, that furthered the progressive cause, providing the means to 
the end. 
Things changed. 
World War I radically altered the rate schedule, ratcheting it up, 
and World War II transformed the breadth of the tax's application, 
expanding it enormously once the practical expedient of wage 
withholding was discovered.65 The top marginal rate bracket under the 
income tax rose to above 90 percent during World War II, and stayed 
at 90 percent throughout the 1950s, until John F. Kennedy cut it - to 
70 percent - in 1963. These high tax rates now added to the base as 
means to the ends of j ustice in tax. But, meantime, the dramatic 
expansions in scale and scope triggered the perceived need for some 
previously scarce thought, reflection, and justification: Why did we 
have such steep progressivity in tax rates? 
Walter Blum and Harry Kalven, writing in full view of extremely 
high nominal rates, set the tone for postwar scholarship by sounding a 
skeptical note, sketching out the "uneasy case" for progressivity.66 
Later, the case was made to seem far less uneasy by the economic 
analysis of optimum income taxation most famously made out by the 
Nobel Laureate James Mirrlees, and subsequently brought into a wide 
tax scholarly readership by Joseph Bankman and Thomas Griffith -
the latter pair writing after Ronald Reagan, America's second great 
63. SMIIB, supra note 54, at 777, 782; Mill, supra note 1, at 171-73. 
64. W. ELLIOT BROWNLEE, FEDERAL TAXATION IN AMERICA 44-46 (1996); JOHN F. 
WITTE, THE POLmCS AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX 78 (1985). 
65. BROWNLEE, supra note 64; POLLACK, supra note 4; Carolyn C. Jones, Class Tax to 
Mass Tax: The Role of Propaganda in the Expansion of the Income Tax During World War 
II, 37 BUFF. L. REV. 685, 686, 697 (1988/89). 
66. Walter J. Blum & Harry Kalven, Jr., The Uneasy Case for Progressive Taxation, 19 
U. CHI. L. REV. 417 (1952). 
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income-tax-cutting President, had slashed the top marginal rate all the 
way down to 28 percent.67 Mirrlees, Bankman and Griffith, and the 
wider welfarist or utilitarian turn in law-and-economics theory lent a 
strong hand to the arguments for progressivity in tax. Given any form 
of diminishing marginal utility of wealth, social welfare could improve, 
under specified conditions, by taking proportionately more from those 
who have proportionately more material resources.68 Further, the 
theory of optimal income tax gave prescriptive advice for how to 
effectuate progressivity in tax, without relying excessively - and 
perhaps counterproductively - on steep marginal tax rates.69 Such 
rates are only a means to the end of redistribution.70 The optimal 
income tax movement attempted to reground analysis of the tax rate 
structure in the compelling framework of ends, equity and efficiency. 
What is most important at this stage of the story is that the rate 
questions historically followed the base ones. Because high rates and a 
broadened base arose in the shadows of the actual income tax, which 
itself had followed from a simple conception of the income-versus­
consumption debate, the traditional view of tax infused the 
understanding of the effects of tax rates. Since it was by now assumed 
that a consumption tax base was more inherently regressive than an 
income tax base - the base argument - a "rate argument" seemed to 
follow naturally enough.71 If consumption taxes are regressive, a 
progressive consumption tax must be doubly so. More sophisticated 
scholars fell into a subtler trap. If the reason for a consumption tax 
was to exempt the yield to capital, as the traditional conception of the 
income-versus-consumption debate would have it be, then the rate 
structure of any consumption tax was constrained. And so a rate 
argument joined with the base argument to favor an income tax in the 
service of progressivity or liberal egalitarianism. 
67. See Mirrlees, supra note 12; Bankman & Griffith, Social Welfare, supra note 12; see 
also Marjorie E. Kornhauser, The Rhetoric of the Anti-Progressive Income Tax Movement: A 
Typical Male Reaction, 86 MICH. L. REV. 465 (1987). See also VICKREY, supra note 50. 
Mirrlees and Vickrey won the 1996 Nobel Prize in Economic Sciences in large part for their 
work on tax. See Press Release, The Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences, The Sveriges 
Riksbank (Bank of Sweden) Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel for 
1996 (Oct. 8, 1996) at http:www.se/economics/laureates/1996/press.html (noting their 
contributions to optimal taxation theory). 
68. KAPLOW & SHA YELL, supra note 21; Bankman & Griffith, Social Welfare, supra 
note 12. 
69. See Bankman & Griffith, Social Welfare, supra note 12; Berliant & Rothstein, supra 
note 12; Mirrlees, supra note 12. The important distinction between marginal and average, 
or (equivalently) effective, tax rates shall factor into the new understanding of tax. A flat 
percent tax combined with a lump sum tax effectuates progressivity in average, or effective, 
tax rates. See MCCAFFERY, FAIR NOT FLAT, supra note 2, at 79-85, for a simple illustration. 
70. See Mirrlees, supra note 12. Part of Mirrlees's brilliance was to show convincingly 
how progressivity in effective rates could be obtained without progressivity in marginal ones. 
71. See McCaffery, Three Views, supra note 19. 
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The what and how much questions, asked in that order, have 
dominated discussions of tax policy, inside and outside the academy. 
The relative neglect of the who question has been unfortunate, for 
deep issues of justice lie buried in both the seemingly arcane questions 
of attribution, that is, of the appropriate taxable unit, and of the 
equally arcane questions of incidence, that is, of who really, ultimately, 
bears the burden of various alternative taxes.72 If the central aim of tax 
as an instrument of social justice is to get citizens to share in the 
burdens of their society in proportion to something - their ability to 
pay, their benefits received, or some combination thereof - it matters 
critically who is in fact bearing the burden of any particular tax. 
This then leaves the when question. It is hardly the case that 
matters of time and tax have been understudied.73 But the questions of 
time have been framed by the seemingly prior and foundational what, 
or tax base, question. There have been two large and persistent 
themes. 0 
First, principles of timing have been used to help inform the 
fundamental tax base debate, that is, to illustrate the difference 
between income and consumption taxes. Under the traditional view, 
timing principles have been used to show the equivalence of prepaid 
and postpaid consumption taxes in present value terms, and the 
differences between an income and any consumption tax.74 There are 
only differences over time, after all - savings, which is analytically 
identical to nonconsumption, only exists in what an economist would 
call a "two period model."75 The initial mapping between an income 
tax as a double tax on savings, on the one hand, and both forms of 
consumption tax as involving no effective taxation of the yield to 
savings, on the other, was made out in simple, partial-equilibrium 
models. Since then, more sophisticated financial analysis has suggested 
that some but not all of the yield to capital is taxed under a postpaid, 
but not a prepaid, consumption tax - the "supranormal" or 
72. EDWARD J. MCCAFFERY, TAXING WOMEN (1997) (hereinafter MCCAFFERY, 
TAXING WOMEN]; Grace Blumberg, Sexism in the Code: A Comparative Study of Income 
Taxation of Working Wives and Mothers, 21 BUFF. L. REV. 49 (1972); Edward J. McCaffery, 
Equality, of the Right Sort, 6 UCLA WOMEN'S L.J. 289 (1996). 
73. See, e.g., Daniel I. Halperin, Interest in Disguise: Taxing the "Time Value of Money '', 
95 YALE L.J. 506 (1986); David J. Shakow, Taxation Without Realization: A Proposal for 
Accrual Taxation, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 1111  (1986); David Slawson, Taxing as Ordinary 
Income the Appreciation of Publicly Held Stock, 76 YALE L.J. 623 (1967). See generally 
Cunningham, supra note 7; Mary Louise Fellows, A Comprehensive Attack on Tax Deferral, 
88 MICH L. REV. 722 (1990): Kelman. supra note 8: Klein. supra note 14: Reed Shuldiner, A 
General Approach to the Taxation of Financial Instruments, 71 TEX. L. REV. 243 (1992); 
Strnad, Periodicity and Accretion Taxation, supra note 37. 
74. See supra note 7 and accompanying text. 
75. See Strnad, Taxing Convertible Debt, 56 SMU L. REV. 399, 448 (2003); see also Jeff 
Strnad, Periodicity and Accretion Taxation, supra note 37. 
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"inframarginal" returns, in some specifications, the return to risk, in 
others.76 
Second, principles of timing have been brought into play in the 
context of what is wrong with the "income" tax: how its failure to 
currently tax all of the yield to capital leaves it short of its animating 
ideal, and how to cure this defect.77 Tax policy scholars have analyzed 
how and when to tax capital appreciation - or "ordinary" 
appreciation masquerading as "capital" appreciation - so as to 
effectuate a practicable income tax. Some scholars, for example, have 
considered a form of "taxation on realization," or "retrospective 
capital gains," to make up for the deferral of taxes created by an 
76. Much recent tax policy literature has been breaking down the analytics of the return 
to capital and exploring the related empirical and macroeconomic issues. Scholars have 
analyzed the different components of the yield to capital - compensation for risk or 
inflation, inframarginal returns, the pure riskless rate of return - with the income-versus­
consumption debate in mind, showing how different tax systems, with and without certain 
technical features (such as full loss offsets under an income tax), affect each component. See 
sources cited in note 39, supra. 
This is all interesting and important work. A central message of this descriptive, analytic 
traditional literature is that a postpaid consumption tax, even with constant tax rates, most 
likely captures some or all of the supranormal returns to capital, whereas a prepaid 
consumption tax, by design, captures none of it. The traditional view has often left it at that; 
with Andrews's "most sophisticated" argument haunting the consumption tax, the facts of 
the matter might even suggest a prepaid consumption tax from this analysis. Within the new 
understanding of tax, in contrast, where the commitment to progressivity comes first, the 
possibility that even a constant-rate postpaid consumption tax gets at some of the 
extraordinary returns to capital offers yet another reason to prefer the postpaid model over 
the prepaid, yield-exempt one. The analytics normatively suggest a prepaid model only if (1) 
the reason for adopting a consumption tax is to preserve the pretax equality of present and 
deferred consumers (Mill's insight and Andrews's most sophisticated argument, again), and 
(2) the proper moment for deciding on that equality is ex ante to the distribution of returns 
from the capital market. If these two conditions held, it would be "wrong" - nonneutral -
to burden any of the windfall return with a "second" tax. But both prongs are normatively 
dubious at best. The horizontal equities of Ant and Grasshopper are not the best reasons for 
adopting a consumption tax, and an ex post perspective more befits a social concern with 
individuated justice, given the moral arbitrariness of varying returns to capital, and, within 
the new understanding of tax, the wisdom of waiting until ultimate private preclusive use to 
make judgments about the yield to capital. This latter point, which echoes a strong theme of 
Warren's - namely, that tax policy should take an ex post perspective - is, in essence, the 
yield-to-capital norm. Warren, supra note 13; see also Gentry & Hubbard, Distributional 
Implications, supra note 11; William M. Gentry & R. Glenn Hubbard, Fundamental Tax 
Reform and Corporate Financial Policy, 12 TAX POL'Y & ECON. 191, 196-97 (1998) (citing 
U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, INTEGRATION OF THE INDIVIDUAL AND CORPORATE TAX 
SYSTEMS (1992)); Barbara H. Fried, Ex Ante/Ex Post, 13 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 123 
(2003).  
77. See Fellows, supra note 73;  Halperin, supra note 73;  Shakow, supra note 73;  David 
Shakow & Reed Shuldiner, A Comprehensive Wealth Tax, 53 TAX L. REV. 499 (2000); Jeff 
Strnad, Periodicity and Accretion Taxation, supra note 37. See generally Deborah H. Schenk, 
A Positive Account of the Realization Rule, 57 TAX L. REV. 355 (2004 ); Deborah H. Schenk, 
An Efficiency Approach to Reforming a Realization-Based Tax, 57 TAX L. REV. 503 (2004); 
David M. Hasen, A Realization-based Approach to the Taxation of Financial Instruments, 57 
TAX L. REV. 397 (2004). 
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income-with-realization-requirement tax;78 others have explored 
questions of "original issue discount" and similar mechanisms for 
disguising the ordinary return to savings as capital appreciation.79 All 
thesf! technical questions have been framed by the income-versus­
consumption debate: they arise out of an attempt to ensure that the_ 
"income" tax is, in fact, an income tax. 
These timing matters are important questions, to be sure. The tax­
policy literature has generated valuable insights into matters of tax­
policy design by asking them. But they are not the central questions of 
the fair timing of tax. A different question waits to be asked, one that 
promises new and pressingly practical insights into matters of tax­
policy design. Asking it lies at the core of the new understanding of 
tax. The new timing question sounds in a commonsensical morality, 
and follows from the first commitment of the tax system, to having at 
least moderately progressive rates: 
When, in a taxpayer's flow of funds, is it fair and 
appropriate to levy progressive taxes? 
This is an altogether different question from traditional ones of timing, 
and the answers it leads to - the ways it leads us to think about tax -
are fundamentally different as well. The new understanding of tax 
follows a different logic than the traditional view. It begins with a 
commitment to progressivity and moves out to questions of timing. I 
explore this later. But first let us dwell a bit longer in the intellectual 
history of tax, to better understand where we are, and how we got 
here. 
C. The Modern Income-Versus-Consumption Debate 
The contemporary origins of the income versus consumption tax 
debate, which has raged for centuries, lie in the works of two Harvard 
law professors, William Andrews and Alvin Warren, beginning in the 
1970s. This debate repays a close and careful visit. 
1. The Case for Consumption 
The Haig-Simons definition (I = C + S), and its manipulation to 
show the essential structure of a consumption tax ( C = I - S), was 
central to two important articles by Andrews, each published in the 
78. See, e.g. , Alan J. Auerbach, Retrospective Capital Gains Taxation, 81 AM. ECON. 
REV. 167 (1991); Alan J. Auerbach, Commentary, 48 TAX L. REV. 529 (1993); Fellows, 
supra note 73; Shakow, supra note 73; Shakow & Shuldiner, supra note 77; Strnad, 
Periodicity and Accretion Taxation, supra note 37. 
79. See, e.g. , Halperin, supra note 73. 
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Harvard Law Review in the early 1970s. In the first, published in 1972, 
Andrews used the relationship to suggest that while source neutrality, 
or the idea that the type of inflow should not matter to judgments 
about tax, was a compelling norm, use neutrality was far less obviously 
so.8° Features of the "income" tax, such as deductions for 
extraordinary medical expenses81 or charitable contributions,82 could 
be understood as appropriate normative refinements of the right-hand 
side of the Haig-Simons identity. In other words, not all 
"consumption" ought to count equally, at least in accordance with 
well-settled practices in tax. This is an important insight, and one that 
should be extended to differentiating between the uses of savings as 
well as the uses of consumption:83 that is a principal aim of this Article 
and the new understanding of tax. 
Andrews's second article, published in 1974, profoundly changed 
the course of tax scholarship and policy.84 Again looking to the right­
hand side of the Haig-Simons definition, Andrews generalized an 
important real-world observation: what we call an "income tax" does a 
very poor job of getting at savings or, in Simons' words, "the change in 
value of the store of property rights between the beginning and end of 
the period in question."85 Andrews argued that we ought to 
systematically give up the attempt to tax the yield to capital, 
subtracting savings from income to generate a postpaid consumption 
tax, on the model of Equation [2), above. 
Andrews's article rekindled the income versus consumption 
debate, which had its roots in Hobbes, Smith, and Mill. Andrews drew 
especially on Nicholas Kaldor's important and more recent work on 
consumption or expenditure taxation.86 In the event, Andrews's article 
opened a floodgate for reconsideration of the case for adopting a 
consumption tax. Blueprints for Basic Tax Reform, an influential 
Treasury Department study, largely authored by the public finance 
economist David Bradford (who later collaborated with Andrews), 
sketched out two routes for tax: perfecting the nominal income tax, 
and adopting a progressive postpaid consumption tax, a la Andrews's 
1974 article.87 By the mid-1990s, the latter idea had ripened into a full-
80. See William D. Andrews, Personal Deductions in an Ideal Income Tax, 86 HARV. L. 
REV. 309, 331-37 (1972) [hereinafter, Andrews, Personal Deductions] . 
81 . I.RC. § 213 (2004). 
82. I.R.C. § 170 (2004). 
83. See MCCAFFERY , FAIR NOT FLAT, supra note 2; McCaffery, Hybrid, supra note 23, 
at 1 175-218. 
84. See Andrews, Personal Income Tax, supra note 8. 
85. SIMONS, supra note 29, at 50. 
86. NICHOLAS KALDOR, AN EXPENDITURE TAX (1955). 
87. BRADFORD, ET AL., supra note 8. 
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scale legislative proposal, the Nunn-Domenici USA (for "unlimited 
savings allowance") Tax, which made it to the House floor in 1995.88 
For all its power and influence, however, the reformulated Haig­
Simons definition of "consumption" taxation has led to an analytic 
confusion. It is true that a postpaid consumption tax does not tax the 
act of savings, or the use of available resources to save. But a 
progressive postpaid consumption tax can, and - this Article argues 
- ought to, under the appropriate circumstances, tax the yield to 
capital as the source of present consumption. It is all a matter of the 
fair timing of tax. This was an insight that Andrews himself made, in 
passing, in his 1975 reply to Alvin Warren's critique of his 1974 
article.89 But by then, perhaps, it was too late. As with the Haig­
Simons definition, the analytics had morphed into a norm: an is had 
become an ought.9() 
Andrews, like Mill in the prior century, had grounded the case for 
consumption taxation on the principled basis that the yield to capital 
should not be taxed. He had chosen a postpaid as opposed to a 
prepaid tax model partly on the grounds of administrative concerns: 
Blueprints for Basic Tax Reform, like Andrews, was content to change 
over to a prepaid consumption tax model when it was more 
convenient to do so.91 As Andrews put his "most sophisticated 
argument" for consumption taxation in his 1974 article: 
[T]he lesser burden of a deferred tax is more appropriate because it 
ultimately imposes a more uniform burden on consumption, whenever it 
may occur, than does an accretion-type tax . . . .  Neutrality with respect to 
consumption is important not only because it promotes efficiency in the 
allocation of income, but because it keeps the tax from bearing more 
88. USA Tax Act of 1995, S. 722, 104th Cong. (1995); see SEIDMAN, supra note 41; 
David Wessel, Nunn-Domenici 'USA Tax' Puts Levy on Consumption to Encourage Saving, 
WALL ST. J. ,  Apr. 26, 1995, at A2; see also David Wessel, Another Round: Talk of Tax 
Reform is Gaining Momentum, But Plans Vary Widely, WALL ST. J., Jan. 31, 1995, at Al. 
89. Andrews, Reply to Professor Warren, supra note 16, at 949; see Warren, supra note 
13, for the critique, and Andrews, Personal Income Tax, supra note 8, for the original 1975 
article. 
90. See DAVID HUME, A TREATISE ON HUMAN NATURE 469-70 (L.A. Selby-Bigge ed., 
2d ed. 1978) (1739) (presenting Hume's famous dictum that an ought cannot be derived from 
an is); Liam B. Murphy, Liberty, Equality, Well Being: Rakowski on Wealth Transfer 
Taxation, 51 TAX L. REV. 473, 473-74 & n.4 (1996) (arguing that popular opposition of the 
estate tax does note necessarily mean it should be replaced); Eric Rakowski, Transferring 
Wealth Liberally, 5 1  TAX L. REV. 419, 421-22 (1996) (same, invoking Hume). 
91. BRADFORD, ET AL., supra note 8. Andrews protests considerably that a postpaid or 
cash-flow consumption tax is not equivalent to a prepaid consumption or wage tax, 
especially under variable rates - the insight behind the new understanding of tax. See 
Andrews, Reply to Professor Warren, supra note 16, at 953-55. But the point was not 
systematically developed by Andrews, by Bradford in Blueprints for Basic Tax Reform, or by 
later writers in the tradition. 
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heavily on one person than another on account of differences in need or 
taste for particular goods or services, now or in the future.92 
There is no denying the sophistication of this argument, or of 
Andrews's elegant formulation of it. Ultimately, it is its rightness - its 
claims to being foundational to the argument for consumption 
taxation - that is in question.93 Under the new understanding of tax, 
Andrews's most sophisticated argument becomes, quite simply, the 
wrong reason (the principled nontaxation of the yield to capital) for 
the right tax (the postpaid consumption tax); advancing this argument 
has had a harmful influence on the development of tax policy. 
2. The Income Empire Strikes Back 
There is also no denying Mill's facts of the matter. An income tax 
falls twice on wealth that is saved; a consumption tax falls once, as the 
equations set out above have shown. But there is, of course, much 
room to argue about the normative consequences of this analytic fact: 
Is Mill's second tax a good or a bad thing? 
Alvin Warren answered Andrews's 1974 article arguing for a 
postpaid consumption tax in a tremendously influential fashion. 
Warren's first response was a brief comment, in 1975, later expanded 
in a 1980 article.94 A major part of Warren's effort was to tum Mill on 
his head. Yes, an income tax imposes a second tax on savings, Warren 
conceded, but that was a good thing: the yield to capital was an 
additional increment to wealth that differentiated its recipients from 
those who did not get it. Andrews had made a "horizontal equity" 
argument in defense of the postpaid consumption tax, arguing that the 
"most sophisticated" argument for a consumption tax was to preserve 
the pretax equality of savers and spenders.95 This argument was to get 
Andrews - and the case for consumption taxation generally - in 
significant trouble. Warren rightly pointed out that its logic led to a 
case for flat, or nearly flat, rates.96 For under progressive or variable 
tax rates, as a descriptive, analytic matter, the equivalence of the 
92. Andrews, Personal Income Tax, supra note 8, at 1167-68. 
93. Actually, in its final clause, this quotation suggests the argument advanced by 
Vickrey, and this Article: Tax should not fall more heavily on any person on account of the 
morally arbitrary time path of her earnings pattern. See VICKREY, supra note 50. But under 
a progressive postpaid consumption tax, tax does fall more heavily on taxpayers with higher 
tastes for goods and services; that is the very thing being taxed, and progressively. 
94. Warren, supra note 13; Alvin Warren, Would a Consumption Tax Be Fairer Than an 
Income Tax?, 89 YALE L.J. 1081 (1980). 
95. See supra text accompanying note 92. On horizontal equity, see generally MURPHY 
& NAGEL, supra note 6, at 37-39; MUSGRAVE, supra note 46; STEUERLE, supra note 9, at 10; 
for criticism, see Louis Kaplow, A Note on Horizontal Equity, 1 FLA. TAX REV. 191 (1992); 
Kaplow, supra note 9; Griffith, supra note 9. 
96. Warren, supra note 13, at 944-45. 
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prepaid and postpaid consumption tax models can be destroyed, and 
the yield to capital can bear some tax. 
Warren responded to Andrews by primarily making a vertical 
equity argument to counter Andrews's horizontal equity ("most 
sophisticated") argument. Warren also importantly shifted the analysis 
from the ex ante equality of present and deferred consumers 
(spenders and savers, like Ant and Grasshopper) to ex post 
outcomes.97 The saver has more than the spender in the second time 
period, after all; it is thus fair and appropriate to tax her more. This 
was an argument whose roots could be found in the writings of 
prominent public finance economists.98 More important, it resonated 
with popular sentiment and with the very reason for the income tax in 
the first place. Only wealthy persons have the capital to generate any 
significant yield at all. The vast masses of people living from paycheck 
to paycheck are hard pressed to understand an argument of ex ante 
equality suggesting that this yield should escape tax altogether when it 
comes to their distant, and rich, fellow citizens. Ordinary citizens are 
even less likely to understand or accept arguments that the stream of 
value had already been taxed (as Mill would have it) or that the 
lingering psychic benefits of present consumption - the memory of 
things past - were not being taxed, so they had no real complaint vis­
a-vis the savers even if the yield to capital was tax-exempt.99 In siding 
with popular morality and common sense, Warren was invoking what 
the new understanding of tax calls the yield-to-capital norm. 
Meanwhile, Andrews's argument for horizontal equity haunted the 
consumption tax crowd, although Andrews tried, tentatively, to back 
off from it in his 1975 reply to Warren's critique.100 Warren's argument 
for vertical equity was more powerful than Andrews's horizontal 
equity defense of consumption taxation, suggesting that attitudes 
towards progressivity and the redistributive force of tax drive 
conceptions of "fairness" more than the always tricky semantic or 
rhetorical comparisons of putative equals.101 The new understanding of 
tax involves putting the commitment to progressivity front and center: 
the central end of any broad-based tax is to effect some redistribution 
of material resources. While the case for a postpaid consumption tax 
has an element of horizontal equity within it, as seen by the Ant-
97. See Warren, supra note 13, at 941-44. For a discussion of ex ante versus ex post 
perspectives, see KAPLOW & SHA YELL, supra note 21, at 28-30; Fried, Ex Ante/Ex Post, 
supra note 76. 
98. See IRVING FISHER & HERBERT W. FISHER, CONSTRUCTIVE INCOME TAXATION 
(1942); KALDOR, supra note 86. 
99. See Kelman, supra note 8, at 659; Warren, supra note 13, at 936; Warren, supra note 
94, at 1 100. 
100. See Andrews, Reply to Professor Warren, supra note 16, at 953-56. 
101. See Griffith, supra note 9; Kaplow, supra note 9; Kaplow, supra note 95. 
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Grasshopper example, as we shall see, even that element of horizontal 
equity is better understood as specifying the appropriate basis of 
comparison for the more fundamental vertical equity judgments. 
3. Why It Matters 
In the intellectual back-and-forth over the income-versus­
consumption debate, something important had been lost. Andrews 
had begun his 1974 article with a critique of the current "income" tax 
as not getting at the yield to capital at all: most of the article is 
concerned with a careful, critical analysis of the status quo in tax, with 
the claims for the "fairness" of a postpaid consumption tax more or 
less tacked on at the end. Warren had counterpunched with an attack 
on Andrews's "most sophisticated argument" - an ideal argument for 
a consumption tax based on the principled nontaxation of the yield to 
capital. This left open the intriguing possibility that Andrews was 
right, but for the wrong reason - he was actually right for Warren 's 
reason. In practice, a consumption tax, of the right sort, is the best 
real-world tax precisely because it does, and the actual income tax 
does not, get at the yield to capital. Part V, below, extends Andrews's 
critique of the so-called income tax to illustrate how the tax has 
become a specifically prepaid consumption one. In theory, the ideal 
income tax "double taxes" all savings, whereas a postpaid 
consumption tax burdens some but not all savings, and in just the right 
cases -where capital and its yield are elevating lifestyles (a vertical 
equity norm), and not where capital and its yield are compensating for 
arbitrarily uneven labor market earnings (a horizontal equity norm). 
A consumption tax of the right sort best upholds the principles of 
source neutrality and vertical equity, all while making a better use of 
the ordinary moral intuitions about horizontal equities in 
comprehensive tax system design. 
By resting the case for consumption tax on the preservation of the 
pretax equality of saver and spender -a horizontal equity argument 
- Mill and Andrews were inclining the tax system towards flat rates. 
In order to preserve this pretax equality, a postpaid consumption tax 
must work like a yield-exempt or prepaid one: t1 must equal t2 in 
Equation [7], above. The new understanding of tax turns on what 
happens when t1 does not equal t2, by design. At a crucial minimum, 
the argument structure for tax changes. Prepaid and postpaid 
consumption taxes are no longer automatically equivalent. Only the 
prepaid model features yield exemption by design. Postpaid 
consumption taxes sometimes burden the yield to capital, at other 
times do not. The case for choosing a progressive postpaid 
consumption tax must therefore rest on arguments different from 
Mill's "double tax" point or Andrews's "most sophisticated 
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argument," or, for that matter, arguments about the appropriate levels 
of individual or aggregate social savings. Indeed, they do. 
The result of the intellectual history of tax has been, from a public 
policy point of view, unfortunate. Both canonical forms of 
consumption tax have been linked, viewed as broad equivalents, and 
tethered to both flat tax rates and the principled argument for the 
total nontaxation of the yield to capital. The case for consumption 
taxation has suffered on the altar of our prior commitment to 
progressivity. In the traditional view, the progressive income tax 
stands alone against the barbarian, nonredistributive flat consumption 
taxes at the gates, and doubly so: both because the income tax features 
progressive rates, whereas there is a (wrongheaded) tendency to pair 
flat rates with consumption taxes (the rate argument), and because 
consumption taxes are assumed to exempt all or most of the yield to 
capital on purpose (the base argument). This has put liberals and 
progressives in the intellectually and politically untenable position of 
defending a highly flawed, highly unpopular status quo in tax, against 
any and all structural reform. Yet, ironically, once we accept 
progressivity in the rate structure as the first commitment of a 
comprehensive tax system, the very equivalence of yield-exempt and 
postpaid consumption taxes no longer holds. Our eyes can open: the 
case for consumption taxation need not be about the importance of 
capital in the small or large at all. 
A final and related point: In the grip of both the income-versus­
consumption debate and Andrews's (and many others') horizontal 
equity argument for consumption taxation, the analysis of the yield to 
savings has been source driven. The literature at least implicitly looks 
to the left side of the Haig-Simons equation, Equation [1], and asks 
from whence a particular return to savings came. Was the return to 
capital merely compensation for inflation, the real riskless rate of 
return, compensation for risk, a windfall, or yet something else? These 
are questions and classifications based on the nature of the input. The 
new understanding of tax firmly shifts the analysis - as Andrews 
generally had begun to do, in both his 1972 and 1974 articles - to the 
uses, or right-hand, side of the Haig-Simons identity. A postpaid 
consumption tax consistently finesses questions of where, exactly, the 
funds for private preclusive use or (equivalently) consumption come 
from: it is source neutral in this important sense. What matters - and 
all that matters - is how the returns are used, or what level of lifestyle 
they finance.102 The focus is on outputs. 
102. For example, a taxpayer who engages in high-risk investments might indeed receive 
some high or supramarginal returns, but this same taxpayer is likely to lose on other 
investments so that, on balance, he or she will not "beat the market." See BURTON G. 
MALKIEL, A RANDOM WALK DOWN WALL STREET (rev. ed. 1999) (relaying a popular 
account of the "efficient market hypothesis"). A tax system designed somehow to isolate 
supramarginal returns faces a practical problem. To be fair, it ought to allow loss deductions 
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D. Two Political Takes 
Theory and intellectual history matter. Today's political world 
follows the academy's lead on the understanding of tax. Crudely, most 
tax politics have come down to a battle of liberals versus 
conservatives, with the vast moderate middle holding the all-important 
swing vote. Liberals support a progressive income tax. They are very 
much concerned with the base, or what, and the rate, or how much, 
parts of tax policy design, following the logic of tax set out above. A 
good deal of liberal energy has been exerted arguing for an income 
base, as well as for other taxes on wealth and capital - such as a 
separate wealth transfer or gift and estate tax; a corporate income tax; 
and, sometimes, a direct tax on wealth103 - in order to get at capital or 
its yield. Liberals of various stripes have also advocated progressive 
rates, to further advance the cause of redistribution. 
Conservatives, meanwhile, have taken to arguing for flat 
consumption taxes.104 Flat consumption taxes of various types are, 
indeed, broadly equivalent in their economic effects: all work to 
exempt from taxes all or most of the yield to capital under plausible 
assumptions. The choice between wage taxes, sales taxes, value-added 
taxes, and flat "income" taxes that exempt all capital gains, interest, 
and dividends comes down to, in good faith, matters of administration 
and, in less good faith, whatever the public will buy.105 
as well. But loss deductions under an income-with-realization tax are problematic. See infra 
Part V. especially V.C. Even an ideal income tax, without the realization requirement and 
with some kind of inflation adjustment to isolate out high investment returns, faces a 
temporal problem under progressive rates: What if the supranormal high and low returns 
occur in different taxable periods? These problems are all solvable, of course, in theory (see, 
for example, former law I.RC. §§ 1301-05 (repealed 1986) (on income averaging); William 
Vickrey, Tax Simplification Through Cumulative Averaging, 34 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 
736 (1969); discussion in Part IV.E, infra), but at the price of considerable real-world 
complexity. Meanwhile, a postpaid consumption tax gets this all right, as a matter of design. 
Since the tax only falls on actual expenditures, and since such expenditures, across a lifetime, 
can only be financed by net capital market returns (as well as labor market returns and 
beneficent transfers), the net yield to capital as used to finance consumption will be taxed. 
103. See, e.g. , BRUCE ACKERMAN & ANNE ALSTOTT, THE STAKEHOLDER SOCIETY 
(1999); Mark L. Ascher, Curtailing Inherited Wealth, 89 MICH. L. REV. 69 (1990); Joseph 
Bankman, Commentary: What Can We Say About a Wealth Tax?, 53 TAX L. REV. 477 
(2000); Michael J. Graetz, To Praise the Estate Tax, Not to Bury It, 93 YALE L.J. 259 (1983); 
Rakowski, supra note 15; Daniel N. Shaviro, Commentary: Inequality, Wealth, and 
Endowment, 53 TAX L. REV. 397 (2000). 
104. See, e.g. , ROBERT E. HALL & ALVIN RABUSHKA, THE FLAT TAX (2d ed. 1995); 
Robert E. Hall & Alvin Rabushka, Putting the Flat Tax into Action, in FAIRNESS AND 
EFFICIENCY IN THE FLAT TAX 3 (1996). Grover Norquist, President of Americans for Tax 
Reform, and Stephen Moore, President of the Club for Growth, notably, have spearheaded 
the current conservative efforts. See, e.g. , Stephen Moore, Editorial, How Much Tax Would 
You Like to Pay?, WALL ST. J., Jan. 27, 2005, at A12. 
105. See, e.g. , SLEMROD & BAKIJA, supra note 7, at 14-15; David A Weisbach, Ironing 
Out the Flat Tax, 52 STAN. L. REV. 599, 599 (2000). 
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An important practical fact of the matter is that conservatives -
after scoring important victories in the 1980s, under Ronald Reagan, 
to bring progressive marginal rates down - rather decisively lost the 
battle to go all the way to a flat-rate system, in both politics and the 
academy.106 While several candidates for the Republican presidential 
nomination, most prominently Steve Forbes and Jack Kemp, have 
championed the idea, none have been able to translate its initial 
popularity into any enduring appeal. Indeed, Kemp had to back off 
from the idea when he became a vice-presidential candidate under 
Bob Dole, who, like George W. Bush, was to advocate an across-the­
board rate cut on income taxes that would lessen, but significantly not 
eliminate, progressivity in the tax. Later, when then President George 
W. Bush created a bipartisan panel to study tax reform and present a 
report of policy options to the Secretary of the Treasury, he included 
among several charges that the panel proffer only plans that offered to 
tax in "an appropriately progressive manner."107 Meanwhile, inside the 
academy, critics of "flat" have scored decisive intellectual victories, 
virtually unopposed by reasoned argument on the other side.108 The 
idea of progressivity in tax burdens would appear to be here to stay. 
Still, this popular center may not hold. Incremental reform within 
the so-called income tax, by moving the tax system towards a prepaid 
consumption tax model, has also been flattening tax rates, and tying 
the hands of future generations that might want to restore more 
meaningful rate progression. 109 
How can this be - that progressivity is desired and disappearing at 
one and the same time? The answer to the apparent paradox lies in 
the choice of tax base. Although the base and rate structures are 
logically, analytically distinct matters,110 they are, of course, politically 
106. See Edward J. McCaffery, The Missing Links in Tax Reform, 2 CHAP. L. REV. 233 
(1999); Weisbach, supra note 105; Lawrence Zelenak, The Selling of the Flat Tax: The 
Dubious Link Between Rate and Base, 2 CHAP. L. REV. 197 (1999); Clay Chandler, Taking a 
Democratic Cue, GOP Rivals Declare 'Class War' on Forbes, WASH. POST, Feb. 2, 1996, at 
Al2; John Harwood, Forbes Plans to Drop Out of GOP Presidential Race, WALL ST. J., Mar. 
14, 1996, at A20; Jacob M. Schlesinger, Party Favors: Why Tax Reform Won ·; Top the 
Agenda of the Next President, WALL ST. J., Oct. 26, 2000, at Al;  Lester, supra note 21 .  (poll 
results indicating popular opposition to flat tax). 
107. At least one of the plans had to include an income tax base. Exec. Order No. 13369, 
70 Fed. Reg. 2323 (Jan. 7, 2005). 
108. See, e.g., Barbara H. Fried, The Puzzling Case for Proportionate Taxation, 2 CHAP. 
L. REV. 157 (1999); The State of Federal Income Taxation Symposium: Rates, Progressivity, 
and Budget Processes, 45 B .C. L. REV. 989 (2004). 
109. See Grover Norquist, Step-By-Step Tax Reform, WASH. POST, June 9, 2003, at A21; 
Bruce Bartlett, Bush's High Five, NAT'L REV. ONLINE, Feb. 10, 2003, available at 
http://www.nationalreview.com/nrof.bartlett/bartlett021003.asp ("By Bush's second term, it 
is possible that we will have made enough incremental progress toward a flat rate 
consumption tax that we may finally see fundamental tax reform fully enacted into law. If so, 
it will be a testament to a very clever, yet bold strategy that was initially invisible . . . .  "). 
1 10. Zelenak, supra note 39; MCCAFFERY, FAIR NOT FLAT, supra note 2, at 11. 
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and economically connected. This is so, not simply in the sense that 
Stanley Surrey was fond of pointing out, namely, that any shrinkage to 
the tax base, ceteris paribus, has to lead to an increase in tax rates.111 
On a deeper, more fundamental level - at the stage of initial tax 
system design - the nature of the tax base shapes and constrains the 
practical political possibilities for progression in the rate structure. 
Taxes on wages are especially constrained because high tax rates, 
especially high marginal tax rates, deter the socially important and 
morally unobjectionable activity of working. In the new understanding 
of tax - contrary to the traditional opposition of income and 
consumption taxes - income and prepaid consumption taxes stand on 
one side of a divide, as taxes on inflows, which means, principally, 
taxing labor market earnings.112 Postpaid consumption taxes stand on 
the other side of the divide, as taxes on outflows. It is far easier, and 
better, in both theory and in practice, to predicate progressivity on 
outflows rather than on inflows. High marginal tax rates on spending 
deter only high-end spending, but this pattern of disincentives can be 
good for a liberal society.113 Today, the principal challenge to 
progressivity comes not from the movement away from the income tax 
- which, as we shall see, has been too long in coming to question 
seriously now, even if one wanted to - but rather from the movement 
to the wrong kind of consumption tax base. Conservatives have shifted 
their attention to this critical battlefield, and are diligently working to 
create a prepaid - and, not coincidentally, a relatively flat -
consumption tax. 
Liberals, for their part, have failed to think through the 
ramifications of their victory on the how much front. They continue to 
fight for an income tax and its traditional adjutants, the gift and estate, 
and corporate income taxes. In all this, liberals have been ill-served by 
the traditional understanding of tax. It turns out that there is more 
than one way to skin the capitalist cat. In theory, given progressive 
111. See STANLEY S. SURREY, PATHWAYS TO TAX REFORM (1973); STANLEY S. 
SURREY & PAUL R. MCDANIEL, TAX EXPENDITURES (1985); Stanley S. Surrey, Federal 
Income Tax Reform: The Varied Approaches Necessary to Replace Tax Expenditures with 
Direct Governmental Assistance, 84 HARV. L. REV. 352 (1970); Stanley S. Surrey, Tax 
Incentives as a Device for Implementing Government Policy: A Comparison with Direct 
Government Expenditures, 83 HARV. L. REV. 705 (1970); see also Boris I. Bittker, 
Comprehensive Income Taxation: A Response, 81 HARV. L. REV. 1032 (1968); Boris I. 
Bittker, A "Comprehensive Tax Base" as a Goal of Income Tax Reform, 80 HARV. L. REV. 
925 (1967). 
1 12. A prepaid consumption tax only taxes labor earnings, by design. An ideal income 
tax is designed to tax the yield to capital as well, but, in practice, it reaches capital income to 
a far lesser extent than it does labor market earnings. The failure of the so-called income tax 
to reach much of the yield to capital effectively makes it a wage tax. 
113. See ROBERT H. FRANK, LUXURY FEVER 232-35 (1999); Mccaffery, The Right to 
Waste?, supra note 24; at 87-91 see also infra note 347 (discussing optimum consumption tax 
theory). 
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rates, an income tax, per se, is no longer needed to get at the yield to 
capital. Further, in practice, the actual income tax is not even good at 
doing the very thing that liberals insist on retaining it to do - namely, 
getting at the yield to capital - and it is highly unlikely ever to 
improve in that regard. There are deep, structural reasons for this 
failure, sounding not just, or even primarily, in practical or 
administrative concerns - though these are profound - but far more 
so in normative reasons. To wit, most liberals do not want to perfect 
the income tax, for they do not want to get at the yield to capital in all 
instances: tax-favored savings plans have been as much, if not more, a 
feature of Democratic, rather than Republican, tax policy for many 
decades.114 Advocates of redistributive taxes must wake up and realize 
that their end is in jeopardy on account of their poor choice of means: 
they are fighting, and losing, the wrong war. 
E. Three Neutralities 
The three forms of taxation - income, prepaid and postpaid 
consumption taxes - do not map up as traditional tax theory would 
have them do under progressive tax rates. Each tax is unique. Each tax 
corresponds with a particular instantiation of a "neutrality" norm, and 
it is worth considering these norms. First, however, we need to ask 
why we should care about neutrality at all. 
1 .  Why Even Care About Neutrality? 
Neutrality - of the right sort - is an attractive feature of tax-law 
design. Neutrality is an important element of fairness to political 
philosophers such as Rawls, even though all thoughtful theorists are 
now aware that social institutions inevitably have disparate impacts on 
differing conceptions of the good.115 Rawls reconciled this apparent 
dilemma by insisting, with others, on "justificatory neutrality" - the 
idea that social institutions must be justified by appeal to reasons not 
sounding in the advancement of any particular comprehensive 
114. See Jonathan Weisman, Democrats Put Tax Proposals in Context of Systematic 
Change, WASH. POST, Jan. 12, 2004, at A5; Rob Wells, Bush Tax Panel's Breaux Seeks 
Income-Consumption Hybrid, WALL ST. J. ,  Feb. 17, 2005, at A2 (discussing the support of 
John Breaux, Vice-Chairman of President Bush's Advisory Panel on Tax Reform and 
former Democratic Senator from Louisiana, for a hybrid-based tax). 
115. See John Rawls, The Priority of Right and Ideas of the Good, 17 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 
251, 262 (1988); see also Thomas C. Grey, Holmes and Legal Pragmatism, 41 STAN. L. REV. 
787 (1989); Kelman, supra note 8; Richard Rorty, The Banality of Pragmatism and the Poetry 
of Justice, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 1811 (1990); Richard Rorty, Pragmatism and Law: A Response 
to David Luban, 18 CARDOZO L. REV. 75 (1996). 
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doctrine. 1 16 Neutrality, in such a sense, is a constitutive element of the 
fairness and legitimacy of state action. 
Tax policy typically invokes neutrality in a specifically economic 
sense. Economic efficiency is obtained when tax systems are neutral 
relative to a hypothetical no-tax world.117 This means that taxes do not 
distort the relative prices that emerge from such a no-tax state; it is 
those prices that operate to make for a competitive general 
equilibrium achieving first-best, Pareto-optimal, aggregate social 
welfare.118 As long as any tax equally impacts all pretax prices, there is 
no relative change in prices, and hence no distortion in the allocation 
of resources, which is the exclusive concern of economic efficiency. 
An attempt to obtain neutrality in this sense is suggested by 
Andrews's "most sophisticated" argument for consumption taxation, 
for the preservation of the pretax equality of savers and spenders. A 
consumption tax of any form - under the critical assumptions that the 
tax rate, t, and the rate of return, r, remain constant - preserves the 
pretax equality of future and present values, and hence is "neutral" in 
regard to the decision to save or spend. The income tax double taxes 
savings and thus hurts savers vis-a-vis spenders, both within the 
income tax regime and relative to a hypothetical no-tax world. 
This is true so far as it goes. But there are serious challenges in 
moving from the is generated from these analytic facts to any 
compelling ought. One such challenge derives from the simple 
economic fact that all real-world taxes have distorting effects.1 19 
A voiding a distortion to the saving-spending decision runs the risk of 
skewing the work-leisure tradeoff, for example, as Warren and others 
pointed out in response to Andrews. Any move from an ideal income 
tax to an ideal consumption tax would require raising tax rates to keep 
revenues constant, on account of the principled omission of an 
element of the tax base, the yield to capital, increasing the tax's 
distortions.120 Tax, because of its incentive effects and the limited 
116. See Rawls, supra note 115; see also RONALD DWORKIN, FREEDOM'S LAW 38 
(1996); CHARLES E. LARMORE, PAITERNS OF MORAL COMPLEXITY 40-68 (1987); Bruce A. 
Ackerman, What is Neutral About Neutrality?, 93 ETHICS 372 (1983). 
1 17. See FULLERTON & HENDERSON, supra note 33; FuLLERTON & ROGERS, supra 
note 33. 
1 18. This was proven many years ago by the seminal work of Kenneth Arrow and 
Gerald Debreau. Kenneth Arrow & Gerard Debreu, Existence of a Competitive Equilibrium 
for a Competitive Economy, 22 ECONOMETRICA 205 (1954). 
119. Slemrod, supra note 12, at 157, 159. 
120. This, however, is not to say that a move from the actual income tax to a consistent 
consumption tax would work this way; the current tax is not an ideal income tax or anything 
too close to it. Adopting a consistent postpaid consumption tax would have very important 
base-broadening features, including the inclusion of debt-financed consumption, and the 
elimination of preferential capital gains rates and the "stepped-up" basis for assets 
transferred on death. Tax rates might well decrease in any conversion to a consistent 
postpaid consumption tax. 
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information of government policymakers - not to mention 
administrative concerns121 - is in a deeply "second-best" situation. 
There is simply no a priori way to say that welfare would improve, 
ceteris paribus, by moving from an ideal income tax to a consumption 
tax. 
What to do? The general problem of maximizing social welfare or 
economic efficiency in tax is best solved by the highly intricate, 
sometimes counterintuitive, optimal tax literature, begun by Frank 
Ramsey in 1927 and importantly extended to income taxation by the 
Nobel Laureate James Mirrlees in 1971. 122 This literature - and this 
literature alone - points the way towards a thoroughly welfarist 
conception of tax. Under such a conception, the question of the 
appropriate timing of tax - as of the appropriate tax base, the 
appropriate rate structure, and so on - is a technical one for the 
experts. There is no a priori reason to favor the neutrality of any one 
tax over the neutrality of another, on economic grounds. 
But adding to the difficulties with Mill's and Andrews's particular 
"neutral" argument for a consumption tax, and complicating the 
economics-based first objection, neutrality, as a construct of fairness, 
is a different matter from the narrowly economic welfarist perspective. 
There are two large reasons for this. First, judgments of fairness need 
not take the pretax status quo as normatively appropriate, although 
the standard economics or welfarist account, with its Paretian 
constraint, typically {though not universally or necessarily) does. 123 
Second, and more important, the "optimal" welfare-maximizing tax 
answer may clash with ordinary moral intuitions and reflective 
normative commitments. A quick example helps to illustrate this latter 
point. The core insight of the Ramsey optimal tax literature is the 
"inverse elasticity" rule. The government should tax goods in inverse 
proportion to their price-elasticities. The economic intuition for the 
rule is straightforward: The demand for goods that are inelastically 
desired is less distorted by a tax, and hence pretax prices are less 
affected by that tax.124 In terms of "neutrality," Ramsey taxation aims 
for equal and minimal distortion in the pretax, competitive general­
equilibrium allocation of resources. Applying the Ramsey rule to the 
case of income or labor taxes, as Mirrlees did in 1971, the principle 
becomes that we should tax inelastic suppliers of labor more than 
elastic ones. This is one among several reasons to consider more tax 
121. Slemrod, supra note 12. 
122. F.P. Ramsey, A Contribution to the Theory of Taxation, 37 ECON. J. 47 (1927); 
Mirrlees, supra note 12. See also VICKREY, supra note 50. 
123. This is a central theme of THE MYTH OF OWNERSHIP. MURPHY & NAGEL, supra 
note 6, at 31-37. 
124. MCCAFFERY, TAXING WOMEN, supra note 72, at 170-73. 
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breaks for working married women, who tend to be more elastic 
suppliers of paid-market labor, than their husbands.125 But such is a 
case where the precepts of fairness and efficiency happen to converge 
(making it all the more puzzling that real-world tax policy has gone in 
the opposite direction).126 Convergence will not always be obtained so 
felicitously, however, so that we cannot avoid a more finely tuned 
moral reasoning in tax - we cannot turn the tax system over to a 
computer responding to elasticity data alone.127 The theory of optimal 
income tax suggests, for example, isolating persons with especially 
high work ethics, such as recent immigrants or, perhaps, members of 
certain cultural groups placing a high value on work. Ordinary moral 
intuition - supported by liberal and social-contractarian political 
theory - should revile the thought. 
The analysis shows that "neutrality" is not itself a trump, but 
rather a claim to be investigated empirically, and a call, but not 
necessarily a decisive call, on our reflective normative judgments. 
With these thoughts as background, another large and disturbing 
feature of the landscape emerges: all comprehensive tax systems have 
a claim to "neutrality" of some sort. Any consistently applied tax 
system is neutral in regards to its intended base. A tax on apples, after 
all, would (or should) tax all apples. A tax that fell only on Macintosh 
or Golden Delicious apples would violate this neutrality norm -
unless it could be recast as a normatively appropriate tax on 
Macintosh or Golden Delicious apples alone, and so on. We cannot 
avoid considering the neutrality of each of the three principal taxes 
under consideration. 
2. Three Taxes, Three Neutralities 
The neutrality of an ideal income tax is familiar: It falls on all 
inflows, whatever the source. Broadly speaking, the sources of present 
or future consumption (consumption plus savings) are the returns to 
labor or capital, whether one's own or another's. Thus, gifts are 
certainly "income" in a Haig-Simons sense: they are resources 
available for consumption or savings.128 Add in windfalls, or manna -
found value - and the ideal income tax base is more or less complete. 
125. Id. at 175-82. 
126. Id. at 183-84. 
127. See Slemrod, supra note 12, at 159-62. 
128. The income tax has never included gifts in gross income, though. See I.RC. § 102 
(2004). See also Douglas Kahn & Jeffrey H. Kahn, "Gifts, Gafts, and Gefts" - The Income 
Tax Definition and Treatment of Private and Charitable "Gifts" and a Principled Policy 
Justification for the Exclusion of Gifts from Income, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 441 (2003); 
Carolyn C. Jones, Treatment of Gratuitous Transfers: Unraveling the Case for a Consumption 
Tax, 29 ST. LOUIS L.J. 1155 (1985); Marjorie E. Kornhauser, The Constitutional Meaning of 
Income and the Income Taxation of Gifts, 25 CONN. L. REV. l,  102 (1992). 
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Any resources available for a taxpayer's personal use, whether they 
are presently consumed or saved, are taxed at the moment of inflow. 
Labor and capital market returns, and beneficent transfers, are the 
three primary sources of wealth. An ideal income tax would attach to 
all three. 
This is a general norm of source neutrality. But, it is also - a point 
far less noted in the traditional tax-policy literature - one of use 
neutrality. Since sources equal uses (Equation [la]), taxing all sources 
means taxing all uses. While Mill and Andrews each point out that an 
ideal income tax is not neutral relative to savers and spenders, that 
observation arises only in a dynamic, or two-period, model. An 
income tax is use neutral in a static, or one-period model: It simply 
does not matter, in the Haig-Simons definition, what one does with 
her available resources, any more than it matters from whence these 
resources came - you need not tell the government what you do with 
your income under an ideal income tax.129 But as Andrews pointed out 
in his 1 972 article, it is far from clear that we ought to have use 
neutrality in taxation: medical expenditures and charitable 
contributions may not strike us, for example, in reflective equilibrium, 
as the kind of uses we ought to be taxing.130 So, too, not all uses of 
capital transactions are created equal. While the income tax is use 
neutral in a one-period setting, it is not neutral in a multiperiod one: 
Savers are "double taxed," whereas present spenders need not pay 
taxes again on any lingering psychic yield from their pleasures past.131 
Prepaid consumption or wage taxes apply to all of one's own labor 
earnings, period. The yield to savings is never taxed, in the spirit of 
Mill's anti-double-tax argument. Nor are other people's capital, 
windfalls, or manna, taxed: All value must trace back to someone's 
labor earnings, at some point in time, when (and only when) it was 
taxed. A prepaid consumption tax puts pressure on sorting out the 
labor-capital (as well as the labor-beneficent) distinction, which can 
get tricky in hard cases. But it, too, is neutral, in theory, relative to its 
intended base: All and only labor earnings get taxed. 
A prepaid consumption tax is not, therefore, source neutral; it 
ignores all sources other than own labor market earnings. But a 
prepaid consumption tax is even more use neutral than an income tax 
129. Of course, you would need to tell the government how much of your gross receipts 
was spent on generating income, so that you would be taxed on your net income (the 
movement from I.RC. § 61 (gross income) to § 62 (adjusted gross income) (2004), in sum), 
and therein many difficult issues of mixed business-personal expenses, timing, and so on 
would remain. But once we had gotten to this net figure, the resources available to you to 
save or consume, the government would be indifferent to your particular mixture of savings 
and consumption activities under a pure income tax. 
130. Andrews, Personal Deductions, supra note 80; see also l.R.C. § 213 (2004) 
(extraordinary medical expenses); id. § 170 (charitable contributions). 
131. Kelman, supra note 8. 
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because it is dynamically as well as statically use neutral, thus avoiding 
Mill's and Andrews's criticism of the income tax. It simply and 
consistently never matters what one does with her resources under a 
prepaid consumption tax, whether within a one- or a multi-period 
model. Even under variable and progressive effective or marginal tax 
rates, a prepaid consumption tax is "neutral" as between savers and 
spenders - Andrews's most sophisticated argument again - because 
of its consistent yield exemption. It preserves the pretax equality of 
present and deferred consumers, ex ante to the actual distribution of 
capital market returns for savers. 
Progressive rates do, however, change things dramatically. Under 
progressive rates, neither the prepaid consumption nor the income tax 
is neutral as to the time path of labor market earnings, at least absent 
some averaging provision.132 Taxpayers who earn their wages - or, 
under the income tax, receive any inflow - in relatively small, 
concentrated bunches will be hurt by progressive tax rates, vis-a-vis 
lower but steadier earners.133 Artists, athletes, doctors, lawyers, and 
others with skills of limited temporal duration or high human capital 
requirements, and people who are dependent on whimsical consumer 
demand or other markets, will suffer on account of the interrelation 
between their patterns of labor market realizations and progressive 
marginal rates. 134 Most generally, any gap between inflows and 
outflows in constant real terms will increase one's average annual 
effective tax rate. This becomes a central theme in the new 
understanding of tax. 
Finally, postpaid consumption taxes are neutral, too, and in a 
morally significant regard: They are neutral relative to the source of 
funds for financing present consumption. Since all that matters is the 
use - the fact of spending, or of "private preclusive use" as Andrews 
called it - postpaid consumption taxes are not use neutral, statically 
or dynamically, under progressive rates. They are not statically use 
neutral because savings are not taxed at all in the period of savings. 
They are not dynamically use neutral once we have relaxed the 
assumption of constant tax rates, by design. Some acts of savings will 
result in higher tax burdens than if they had not been engaged in; 
others will lower the burden of taxation. But in giving up use 
neutrality, postpaid consumption taxes find genuine source neutrality. 
Whether consumption is funded by labor or capital market returns, or 
132 See prior law I.RC. §§ 1301-05 (1982) (repealed 1986); see infra Part IV.E for a 
discussion of averaging. 
133. Klein, supra note 14, at 463. 
134. Id. at 470-79. See also BRADFORD ET AL., supra note 8, at 44; VICKREY, supra note 
50, at 165-68. 
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by beneficent transfers, it is taxed at the same rates as all other 
consumption at the same level.135 
Postpaid consumption taxes, in contrast to the two other 
comprehensive taxes, are indeed neutral as to the time path of labor 
(or capital) market earnings. It does not matter when a taxpayer earns 
or receives her lifetime resources; it matters only when she spends 
them. Thus, the person who earns a high salary over a short period of 
time - like the well-educated but highly worked lawyer - is not 
burdened vis-a-vis the slow but steady earner, given equal lifetime 
aggregate earnings and the use of capital market transactions to 
balance out the books. 
In sum, an ideal income tax is both source and use neutral, 
although the use neutrality wanes in a dynamic setting, leading to 
Mill's critique. A prepaid consumption tax is not source neutral, as it 
ignores all but one's own labor earnings - it ignores all capital market 
earnings and beneficent transfers - but it is use neutral, both 
statically and dynamically. A postpaid consumption tax is not use 
neutral, because it differentiates between savings and consumption, 
but it is source neutral because it includes all sources of financing 
present consumption: labor, capital, and beneficence. Adding 
progressive rates into the mix adds an important dimension to the 
neutrality analysis. Progressive income taxes are not neutral as to the 
time path of inflows (earnings) or outflows (consumption); the former 
on account of the interaction between progressive rates and the base, 
the latter because of the double taxation of savings needed to effect 
certain patterns of consumption flows. Progressive prepaid 
consumption taxes are neutral relative to the time path of outflows 
(consumption) but not inflows (earnings). Progressive postpaid 
consumption taxes reverse this dynamic neutrality: they are neutral as 
to the time path of earnings but not of consumption. It does not 
matter under a progressive postpaid tax when or how one earns or 
receives her wealth; what matters - and all that matters - is when 
and how she spends it. 
IV. A NEW UNDERSTANDING OF TAX 
The critical step in attaining a new understanding of tax is putting 
progressivity in the rate structure first, as the foundational 
commitment of the comprehensive individual tax system, the primary 
means to achieve the end of a fair distribution of social resources. 
Things change once we presume progressivity in tax - once we no 
longer assume that the tax rate will be the same at the moments of 
first earning and of subsequent use. No longer are a prepaid and 
135. See Andrews, Reply to Professor Warren, supra note 16, at 949-50. 
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postpaid consumption tax equivalent, even given constant rates of 
return and the relatively simple behavioral assumptions of the 
traditional view. A tax designer now faces three choices of income, 
prepaid, and postpaid consumption taxes, each with fundamentally 
different properties. 
Under this new understanding, at least part of the "best, most 
sophisticated argument" for a consumption tax of the right sort is that 
it is a far better, and far more consistent, tax, on the yield to capital, 
under just the conditions in which it is fair and appropriate to tax such 
yield, than any other broad-based tax, certainly in practice and almost 
as certainly in theory. An ideal income tax double taxes all savings, 
whatever their use. A prepaid consumption tax never taxes savings, 
whatever their use. A consistent, progressive postpaid consumption 
tax - a progressive sales or spending tax, in short - burdens capital 
when savings and investments are used to enhance lifestyles (one's 
own or another's); but it does not burden capital when savings and 
investments are used to smooth out lifestyles (one's own or another's). 
A close, reflective reading of our tax practices reveals that this is what 
the actual tax system has been trying to do, but under the ill-fitting 
guise of maintaining an income tax: The nonideal income tax is at best 
a mishmash in regards to the taxation of capital and its yield.136 Theory 
and practice happily converge under a consistent, progressive postpaid 
consumption tax.137 
This argument structure stands the traditional view on its head: It 
argues for a consumption tax for the very reason that the traditional 
view clings to an income tax - to get at the yield to capital. The 
argument proceeds on both first-best grounds, namely that an ideal 
136. See infra Part V. 
137. This answers the question of whether the critique of the income tax and the 
argument for a progressive postpaid consumption tax throughout this Article is ideal, or 
first-best, as opposed to nonideal, or second-best, a confusion rampant in tax policy. My 
answer is both. The argument is that the problems with the actual income tax flow, in large 
part, from the failure of ordinary moral intuitions to support the income ideal; many of the 
inequities and distortions noted in Andrews, Personal Income Tax, supra note 8, followed 
from an unwillingness to tax all savings. By keeping to the form of an income tax while 
attempting to implement both the ordinary-savings and yield-to-capital norms, we created an 
incoherent nonideal system. A progressive postpaid consumption tax, on the other hand, 
implements the first-best ideals of the ordinary-savings and yield-to-capital norms, and so its 
nonideal, real-world instantiation will not be in conflict with its animating ideal. It is true, as 
some commentators have pointed out, that we may continue to want deviations from the 
taxation of all consumption under a postpaid consumption tax; there will continue to be 
arguments for medical expense and charitable contribution deductions, and so on. But recall 
that these arguments also apply to an income tax, which aims to tax all consumption and all 
savings. See e.g. , BRADFORD ET AL., supra note 8; MCCAFFERY, FAIR NOT FLAT, supra note 
2, at 130-38, 148-50. There is no change, ceteris paribus, in the analysis of consumption terms. 
The progressive postpaid consumption tax simply puts the taxation of capital or savings on a 
more principled footing, implementing the yield to capital and ordinary-savings norms, and 
does so by design. Both the first-best and second-best arguments for such a resolution are 
compelling. 
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consumption tax is preferable to an ideal income tax, as a matter of 
fairness - specifically in terms of its fairness at getting at the yield to 
capital - and on pragmatic or second-best grounds, namely that the 
best obtainable real-world tax system is a consumption not an income­
based one, again specifically insofar as the taxation of the yield to 
capital is concerned. 
This Part sets out the analytics of the new understanding of tax, 
anticipating, at the same time, the normative argument for a consistent 
progressive postpaid consumption tax. 
A. Two Norms 
Critical reflection reveals two seemingly conflicting norms about 
the taxation of savings. In some cases, we desire to get at the yield to 
capital, contra Mill, because we view such yield as the domain of the 
socially fortunate. Those with more capital have more ability to pay, 
and more benefits received from the state, than those without capital. 
In other cases, pace Mill, we do not want to doubly tax savings, 
because savings is a normal, even laudable, activity in the course of an 
ordinary life, and it seems unfair to penalize savers but not consumers, 
Ants but not Grasshoppers. These two norms, introduced above as the 
yield to capital and ordinary-savings norms, respectively, are in 
tension - fatal tension - under an income tax, which is committed to 
double taxing all savings. Neither is met under a prepaid consumption 
tax, which ignores all savings. But the two norms come into perfect 
harmony under a progressive postpaid consumption tax, which can be 
understood precisely as implementing them simultaneously. This is not 
the only, or even necessarily the best, reason to favor such a tax, but it 
furthers the main point at hand: a commitment to progressivity in tax 
changes the traditional analysis of tax policy, especially in regard to 
the taxation of capital, and most advocates of an income tax should 
instead prefer a suitably designed consumption tax for the very 
reasons leading them presently to think otherwise. 
1. A Note on Reflective Equilibrium 
This is an argument, and an argument structure, that appeals to 
our enlightened common sense, one that can result in a reflective 
equilibrium, in Rawls's helpful epistemic term.138 Such an equilibrium 
occurs when we have gone back and forth between relatively abstract 
political and moral theorizing, 
·
on the one hand, and paying close 
attention to our actual practices and ordinary moral intuitions, on the 
138. RAWLS, supra note 52, at 19-21, 48-51.  Actually, Rawls credits Nelson Goodman 
with the development of the term and concept. Id. at 20 n.7 (citing NELSON GOODMAN, 
FACT, FICTION AND FORECAST 65-68 (1955)). 
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other; theory is checked by practice, and vice versa. This style of 
thinking looks to our actual practices for source material to interpret 
the way to a better - fairer - set of rules.139 It is a mode of analysis 
familiar to lawyers and law students reasoning in the domains of 
common and constitutional law - where practitioners of the method 
read cases to try to discern principles within them that they then 
endeavor to render consistent from a theoretical point of view - but 
curiously absent from our thinking about tax.140 Yet precisely the same 
style of analysis can open up promising avenues for reform obscured 
by more conventional approaches. Consider the following abstract and 
admittedly stylized account of where we are in tax, and how we got 
here. 
Theory, at first, suggested some form of redistributive taxation to 
help effect social justice while financing important public goods -
including possibly the redistribution of income itself. This is a 
plausible, compelling end for tax. But a commitment to progressive or 
redistributive taxation is not nearly specific enough. Society still must 
answer each of the inevitable questions of tax: what, when, whom, 
how, and how much. Theory suggested an income tax as the best 
vehicle for redistribution, precisely because such a tax reaches the 
yield to capital, which is nearly the exclusive domain of the socially 
fortunate. Theory had read Mill;141 the base argument was born. At an 
early historical moment where theory dominated - there was after all 
a paucity of practice at the time - the United States adopted an 
income tax. It was a limited tax, with modest and modestly progressive 
rates on the economically privileged few. 
Practice grew up in the shadows of this prior theory. But over time, 
these practices - nearly one hundred years of them by now - began 
to show an unease with the very idea of an income tax, especially as 
both tax rates and the breadth of the tax's application increased far 
beyond their initial bounds. As the tax grew from its humble roots, 
compromises and deviations piled on each other, generating over time 
a badly flawed tax, with multiple holes in its commitment to taxing the 
yield to capital. Unreflectively, as is its way, practice tried to patch up 
these holes, as by adding on corporate income and wealth transfer 
taxes to the income tax as "backstops" to its inherent desire to tax the 
139. See generally RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE (1986); Gregory C. Keating, 
Rawlsian Fairness and Regime Choice in the Law of Accidents, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 1857 
(2004); Edward J. McCaffery, Tax's Empire, 85 GEO. L.J. 71 (1996) [hereinafter, McCaffery, 
Tax's Empire]. 
140. I am here following a methodology I have laid out elsewhere, one that consciously 
draws on a model of normative constitutional and common law argument. See McCaffery, 
Tax's Empire, supra note 139. 
141. See MILL, supra note 1 .  For an overview of the history of the desire for 
progressivity in tax, see Jensen, supra note 4; Bank, supra note 4. 
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yield to capital. The system attempted to close some of the widening 
loopholes to clamp down on certain attempts to avoid its theoretical 
commitment to taxing the yield to capital, such as through complex 
rules regarding "original issue discount" and so on,142 while at the 
same time widening the holes in other cases, as through provisions for 
tax-favored savings accounts.143 
Confronted with practical incoherence and conflict, we return to 
theory. Theory sees that something has gone badly awry in the 
progressive income tax - that is why we are where we are, reflecting 
over what to do next. Some take this as an occasion to argue against 
progressivity itself. Theory will soon see that this is a mistake. For one 
thing, rather little of the practical morass of tax is directly traceable to 
the decision to have progressive tax rates.144 More important, our 
normative commitment to at least moderate progressivity in tax 
burdens remains as solid as ever: indeed, a large part of the 
disillusionment with tax relates to the sense that the rich are, in fact, 
not paying their fair share, and that the burdens of tax fall all too 
heavily on the middle, laboring classes.145 Progressivity is an end, ill­
served by the means of the present tax system; we have not changed 
our ends. Further, this sense of unease with the status quo, however 
inchoate it is, is right in its factual predicates, and directly related to 
deep structural features of the so-called income tax - this is a lesson 
that theory can learn from a detailed consideration of our practical tax 
system, as considered further below.146 Clinging to a commitment to 
progressivity is not a scholarly fiat: political attempts to cash in on 
disdain for the progressive income tax with a flat tax of some sort have 
not, in fact, resonated with the people.147 
If progressivity is to remain, theory next considers whether 
something is wrong with the "income" part of the progressive income 
tax. Here, indeed, things have gone amuck, and the practical mess 
relates almost entirely to the erratic treatment of savings or 
accumulation, a point that Andrews had seen and made forcefully 
142. See, e.g. , I.R.C. §§ 1271-1275 (2004) (o.i.d. rules); see also Halperin, supra note 73. 
143. See, e.g. , I.R.C. §§ 401 (qualified pension plans), 408 (traditional IRAs), 408A 
(Roth IRAs) (2004); see infra Part V.B for an analysis of the current system's ad hoc 
deviations. 
144. Bankman and Griffith make this point well. See Bankman & Griffith, Debate, supra 
note 12; Bankman & Griffith, Social Welfare, supra note 12. 
145. In a 2003 CNN/Gallup/USA Today poll, 63 percent of respondents thought the rich 
pay too little in taxes, while only 7 and 12 percent, respectively, thought middle- and lower­
income taxpayers pay too little. KARLYN H. BOWMAN, AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE, 
PUBLIC OPINION ON TAXES 18 (2004), http://www.aei.org/publication16838 (last visited Jan. 
14, 2004); see also GRAETZ, supra note 6, at 10-13; SLEMROD & BAKIJA, supra note 7, at 5;  
Graetz, supra note 6, at 282-83. 
146. See infra Part V. 
147. See supra notes 106-110 and accompanying text. 
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nearly three decades ago - theory reads law review articles.148 We are 
not, in fact, taxing all savings equally. Worse, the practical 
compromises we have made are theoretically incoherent, leading to 
the sorry state of affairs in which we fail to tax consumption financed 
out of the yield to capital, and cannot even predictably induce more 
savings, on an individual or an aggregate social level, when we try.149 
And so theory asks an obvious question: Should we be taxing the 
yield to capital? This is the question at the core of the income-versus­
consumption debate, which has been needlessly, and unfortunately, 
all-or-nothing. Theory sees that a prepaid consumption tax, namely, a 
wage tax, can never get at the yield to capital, within or between 
generations. This bothers theory; it seems to violate a core reason to 
want progressive individuated taxes in the first place. But theory also 
sees Mill's point, and the practical resistance against a willy-nilly 
double taxation of all savings. Theory sees much principle in the 
income tax's consumption tax provisions, such as for retirement 
savings, and so becomes disenchanted with the extremes in the debate. 
Should we be taxing all yield to capital in the same manner? Is it the 
case that all savings are created equal? Are we equally normatively 
committed to double taxing - or altogether exempting - all forms of 
savings, as the stark income-versus-consumption tax debate would 
have it? If not, is a principled middle ground practically obtainable? 
2. The Norms of Capital 
Asking just these questions brings theory to a critical epiphany. It 
leads abstract theory to understand what practice has been trying 
inchoately and imperfectly to express for scores of years by now. We 
do, in fact, want to burden some but not all savings. Further, on 
reflection, we see that our best normative judgments and ordinary 
moral intuitions flow naturally to the uses and not to the sources of 
such savings.150 It is not, that is, that our reflective judgments counsel 
for taxing those savings that come from stocks versus bonds versus 
real estate and so on differently. Here, I put aside the far lesser in 
148. See Andrews, Personal Income Tax, supra note 8, at 1 128-29. 
149. The reason is that it is possible to save on the one hand and borrow on the other, 
resulting in a deduction with no net savings, or to move existing savings into tax-favored 
accounts, thereby obtaining a similar bottom-line result. See Edmund L. Andrews, Savings: 
Lots of Talk, but Few Dollars, N.Y. nMES, Mar. 13, 2005, at § 3, p.6; Elizabeth Bell, Adam 
Carasso, and C. Eugene Steuerle, Retirement Saving Incentives and Personal Saving, 105 
TAX NOTES 1689 (2004) (reporting that tax breaks for retirement programs cost $112 billion 
in 2004, according to the Office of Management and Budget; personal savings, for all 
purposes, totaled $100.8 billion). 
150. See McCaffery, Hybrid, supra note 23, at 1148 (arguing for a hybrid income­
consumption tax "because of the different values we place on the different types of 
savings"). 
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magnitude, and more technical or economic, question of whether or 
not, in some special instances, because of market failures or for some 
other reason, we actively want a tax-based policy of inducing capital to 
flow to certain uses or areas, such as "empowerment zones." 151 These 
are technical questions best left to technical experts. Theory is, in 
contrast, crafting the broad contours of a socially just comprehensive 
tax system; we are getting the individuation of tax down right, in the 
spirit of Vickrey. Of course, tax can do other things, such as correct for 
market failures here and there. But the task of the major 
comprehensive individual tax system as a central component of a just 
social structure is wider and deeper than ad hoc corrections for market 
failures. 
Back to the broader strokes of comprehensive tax policy: It strikes 
our ordinary moral intuitions that some uses of savings -
paradigmatically, for retirement, but also for medical and educational 
needs, and so on - are appropriate on an individual and, perhaps, a 
social level, and, if anything, ought to be encouraged, certainly not 
double taxed. Other uses of savings - as to enable grander lifestyles, 
in this or later generations - strike us as not deserving of our 
sympathies in the same regard. How can theory reconcile these 
seemingly opposing intuitions? To further advance its practical 
project, theory needs a better, more specific, understanding in regard 
to the competing ideas about savings manifest in today's tax system. 
On critical reflection, the two distinct norms anticipated above 
emerge. Note that these are norms about the taxation of the activity of 
savings, that is, about the flow of funds going into and out of a 
taxpayer's household, as befits Mill's focus on such flows and 
Andrews's focus on uses. Different norms might apply to the stock of 
capital, that is, to the very possession of wealth, or to how and where 
the value is invested. I shall revisit these concerns later.152 
One norm is that capital and its yield, as a general matter, ought to 
bear some tax; those fortunate enough to be able to live off interest, 
dividends, capital gains, and so forth ought not be further privileged 
by way of exemption from the public-regarding burdens of tax. This is 
the yield-to-capital norm. Indeed, if anything, there is an urge to tax 
the yield to capital more than the yield-to-labor. The general intuition 
behind the yield-to-capital norm is reflected in the very choice of an 
income tax, as we have seen, and in the periodic attempts to plug up 
151. Empowerment zones are regulated by I.R.C. §§ 1391-13970 (2004). Of course, 
such regulations have complicated and sometimes counterproductive effects. See Jeffrey S. 
Lehman, Updating Urban Policy, in CONFRONTING POVERTY 226, 228-30 (Sheldon H. 
Danziger et al. eds., 1994); Jeffrey S. Lehman & Timothy M. Smeeding, Neighborhood 
Effects and Federal Policy, in 1 NEIGHBORHOOD POVERTY: CONTEXT AND CONSEQUENCES 
FOR CHILDREN, 251, 259-62 (Jeanne Brooks-Gunn et al. eds., 1997). 
152. See infra Part VIl.B.4. 
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certain "loopholes" in the actual income tax's commitment to taxing 
the yield to capital. This intuition is also shown in the misguided, if 
understandable (given the traditional view of tax) , categorical 
resistance to any comprehensive conversion to a consumption base. 
The yield-to-capital norm is further manifest in the insistence on 
maintaining separate gift and estate, and corporate income taxes: an 
insistence that may well also be misguided, on the better view of tax's 
possibilities. The more particularized intuition that the yield to 
financial capital ought to bear, if anything, a higher burden than labor 
earnings, or the yield to human capital, reflects an ordinary moral 
intuition that such financial yields come more easily, without the 
psychic disutility of physical work. These attitudes were widespread at 
the time of the adoption of the modern income tax, and they sensibly 
fit with the choice of that tax.153 We can understand the yield-to-capital 
norm as a vertical equity one: it reflects an intuition that the yield to 
capital is a privilege of the economically fortunate. 
A second norm, seemingly inconsistent with the first, is also 
evident in our practices of tax. This is the ordinary-savings norm, 
which rests on an intuition that some savings are different. Broadly, 
these are the savings that take place - or ought to - in the ordinary 
course of an ordinary life. Savings for one's own retirement, for one's 
children's education, for medical and other emergencies, fit into this 
norm. There is a strong and widely held intuition that such savings 
should not be subjected to Mill's double tax, whether or not 
proponents of the norm are aware of the canonical mappings of 
traditional tax policy. Such savings should be encouraged, if anything, 
and certainly not discouraged. To reconcile the ordinary-savings norm 
with the yield-to-capital norm, in theory, we can understand ordinary­
savings as moving the yield to human capital - that is, labor earnings, 
wages - evenly through time. The ordinary moral intuition to burden 
the yield to financial capital more than the yield to human capital, as 
the latter involves psychic disutility to work (and so on), does not 
extend so compellingly to labor earnings that are simply saved at a 
normal rate of return for some later day. This distinction will become 
clearer in the next section, with a practical analytic vocabulary 
regarding the uses of capital transactions before us. 
In any event, the ordinary-savings norm is, of course, reflected in 
the many provisions of the law that favor (or do not disfavor) such 
savings: pension plans such as 401(k) plans, IRAs of various types, 
medical and education savings accounts. These elements began in the 
1940s.154 A large and very important trend of the 1990s was the 
expansion of such prosavings provisions. (The fact that some such 
153. See generally, e.g. , Bank, supra note 4; Jensen, supra note 4. 
154. See infra note 254 and accompanying text. 
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provisions are structured along a prepaid model, as in the "Roth" 
IRAs, while others continue to come in a postpaid fashion, as with 
"traditional" IRAs, is yet another sign of the analytic muddle of tax.155 
This move towards prepaid and away from postpaid consumption 
taxation has also characterized the contemporary conservative assault 
on progressivity in tax.) In any event, in the traditional normative 
language of tax policy, we can see this second norm as a horizontal 
equity one. "Ordinary" savers are not the privileged elite. Rather, they 
are regular workers choosing to do a perfectly sensible - indeed, 
admirable - thing with some of their earnings: save them for a later, 
perhaps rainy, day. Here, the familiar pair-wise comparisons carry 
normative force: Why should the thrifty Ant be taxed more heavily 
than the spendthrift Grasshopper, when both have the same resources 
as of a critical moment in time, and when Ant is actually doing what a 
reasonable society should want her to do at that time? 
There is another and important sense in which this ordinary­
savings norm reflects a horizontal equity perspective. It is that the 
vertical equity judgments made by the basic rate structure - and the 
choice of an income tax, with its yield-to-capital norm - ought not fall 
on individuals only temporarily elevated into the higher "ability to 
pay" or high tax-rate regions because of morally arbitrary patterns of 
labor market earnings. In order to make sure that we are taxing equals 
equally under the progressive rate structure - in order to best (most 
fairly) determine who are indeed "equals" - we need a wider time 
frame than the arbitrarily chosen twelve calendar month one of 
practical tax administration.156 
The yield-to-capital norm was present at the dawn of the income 
tax: It was a large part of the reason for choosing such a tax. The 
ordinary-savings norm favoring - or, perhaps better put, opposed to 
disfavoring - certain classes of savings, in contrast, became apparent 
much later, after income tax rates had risen and the tax's breadth had 
expanded to reach the majority of adult Americans. 157 It was then that 
the horizontal equity issues became problematic; it was then that the 
call to escape Mill's curse became more clarion. But herein seemingly 
lay a rub: The ordinary-savings norm is inconsistent with the choice of 
an income tax, made to further the yield-to-capital norm. As a 
practical matter, the coexistence of the two norms about capital and its 
yield under a nominal income tax has generated a highly flawed status 
quo. As an analytic matter, it has left us in the grip of incoherence. 
The particular ce:pter we have chosen cannot hold. 
155. See MCCAFFERY, FAIR NOT FLAT, supra note 2, at 50. 
156. See generally DAVID F. BRADFORD, UNTANGLING THE INCOME TAX {1986); 
BRADFORD ET AL., supra note 8; VICKREY, supra note 50; Daniel Shaviro, Endowment and 
Inequality, in TAX JUSTICE 123 (Joseph J. Thorndike & Dennis J. Ventry, Jr. eds., 2002). 
157. See Jones, supra note 65. 
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Now, theory has a sharpened practical question to ponder: Is it 
possible to design a tax system that gets at some, but not all, of the 
yield to capital, in just the way we want it to? That does, consistently 
and logically, what our imperfect real-world tax system attempts to do 
inconsistently and illogically? That is, a tax system that implements the 
yield to capital and ordinary-savings norms concurrently? 
Surprisingly - especially to those in the grip of the traditional 
view - the seemingly inconsistent popular attitudes towards savings 
can be rendered perfectly coherent and consistent under a properly 
designed tax system. Those forms of savings that ordinary moral 
intuitions favor are precisely those that smooth out life-cycle 
consumption: that move wealth from high-earning periods into lower­
earning ones, such as retirement, or into those of greater urgency or 
objective need, such as times of increased education or medical 
expenses.158 At the same time, the urge to tax some of the yield to 
capital plausibly relates to material resources used to finance higher 
standards of living, namely, greater discretionary expenditures, within 
or between individual lifetimes. How can we relatively favor the one 
form of savings, which smoothes out labor earnings, while not favoring 
the other, which enhances lifestyles? It turns out that a progressive 
postpaid consumption tax does exactly this. It is the mechanism of 
progressivity under the tax that does the bulk of the normatively 
desired work. 
B. Two Uses of Capital 
The analysis of the prior section suggests an analytic distinction not 
presently drawn in the tax policy literature. Capital transactions -
borrowing, saving, and investing - can in fact be put to two broad 
(and analytically exclusive) uses within a taxpayer's lifetime. One is to 
smooth out one's labor earnings, which are earned over a limited 
period of years, into a steady consumption pattern over one's entire 
life. This smoothing perspective solves a certain personal financial 
equation: it sums up an individual's earnings in constant dollar terms, 
and then divides this total by the years in one's life. The result of this 
exercise is to generate the same level of consumption, in real dollar 
terms, for each year of life; it balances out an individual's books, so to 
speak, as if her life were self-contained and devoid of any windfalls, 
gifts, and the like. Smoothing effectuates the ordinary-savings norm. 
The other use of capital transactions is, in short, to do anything 
other than smooth out earnings. Capital transactions can shift 
consumption patterns: to make one better (or worse) off than she 
could be on the basis of labor market earnings alone, for certain 
158. For a philosophical discussion of urgency and objective needs, see T.M. Scanlon, 
Preference and Urgency, 72 J. PHIL. 655, 660-61 (1975). 
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periods of her life or throughout her entire life. Consumption shifting 
corresponds to the yield-to-capital norm. 
A simple graphical example helps to see these points. 
1 .  An Untypical Picture of a Typical Life 
Figure 1 shows, in stylized and financial terms, how many of us 
live. The solid line shows labor earnings, while the dotted line shows 
spending or consumption. Simply to get an easily tractable example, 
Figure 1 reflects a world with no inflation, which solves the problem of 
translating fluctuating nominal dollars into constant real ones.159 There 
are also no taxes - yet - in the story. 
FIGURE 1 
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The hypothetical taxpayer in the figure lives for 80 years. She 
works for 40 of those years, from age 20 to age 60, but, of course, she 
consumes for all 80 years. Assume that she has no benefactors, such as 
parents, and no beneficiaries of her largesse, such as children; she acts 
as a self-contained financial unit, balancing her books of inflows and 
outflows within her lifetime alone. Later I shall relax this assumption, 
with a corresponding expansion in generality of the normative points. 
159. The assumption does not materially affect the analysis. Inflation can be generally 
accounted for by indexing the rate brackets, which is how progressivity will be achieved: 
Fully indexed, the system maintains a constant effective tax rate on constant real value 
dollars, as the no-inflation assumption also effects. Further, under a progressive postpaid 
consumption tax, the full deductibility of principal and interest washes out the time value 
effects at least at the normal rate of interest. 
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In any event, during her labor market earnings years, the taxpayer 
makes a constant $60,000; throughout her life, she spends $30,000 
annually. In such a fashion she can balance the books, with her $2.4 
million of lifetime earnings and spending. 
2. Smoothing Transactions 
The stylized picture of Figure 2 adds onto Figure 1 to show one 
very important use of capital: to smooth out consumption patterns 
over a lifetime. The hypothetical taxpayer effectuates this smoothing 
by capital transactions. She borrows $30,000 a year for the first 
quarter, or 20 years, of her life, at 0 percent interest.160 For the second 
quarter, the first 20 years of her working life, from age 20 to 40, she 
pays off this debt at the rate of $30,000 a year, living on her remaining 
$30,000 annually. For the third quarter, the final twenty years of her 
working life, from age 40 to 60, she sets aside $30,000 a year for her 
retirement, once again, in the simplifying assumptions of the story, at 
no nominal interest, and spends the remaining $30,000. When she 
retires at age 60, she draws down her retirement savings to finance 
continued consumption during her last quarter of life, once again at 
the rate of $30,000 a year. 
160. This is, of course, a simplifying assumption, but it does not affect the analysis. 
Recall the 0 percent inflation in the story; at a positive rate of inflation, the wages would be 
higher to reflect the inflation in the principal of the debt. Consider also that many loans are 
intrafamily transfers, as I shall discuss below. Any real interest, in fact, reduces the amount 
of lifetime consumption (below the posited $2.4 million in the example), but then any real 
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In this stylized example, we see that both "normal" borrowing and 
savings transactions - those that carry a normal rate of interest, 
principally (and in the simplified example, exclusively) compensating 
for inflation - help the taxpayer to smooth her consumption pattern. 
Borrowing shifts labor earnings forward in time, so that one can 
consume before she earns; savings shift them back, so that one can 
continue to consume after she ceases to earn. In Figure 2, with no 
inflation, the taxpayer will simply borrow $30,000 a year for the first 
20 years of her life, pay this debt off over the next 20 years, save 
$30,000 for the next 20 years, and draw this down for the final 20 
years. 
In a simple setting with perfect knowledge, no transaction costs -
and no other humans in the picture - the smoothing of Figure 2 can 
be achieved by well-functioning financial capital markets. Of course, 
the world is not so perfect. In its imperfection, smoothing does not 
occur so precisely. In practice, families often function as annuities, 
insurance, and other capital markets.161 By social norm or otherwise, 
our parents pay for our consumption in our youth; we may or may not 
pay them back in later years, but in any event, we are expected to pay 
161. Laurence J. Kotlikoff, Intergenerational Transfers and Savings, J. ECON. PERSP., 
Spring 1988, at 41, reprinted in WHAT DETERMINES SAVINGS? 68 (Laurence J. Kotlikoff ed., 
1989); Laurence J. Kotlikoff & Avia Spivak, The Family as an Incomplete Annuities Market, 
89 J. POL. ECON. 372 (1981), reprinted in WHAT DETERMINES SAVINGS? 88 (Laurence J. 
Kotlikoff ed., 1989); Laurence J. Kotlikoff & Lawrence H. Summers, The Role of 
Intergenerational Transfers in Aggregate Capital Accumulation, 89 J. POL. ECON. 706 (1981), 
reprinted in WHAT DETERMINES SAVINGS? 43 (Laurence J. Kotlikoff ed., 1989). 
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for the consumption of our children in their early years. Families also 
provide important mortality insurance should grandparents outlive 
their finances, and so on. In an "overlapping generations" model, as 
illustrated in Figure 3, the smoothing of consumption shown in Figure 

























i" 30 · - - - - · · · · - - · · - - - - · - - · · - · - - - - - - - - - · - - - - · - · · · - - · · - - - · - - - - · - · - - - · - · - - · · - - - - - - - -
c � 20 
10 
0 -1----.�-.-�� ......... ����--.-��-y-����-+-�.----.-�.,-� 
0 10 20 30 40 
Age 
50 60 
- Labor Earnings - - - · Consum ption 
70 
This Figure adds a second generation to the smoothing 
transactions of Figure 2. The darkened arrows indicate transfers across 
generational lines, from parents to children, or vice versa. The story 
162. Robert J. Barro, Are Government Bonds Net Wealth?, 82 J. POL. ECON. 1095, 1 1 1 6  
(1974); Kotlikoff, supra note 161; Kotlikoff & Summers, supra note 161. 
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behind Figure 3 is a common one, where parents help their children in 
their youth, and then these same children help their parents - paying 
them back, in essence - in their old age. Another familiar story of 
intergenerational annuities markets is where parents continually help 
their children, so the support received from one's parents is turned 
over to the third generation, as it were, in an infinitely overlapping 
generations model. The idea here is to sketch out rough possibilities; 
note that these intergenerational transfers can be smoothing or 
shifting. 
Smoothing is simply an analytic possibility that almost all wage 
earners engage in to some extent: one has to smooth, somehow, if a 
limited period of labor market earnings is to support a full lifetime of 
consumption, unless one is a significant beneficiary of some sort (more 
on this, which affects the yield-to-capital norm, anon). What is morally 
significant to theory is that smoothing strikes our ordinary moral 
intuitions - as reflected, in fact, in the practices of the actual income 
tax - as a perfectly normal and appropriate thing to do. Smoothing 
effects the ordinary-savings norm. A reasonable political and moral 
theory can certainly accept this norm revealed from practice, bringing 
about a reflective equilibrium; Mill and Rawls seem to have done so, 
for example. Smoothing balances out the morally arbitrary ups-and­
downs of labor markets.163 Adding progressivity into the mix - as the 
first, foundational commitment of the comprehensive tax system's 
claim to justice - makes this critically important. Income and prepaid 
consumption (wage) taxes fall on the unsmoothed lines of Figures 1-3; 
postpaid consumption (spending) taxes fall on the smoothed lines. 
Under progressive marginal or effective rates, taxpayers pay more tax 
based on the particular pattern of their earnings profile under prepaid 
consumption or income taxes, but not under a postpaid consumption 
tax, when they engage in ordinary smoothing activities. 
It is for these reasons that many scholars have long advocated 
taking a "lifetime" perspective on the imposition of tax burdens. This 
is an idea advanced by Vickrey, through a very clever proposal for the 
lifetime averaging of tax burdens, and picked up in recent years by 
those, such as David Bradford and Daniel Shaviro, discussing 
163. BRADFORD, supra note 156; BRADFORD ET AL., supra note 8; VICKREY, supra 
note 50. Of course, the position that these ups and downs are indeed morally arbitrary 
requires argument, which this Article does not provide in any length or depth. Suffice it to 
say that it is hard to imagine a compelling moral argument that a putative taxpayer should 
pay more taxes strictly on account of her uneven pattern of labor market earnings vis-a-vis 
an equal but steadier earner, yet a system of progressive average rates has precisely this 
effect under a prepaid consumption or income tax. The practical prevalence of the ordinary­
savings norm - the widespread allowances under the "income" tax for backward smoothing 
- further testifies to the moral insignificance of particular patterns of labor market 
realizations. 
March 2005] A New Understanding of Tax 869 
"endowment" taxes.164 The smoothed perspective looks to this lifetime 
average: What is significant is the $2.4 million of lifetime consumption 
spread over 80 years, not the particular - and generally morally 
arbitrary - pattern of earning it. Any tax on inflows, such as a prepaid 
consumption or an income tax, that does not somehow allow for 
smoothing is penalizing those whose human capital gets realized in 
short periods and in bunches - artists, athletes, doctors, and lawyers, 
say - vis-a-vis more regular, steady lifetime earners. This point was 
anticipated, in traditional horizontal equity terms, by Andrews, and 
developed by William Klein.165 Indeed, Mill's double-tax critique is 
most compelling when a taxpayer is simply trying to break even within 
her lifetime, and so too with Andrews's "most sophisticated" 
argument for consumption tax. 
By moving to a lifetime perspective, allowing smoothing to lower 
tax burdens reflects as much a "vertical" as a "horizontal" equity 
norm. If we base a tax on outflows, thereby allowing people to 
smooth, and assume (only for now) no net transfers in or out of the 
taxpayer's combined, total pool of resources available for her own 
personal lifetime consumption, then a taxpayer can solve a personal 
tax minimization problem by perfect smoothing. Note that rough or 
imperfect smoothing comes out much the same way, on account of the 
width of the progressive marginal rate brackets: there is no need for 
taxpayers to be precise actuaries.166 Taxes are then set - equals are 
then measured - on the basis of this smoothed consumption line, 
reflecting a sustainable standard of living across a lifetime. Rather 
than a single year, or a short period of years, of high earnings elevating 
one into higher tax brackets, it is this smoothed, sustainable pattern of 
consumption that sets one's level of taxation. Then those who, after 
smoothing their labor earnings, are able to live a more costly lifestyle, 
are taxed more than those who are not: these are, necessarily, people 
who have enhanced their consumption by capital market returns or 
beneficent transfers. "Equals" are measured by their lifestyles; 
lifestyles are financed by labor, capital, and beneficent transfers, and 
the consistent postpaid consumption tax does not mark the 
distinctions among sources. 
The smoothed perspective as a measure of taxable ability is 
appealing to ordinary moral intuitions and in reflective equilibrium: it 
164. See BRADFORD, supra note 156; Shaviro, supra note 156. Note that these ideas are 
predicated on individual levels; a somewhat parallel macroeconomic idea can be found in 
Laurence Kotlikoffs and others' writings on "generational" accounting. See supra note 161. 
165. See Andrews, Personal Income Tax, supra note 8, at 1170; Andrews, Reply to 
Professor Warren, supra note 16, at 957-58; Klein, supra note 14; Edward J. McCaffery, The 
Uneasy Case for Wealth Transfer Taxation, 104 YALE L.J. 283, 350-51 (1994) [hereinafter 
McCaffery, Uneasy Case]. 
166. See infra note 193 and accompanying text. 
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happens to map up perfectly with a postpaid consumption tax, but the 
argument is not a matter of semantic definitions. It is not, that is, the 
case that a postpaid consumption tax is independently desired for 
some reason and therefore that smoothing becomes the appropriate 
normative baseline against which to discuss increasing or lowering tax 
burdens. It is, rather, that smoothing strikes us as an appropriate 
normative baseline, because it does not take into account the morally 
arbitrary pattern of labor market earnings on a year-to-year basis, but 
rather rests its decisions about taxability on a sustainable lifetime 
pattern of consumption. A postpaid consumption tax implements this 
norm. 
3 .  Shifting or  Enhancing (Diminishing) Transactions 
A second use of capital and its yield, already anticipated, is to 
change one's average level of lifetime consumption: to enhance or 
increase one's lifestyle by spending out of "surplus" capital funds, or 
to diminish it by being a net saver throughout one's life or by 
transferring wealth to others - personal or institutional (e.g. 
charitable) beneficiaries. Shifting is the complement to smoothing. 
Smoothing takes the taxpayer's average labor market earnings in 
constant real dollar terms as its baseline. Shifting moves this baseline 
up or down. 
In moving from a description of capital transactions to a normative 
position, a norm of self-sufficiency emerges: Capital transactions that 
are "simply" and "normally" translating uneven (by time) labor 
market earnings into even, smooth cash flows should not bear the 
sting of Mill's double tax or, indeed, any positive tax burden at all. In 
the simple smoothed profile, there is no "luck" in the capital markets, 
no largesse from or to any other individual. Smoothing is what an 
ordinary person can do, with the fruits of her own labor, and access to 
normal, well-functioning capital markets with little or no risk. But 
capital transactions can change things, too. One can do better or worse 
than the smoothed profile, by being the beneficiary of good luck or 
someone else's largesse, or by being the recipient of bad luck or a net 
benefactor to others. 
Figure 4 presents a simple picture to illustrate this. Figure 4 adds 
onto Figure 3's intergenerational example the possibility of taxpayers, 
within or across generations, living on more or less than what their 
average annual labor market earnings in constant dollar terms would 
allow. Beginning at age 30 in each generation, the Figure shows 
"enhanced" consumption, where a taxpayer is living at $40,000 a year, 
more than her average annual labor market earnings, in constant 
dollar terms, and a "diminished" consumption pattern, where the 
taxpayer is living at $20,000 a year, below her average annual labor 
market earnings. The intergenerational setting helps to illustrate that 
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there are several sources of this enhanced or diminished consumption 
profile. Good fortune in the capital markets - supranormal returns, 
in the language of recent tax policy analysis167 - is one. 
Intergenerational transfers can also either elevate or diminish 
consumption patterns, and altruism - transfers to charities - can 
diminish them.168 Diminished consumption might result from a simple 
mistake, a failure to "die broke" out of an excess of caution, a failure 
of annuities markets, or a combination of all three factors.169 It could 
also result from bad luck in the capital markets: from a failure to earn 
even normal returns on savings, or excessive payments for the use of 
capital early in life. 
FIGURE 4 
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167. See generally Bankman & Griffith, Debate, supra note 12; Alvin C. Warren, Jr., 
How Much Capital Income Taxes Under an Income Tax Is Exempt Under a Cash Flow Tax?, 
52 TAX L. REV. 1 (1996). 
168. All this depends, of course, on supporting the semantic claim that such personal or 
institutional (charitable) giving is not "consumption;" a position that the present income tax 
law takes, at least relative to charitable giving. See Andrews, Personal Deductions, supra 
note 80, at 346. 
169. STEPHEN M. POLLAN & MARK LEVINE, DIE BROKE (1997); see also Kotlikoff & 
Spivak, supra note 161, at 372-73. 
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A compelling case can be made that the enhanced lifestyle profile 
is "vertically" above the smoothed one: anyone who has received 
additional resources to consume, one way or another, is in fact more 
"able to pay" than someone who has not. Indeed, this is an animating 
norm of an ideal income tax, a logical concomitant of Henry Simons's 
(and many others') "source neutrality" norm. It is more arguable that 
the "diminished consumption" profile represents a lower rung on the 
vertical equity, or "ability to pay," ladder; an ideal income tax 
generally treats people on the basis of their potential to consume170 or, 
somewhat equivalently, treats savings, gifts, bequests, and even many 
capital market losses as instances of consumption. But note that, 
under a consistent, progressive postpaid consumption tax, the 
diminution in private consumption must be permanent, across 
generations, to result in a lesser tax burden. In lying in wait for 
ultimate private preclusive use, the progressive postpaid tax holds out 
the possibility - by design - of an increased tax burden on certain 
patterns of intergenerational transfer.171 
Now it is time to ask a pressing question: Why should the norms 
of capital apply inter, as well as intragenerationally? This is a point 
that distinguishes a consistent progressive postpaid consumption tax 
from a progressive income tax with averaging, as discussed below. 
Once more, second-best concerns loom large: policing and taxing 
intergenerational transfers is hard. But still as a matter of first-best 
theory, and with the various pictures to help us, we can see that 
intergenerational transfers, like intragenerational savings, also differ 
in their intended and ultimate uses. Much intergenerational transfers 
smooth across generations, making for within-family annuity markets. 
Such transfers can save on certain transaction costs compared to third 
party mechanisms, and there is no compelling reason to burden them 
with a double or even triple tax, on transfer. Other transfers simply 
bring children up to a lifestyle level closer to their parents, arguably 
maximizing utility .172 Yet other transfers create dynasties, allowing 
generations to live off the yield to capital, without labor. The current 
system, with a wealth transfer tax rife with exceptions, once again 
reflects two norms, one allowing, the other seeking to tax, these 
transfers, 173 but implements them erratically, at best. A consistent 
170. See Warren, supra note 13,  at 934. 
171. In this way, the progressive postpaid consumption tax acts as an accessions tax, 
falling on heirs. See Mccaffery, Being the Best, supra note 15, at 631. Of course, this might 
not address all of the concerns of advocates of wealth transfer taxation, because the postpaid 
consumption tax can facilitate greater stores or stocks of private wealth. I discuss this issue 
infra Part VIl.B.4. 
172 See Louis Kaplow, A Note on Subsidizing Gifts, 58 J. PUB. ECON. 469 (1995). 
173. See infra Part VI.B (criticizing current wealth transfer tax system). 
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progressive postpaid consumption tax perfectly implements both 
norms, at the same time, and across as well as within generations. 
Back to the reasons for diminished consumption at the parental, or 
putative donor's level: The parent who self-sacrifices to enable her 
child to live an enhanced lifestyle is not solving an intergenerational 
tax minimization problem; she is like the intragenerational taxpayer 
who fails to smooth. Her family's total tax burden will go up, in 
constant dollar terms, on account of her financial behavior. The 
progressive postpaid consumption tax - consistent with its focus on 
uses, or the right-hand side of the Haig-Simons identity -
differentiates among the reasons for diminished lifestyles. Those who 
have had bad luck in the capital markets, or who are benefactors of 
qualified institutional charities, say, will see their and their family's tax 
burdens go down; those who are building private dynasties will see 
their familial tax burdens increase. While an ideal income tax would 
also adversely affect private dynasty creation, it is worth noting that 
neither the actual income tax, where we are, nor a prepaid 
consumption tax, where we are heading, would.174 
C. Progressivity 
The key insight of the new understanding of tax is that, in devising 
a just and practicable comprehensive tax system, the commitment to 
progressivity in individuated tax burdens ought to come first and be 
foundational. It is not sufficient to meet this commitment through the 
choice of base, alone. We do not have and have never had an income 
tax, and largely for the reason that we do not want one - we do not 
want the double taxation of all savings. Within the tax system, 
progressive rates have become the primary engine of effecting 
fairness.175 The next question is to what should we apply these rates: a 
question that can be restated in the temporal terms used above, 
namely as asking when, in a taxpayer's flow of funds, it is fair and 
appropriate to levy progressive taxes. Under progressive rates, the 
traditional view of the mapping between income and consumption 
taxes,  and between types of consumption taxes, is wrong. Each tax has 
very different properties. These properties can be understood as 
affecting capital smoothing and shifting- transactions differently: as, 
that is, differentially implementing the yield to capital and ordinary­
savings norms. 
The principal mechanism for implementing progressivity in the 
income tax - for meeting the vertical equity norm - is its system of 
174. See infra Part V for a critique of the current "income" tax. 
175. Another idea for effecting justice in social systems is to abandon progressivity in 
tax, per se, and to obtain redistribution via transfers or expenditures. See Bird & Zolt, supra 
note 51  (commenting on this strategy for the developing world). 
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progressive marginal rates. Such progressive marginal rates work like 
a ladder. As one ascends into the higher-rate brackets or rungs of the 
ladder, she does not lose the benefit of the lower-rate brackets or 
rungs. Consider the very basic marginal tax rate schedule set out in 
Table 2. The first $10,000 of income (or whatever is being taxed in the 
base) generates no tax. The next $20,000 - the dollars that take one 
from $10,000 to $30,000 of total income - are taxed at a 15 percent 
marginal rate. Thus by the time a taxpayer has made $30,000, she has 
paid $3,000 (not $4,500) in tax: 0 on her first $10,000, and $3,000, or 15 
percent, on her next $20,000. Once one exceeds $30,000, the next 
dollar is taxed at 30 percent. So a taxpayer making $30,001 is taxed 
$3000.30 (not $9000.30); the $3,000 paid on her first $30,000, as 
calculated above, plus $.30 on her last, or marginal, dollar. 
TABLE 2: ILLUSTRATIVE MARGINAL TAX RATE SCHEDULE 
Marginal tax rates are important for their marginal incentive 
effects.176 Social justice, however, is more concerned about average or 
(equivalently) effective tax rates: ensuring that the more able to pay, 
in fact, pay a higher percentage of their wealth in taxes than the less 
able to pay. Average tax rates are simply the total tax paid divided by 
the total income (or alternative base). In our running example, using 
Table 2, the taxpayer who has made $30,000 and paid $3,000 in tax -
while she stands on the brink of entering the 30 percent marginal rate 
bracket - is paying 10 percent taxes on average. (It is a common 
mistake to confuse average and marginal tax rates; this explains the 
emphasis on "not" numbers in the parentheses in the prior 
paragraph). While progressive marginal rates necessarily lead to 
progressive average tax burdens, the converse does not hold: we can 
achieve progressivity in effective burdens with a combination of lump 
sum grants and declining marginal tax rates, a key insight of Mirrlees 
and the optimal income tax literature.177 
176. MCCAFFERY, FAIR NOT FLAT, supra note 2, at 78-81; Bankman & Griffith, Social 
Welfare, supra note 12. 
177. See, e.g. , Mirrlees, supra note 12; Berliant & Rothstein, supra note 12. 
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Figure 5 translates the simplified marginal rate schedule of Table 2 
into effective tax rates. Having a progressive tax system means that 
such a figure, plotting income (or any alternative tax base) along the 
X-axis against effective tax rates on the Y-axis, will show a constant 
increase. That is, higher levels of income, or labor wages, or 
consumption - respectively in each of the three taxes we are 
considering - will be taxed higher, on average, asymptotically 
approaching the highest marginal tax rate.178 
178. That is, as x (income) approaches infinity, a taxpayer gets closer to paying the 
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The central argument of this Article can be seen by superimposing 
Figures 1-4 onto Figure 5, as Figure 6 does. I do not mean to suggest 
that tax rates would or could be the same under the three tax systems. 
It can be hard, for macroeconomic reasons, to compare rates across 
different taxes.179 Rates might differ under an income, prepaid, or 
postpaid consumption tax in order to raise the same amount of 
revenue; this depends on the breadth of the base, and so on, and is a 
complicated empirical project. Further, and very importantly, as a 
normative matter, the nature of the case for progression changes with 
the nature of the tax base; this is another central insight of the new 
understanding of tax obscured by the traditional view. Once again, we 
can think differently about taxing uses than sources. But fortunately it 
is not necessary to make the rates comparable - to "score" a revenue 
neutral result - in order to see the main points. Figure 6 simply 
illustrates how capital smoothing and shifting transactions are taxed 
within each tax system, against a backdrop of not engaging in them. 
A prepaid consumption tax taxes along the solid labor wage line 
and ignores all variations. Under the tax rates of Table 2, this means 
that the taxpayer in the running example will pay $12,000 per year for 
the 40 years in which she works, a 20 percent average rate over her 
179. Rates might also change over time on account of the greater efficiency of a new tax, 
a point David Bradford impressed on me. See David F. Bradford, Transition to and Tax Rate 
Flexibility in a Cash-Flow Type Tax, in 12 TAX POLICY AND THE ECONOMY 151-72 (James 
Poterba, ed., 1998). This complicates but does not fundamentally alter the analysis. 
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lifetime ($480,000 out of $2.4 million).180 Such a tax ignores all shifting, 
upwards or downwards, and smoothing. The "spikier" the inflows line 
- the greater the variance in the realization of labor market returns 
- the higher the lifetime tax. Any enhancements due to success in the 
capital markets or someone else's beneficence get ignored. 
An ideal income tax would also tax on the basis of this labor 
market earnings line, and would add a further tax - Mill's second -
for any positive returns to the savings needed to effect a constant 
lifestyle going forward.181 In general, a progressive income tax burdens 
both shifting and smoothing capital transactions. Compare a taxpayer 
under an income tax who in fact earns and spends $30,000 a year, with 
one who earns $60,000 over 40 years and spreads it across 80. The 
latter, smoothing taxpayer is hit hard by progressive rates: she pays 
$480,000, just as under the prepaid consumption tax example of the 
prior paragraph, a 20 percent effective rate. The naturally-smoothed 
taxpayer in contrast pays $240,000 in lifetime taxes - $3,000 a year for 
80 years; her labor market earnings generate a 10 percent effective tax 
rate. The smoother is also hurt by the double taxation of savings 
needed to effect her backward smoothing: any positive interest here 
will bear Mill's double tax. She is also harmed by the tax treatment of 
debt in effectuating her forward or anticipatory smoothing, given the 
limitation on the deductibility of interest.182 And, of course, any 
enhancements above her labor market earnings will be taxed, while 
diminutions may or may not be relevant. 
A postpaid consumption tax, in contrast, applies to the actual 
consumption line. The perfect smoother, living at $30,000 a year, 
would pay $3,000 a year, a 10 percent rate across her entire life 
($240,000 out of $2.4 million) , just like the naturally smoothed 
taxpayer. The enhanced consumption profile would pay more: under 
progressive tax rates, a postpaid consumption tax does get at the yield 
to capital, as well as beneficent transfers, when these are used to 
upward shift. The diminished consumer would pay less. But if the 
diminished consumption was due to the transfer of resources to 
another taxpayer, the tax will lie in wait, to fall on this heir's enhanced 
consumption. 
We can cash these observations out with some simple, 
paradigmatic examples. Imagine three putative taxpayers: Steady 
Earner, who earns $50,000 annually for all relevant periods; Lumpy 
Earner, who earns $100,000 annually for half of the relevant period, 
180. Once more, she pays 0 on her first $10,000; $3,000, or 15%, on her next $20,000; 
and $9,000, or 30% on her "last" $30,000. 
181. This second tax is not reflected in the picture because of the simplifying assumption 
of a 0% rate of return. 
182. See l.R.C. § 163(a), (d), (h) (2004). 
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borrowing and saving, as in the example above, to consume $50,000 
annually throughout the period; and Trust Fund Baby, who lives off 
$50,000 of investments returns from an ancestral trust.183 An ideal 
progressive income tax falls hardest on Lumpy Earner, treating Trust 
Fund Baby and Steady Earner alike. A progressive prepaid 
consumption or wage tax falls hardest on Lumpy Earner and 
altogether ignores Trust Fund Baby.184 (The actual income tax we have 
treats Trust Fund Baby quite well, too, as Part V illustrates). A 
progressive postpaid consumption tax treats all three taxpayers alike. 
In sum, an income tax double taxes both shifting and smoothing 
capital transactions; a prepaid consumption tax ignores both; and a 
postpaid consumption tax accommodates smoothing but differentiates 
between upward (which lead to higher taxes) and downward (which 
lead to lower taxes) shifting transactions. By ignoring smoothing, 
progressive income and prepaid taxes make the time path of earnings 
economically significant. By accommodating smoothing, a postpaid 
consumption tax does not. 
D. Debt, Again 
Debt, or borrowing, is critical to smoothing, and also to the 
distinctions among the three types of ideal taxes.185 Positive savings 
allow an individual to defer the enjoyment of labor-market earnings, 
to push them backward in time. Borrowing, as negative savings, serves 
a symmetric function: it allows one to shift forward her labor market 
earnings, to consume before earning, as Figure 2 and subsequent 
figures had shown. An income tax is inconsistent in its treatment of 
debt and savings, because it "double taxes" the latter but not the 
former, although the technical analysis depends on the deductibility of 
interest.186 Both prepaid and postpaid consumption taxes are 
consistent: the former ignores all savings, and the latter deducts all 
savings. This leads under a postpaid consumption tax to the inclusion 
of debt as a taxable inflow (as negative savings) and a deduction for all 
repayments of principal and interest. 
183. $50,000 represents a 5% annual yield on a $1,000,000 corpus, a sum easily 
transferred tax-free under today's wealth transfer system. See infra Part VI.B. 
184. Some one might have once paid some tax on Trust Fund Baby's fortune, of course, 
but not necessarily. See Boris I. Bittker, Tax Shelters and Tax Capitalization or Does the 
Early Bird Get a Free Lunch?, 28 NAT'L TAX J. 416 (1975), reprinted in COLLECTED LEGAL 
ESSAYS 547 (1989) (a charming tale of benefiting from the income tax's incentives . . .  before 
the tax was even enacted). 
185. See Adam Hime, Note, Getting Schooled by the Hybrid-based Tax: Equity and 
Efficiency in the Federal Tax Treatment of Debt-financed Post-Secondary Educational 
Expenditures, 77 S. CAL. L. REV. 871 , 889-91 (2004). 
186. See generally Auerbach, supra note 42. 
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All this takes on significance when progressive rates are in play. By 
ignoring both the initial incurring of debt and its subsequent 
repayment, the prepaid consumption and income taxes each penalize 
those whose uneven pattern of labor-market earnings require them to 
borrow in their youth to finance their lifestyles. An important class of 
taxpayers in this situation is, of course, students. The postpaid 
consumption tax solves this problem by including debt as a taxable 
inflow and allowing a systematic deduction for all repayments of 
principal and interest; it allows a taxpayer to smooth forward in time, 
just as retirement savings provisions under the so-called income tax 
allow her to smooth backward. 
Students often recoil at the notion that the proceeds of their 
borrowing will be included in their tax base, as would be the case 
under a consistent postpaid consumption tax. But such an inclusion, 
logically followed by a deduction in the year of repayment, in fact 
effectuates the ordinary-savings norm going forward; it is traditional 
IRA or qualified-pension-plan treatment in reverse. Given progressive 
rates, the difference is significant. In the running example, the student 
borrower will pay a 10 percent effective tax on her loans under a 
postpaid tax, while she would pay 20 percent under an income or a 
prepaid consumption tax model to generate the after-tax dollars to 
pay off those loans. In practice, today, law students must earn twice 
their student-loan balances in order to pay off their debts, because 
they must also pay Uncle Sam out of the earnings - first. 
Within the new understanding of tax, borrowing, or negative 
savings, has an important symmetry with positive savings. Both 
typically effectuate the ordinary-savings norm. Just as savings allow 
the wage earner to shift some of her labor earnings backward in time, 
to finance her retirement, so borrowing allows her to shift her labor 
market earnings forward in time, to finance her youth and 
education. 187 Progressive income and prepaid consumption taxes 
burden these shifts - they disfavor smoothing transactions - because 
the tax falls, and hence the appropriate level of progressivity is set, at 
the moment of labor market earnings, which is arbitrary and uneven. 
Income taxes further burden smoothing transactions by the double 
taxation of savings used to effect them. A postpaid consumption tax, 
in contrast, accommodates smoothing because the moment of ultimate 
private use is the moment when decisions about rate progression are 
set. On the other hand, savings that finance enhanced lifestyles or debt 
that enables taxpayers to live "beyond their means" are disfavored by 
the ordinary operation of the tax: the former phenomenon effecting 
the yield-to-capital norm, the latter creating a "paternalistic push" to 
187. Note that intergenerational smoothing allows family annuities markets to effect this 
result. 
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even out lifestyles within the structure of a progressive postpaid tax, 
and to use debt wisely. 
E. Vickrey's Cumulative Lifetime A veraging, Compared 
A consistent postpaid consumption tax is not the only means of 
effectuating smoothing or averaging to avoid the problem of the 
uneven time-path of labor market (and other) earnings. Vickrey 
proposed a mechanism of smoothing by accounting conventions, a 
"cumulative lifetime averaging" technique that helped to put tax 
burdens on what Vickrey took to be a normatively appropriate 
lifetime basis.188 Blueprints for Basic Tax Reform also contained some 
discussion of the idea, 189 and the Internal Revenue Code contained 
limited income averaging provisions for a number of years.190 Despite 
Vickrey's frequent protestations to the contrary, the idea is 
complicated in practice. It entails choosing a certain period for 
smoothing, adding up cumulative income (or consumption) within the 
period, subtracting previously taxed income (or consumption) and 
then applying a rate structure, which could lead to negative taxes 
(refunds) as well as positive taxes (payments) in the immediate period 
of the return, depending on how this period fit with the average. 
Human events such as marriage, divorce, and death were subjects of 
some concern, and so on. A consistent progressive postpaid 
consumption tax without cumulative smoothing is far easier to 
implement. 
Let us set aside, however, these practical or second-best concerns 
for a moment. For present purposes, imagine that Vickrey's proposal 
could be implemented seamlessly, by summing up lifetime income, 
dividing by the years of the taxpayer's life, and basing a payment 
(annual or lump sum) on the average annual income level. So stated, 
there are two issues at the level of first-best, or ideal, theory to 
differentiate the proposal I am pressing, for a consistent, progressive 
postpaid consumption tax, from Vickrey's proposal for cumulative 
averaging - though we importantly share the end of effecting 
meaningful progression in the allocation of tax burdens, and hence 
have much more in commpn than sets us apart. 
To see the two issues, note that Vickrey's plan is set in the context 
of an income tax, where the problem of uneven labor earnings is made 
more acute by arbitrary patterns of financial capital realizations as 
188. See Vickrey, supra note 102. 
189. See BRADFORD ET AL., supra note 8, at 74-75. I thank David Bradford and Jim 
Hines for a discussion of this and related points. 
190. I.RC. §§ 1301-05 (1982) (repealed 1986). For a discussion of how these (complex) 
provisions operated, see BORIS I. BITTKER, FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOME, ESTATES AND 
GIFTS (1981) 'JI 11 1.3.13, pp. 111-70 to 111-75. 
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well. Taxing earnings consistently throughout a lifetime, however, 
effectuates a smoothing, by design, such that an income tax with 
cumulative averaging begins to resemble a consistent postpaid 
consumption tax. The simplest way to see this point is that if a 
taxpayer balances her books within her lifetime - neither leaving nor 
receiving any net beneficent transfer - then lifetime income equals 
lifetime consumption (consider the Haig-Simons definition, Equation 
[1 ], across a lifetime, with no net savings, so that income = 
consumption). So there is no net difference, in the aggregate amounts 
taxed, between a Vickrey-income tax and a postpaid consumption tax 
for those who do not save beyond their lifetimes. This background 
points out the two theoretical differences between Vickrey's 
cumulative averaged income tax and a consistent postpaid 
consumption tax. 
First, those who do engage in intergenerational wealth 
transmissions - those whose available resources exceed their 
consumption within their own lifetimes - will see their taxes, that is, 
the taxes paid within their generation, go down under a postpaid 
consumption tax compared to Vickrey's tax. Once again, it is not, 
however, the case that total taxes, across generations, will go down by 
the transmission under the postpaid model; this depends on whether 
the intergenerational shift is upwards or downwards, as noted above. 
The multigenerational comparison between Vickrey's income 
averaging and a postpaid consumption tax also depends on the rate 
structure of each. The choice - still in first-best theory - turns on 
what we think of intergenerational smoothing activities. Here 
reasonable minds can differ. In theory, one could certainly argue that 
an incentive to transfer wealth across generations in a smoothing 
fashion - or, equivalently, the absence of an incentive to consume 
excessively in the present generation - is a good thing. 
This is so for several reasons. One, intergenerational smoothing 
implements a familial annuities market that need not be disfavored 
over third-party mechanisms (consider Figure 3, with its overlapping 
generations). Transfers from grandparents to parents and parents to 
children stand in lieu of each generation's annuitizing for itself, 
forward and backward within its own lifetime. Two, transfers to 
otherwise lesser-consuming individuals are, in a straightforward 
application of utilitarian theory, welfare-enhancing. Nor are these 
inducements somehow illiberal - after all, an incentive for the first 
generation to consume everything and die broke is problematic, too. If 
the intergenerational transfers turn out to allow for greater 
consumption at the second and lower generations, the mechanism of 
progressivity under the postpaid consumption tax will burden them. A 
consistent progressive income tax with Vickrey averaging, in contrast, 
will double-tax the transfers - in the first generation at a high level 
because of the potential to consume, in the second generation as a 
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source of use. A single tax, set at a level individuated by the user, 
seems preferable. Once again, a consistent progressive postpaid 
consumption tax, applied across generations, implements both the 
ordinary-savings and yield-to-capital norms, simultaneously, by design. 
These norms are as compelling between as within generations. 
Whereas this first difference turns on our thoughts about 
intergenerational savings, the second difference between a consistent 
postpaid consumption tax and Vickrey's cumulatively averaged 
income tax relates to the taxation of consumption itself, within a 
generation. A move to a consistent postpaid consumption tax avoids 
the problem of having the morally arbitrary pattern of inflows dictate 
the level of progressivity. But it only does so if the taxpayer actually 
does smooth his consumption. If Lumpy Earner makes and spends 
$100,000 a year, he foregoes the benefits of smoothing under a 
postpaid consumption tax. Vickrey might well ask here why the actual 
pattern of consumption should matter, as opposed to an average 
lifetime measure that would reflect the vertical equities of the wider 
view without the happenstance of uneven earnings or spending 
patterns.191 In other words, even if Vickrey or a disciple should 
concede the first point, that consumption and not income is the right 
thing to cumulatively average, why should we not do the averaging 
within a consumption tax design? Why, that is, should the government 
differentiate between someone who spends an even $30,000 every year 
and someone who alternates years of $40,000 in spending with years of 
$20,000 in spending? The Vickrey lifetime averaging mechanism, 
applied to a consistent consumption tax base, would alleviate this 
problem. 
Now as with the first point, reasonable minds can certainly differ. 
There is nothing in the new understanding of tax that would or should 
reject a cumulatively averaged consumption tax out of hand. Far from 
it: This is a serious idea, and an attractive means to a meaningful 
progressivity in tax, where the new understanding of tax aims. Once 
again, however, I suspect that the practical answers are decisive: 
Cumulative averaging is too complex, and its benefits over a 
nonaveraged postpaid consumption tax are too minor, to mandate it. 
But we can also once again proffer several arguments suggesting that 
an averaging mechanism is not needed, and that the relatively simple, 
unadjusted, progressive postpaid consumption tax model, applied 
across and within generations is, indeed, an attractive ideal. 
First, it is important to note that a taxpayer's smoothing need not 
be precise to effectuate lifetime tax minimization, on account of the 
marginal rate bracket mechanism. The very width of the rate brackets, 
191. I thank Jim Hines and David Weisbach for their persistence in pressing these 
points on me. 
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and the slope of their graduation, can be set to mitigate the effect. 
Consider again the marginal rate structure set out in Table 2. A 
considerable part of the virtue of a consistent postpaid consumption 
tax is that there can continue to be rate brackets at higher levels of 
consumption because the disincentive effects do not fall on work 
effort per se.192 Suppose, for example, that there was a 40% bracket 
extending from $100,000 to $200,000. A taxpayer who spent $120,000 
in one year and $180,000 in the next would bear no burden on account 
of not consuming an even $150,000 in each year.193 
Second, capital market mechanisms can rather easily and 
effectively deal with many consumption-smoothing problems, such as 
consumer durables, an issue that haunted Andrews and Blueprints.194 
The problem is that a taxpayer who makes a large purchase in one 
year, say of a house or a car, will show a certain "lumpiness" in her 
consumption, which might indeed trigger higher taxes under a 
consistently progressive postpaid consumption tax. But capital 
transactions, such as leasing or buying over time, can fairly readily 
solve these problems - in a manner that is not always possible with 
self-help labor market averaging.195 Rather than spending $20,000 on a 
car in a single year, for example, a five-year payment plan will 
effectuate a $4,000 annual charge. And housing, which is a complex 
item to tax under any broad-based tax, because of its mixture of 
consumption and savings elements, can be handled in several different 
ways to avoid the specifically lumpy consumption problem.196 
192 See FRANK, supra note 113, at 228-31; Edward J. McCaffery, The Tyranny of 
Money, 98 MICH. L. REV. 2126, 2129-30 (2000) [hereinafter McCaffery, Tyranny] (reviewing 
FRANK, supra note 113). This point also relates back to the first argument against Vickrey's 
position, specifically his use of an income tax base as default. A well-designed tax system, I 
am arguing, should allow an "escape valve" for excessive lifetime earnings - it should allow 
and perhaps even encourage the wealthy to continue to work and save, hoping that they not 
spend their "surplus" funds on themselves. A tax system that taxes spent and unspent 
resources does not do this; it disincentivizes work effort by those who have already funded 
their own generation's needs and wants. 
193. Even a taxpayer who slightly straddles the line will not pay a grave price, on 
account of the slope of the marginal rate brackets. For example, a taxpayer who consumes 
$230,000 one year (in the 50% bracket, say), and $170,000 the next, would pay an extra 
$3,000 (10% of $30,000), or 1.5% of income, for the imprecision. If the brackets increased 
in 5% intervals, the "problem" would be even smaller. I thank Reed Shuldiner for the 
example. 
194. See Andrews, Personal Income Tax, supra note 8, at 1150, 1155-57; BRADFORD ET 
AL., supra note 8, at 81, 108-09, 117. 
195. See MCCAFFERY, FAIR NOT FLAT, supra note 2, at 134-36. Reed Shuldiner has 
pressed me on this need for advice. But, of course, taxpayers today need much advice on 
shifting labor and capital market returns around in time. Consumption smoothing, in 
contrast, seems more natural and largely within a taxpayer's control. See SMITH, supra note 
54, at 778. 
196. See BRADFORD ET AL., supra note 8, at 78 (ignoring the imputed income of home­
ownership "for the sake of simplification"); MCCAFFERY, FAIR NOT FLAT, supra note 2. 
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Third, once the modifications suggested by the first two points 
(wide rate brackets, gradual progressivity, and capital market 
transactions) are understood, a strong argument exists that the pattern 
of household consumption is not morally arbitrary. Determining the 
appropriate spending level is importantly a matter of choice, and one 
that affects the wider body politic.197 
Fourth, and related, there are paternalistic reasons to try to get 
individuals actually to smooth their consumption - certainly a good 
deal of current American socio-economic policies are designed with 
this goal in mind, not the least being the forced retirement savings 
effected by the social security system.198 Vickrey, as a classical 
economist, was drawn to the neutrality of the income-averaging 
scheme; it does not matter whether a taxpayer does smooth because 
all taxpayers with equal lifetime material resources, measured in 
constant dollar terms, pay the same lifetime tax, irrespective of how 
they choose to spend their wealth. On the other hand, ordinary moral 
intuitions may question this proposition. It is prudent and good to live 
within one's means, to borrow sensibly in youth and to save 
responsibly in middle age. 
Once again, to be clear and fair, these various arguments against 
Vickrey's very clever cumulative lifetime averaging proposal, at least 
when set in the context of a consumption tax (that is, after the first 
point, on the income-versus-consumption difference, is set aside) may 
be more a matter of making a virtue out of a near-necessity, for 
Vickrey's proposal is complicated, and would make annual tax 
reporting more burdensome and counterintuitive, while a consistent 
postpaid consumption tax is comparatively straightforward. Still, a 
compelling case can be made that what the progressive postpaid 
consumption tax does simply, by design, is also the right thing to do. 
We should celebrate the fortuity. 
197. McCaffery, The Right to Waste?, supra note 24; McCaffery, Uneasy Case, supra 
note 165; Smith, supra note 54, at 778. It is curious that some argue against this moralism, 
while advocating, explicitly or implicitly, for progressive income tax rates. It is difficult to see 
why the harm from unequal earnings is greater than the harm from unequal spending, 
especially when a tax system can constrain what can be done with the earnings. The problem 
of the accumulated capital itself is, of course, a different matter, which I have addressed 
elsewhere and note again below, infra Part VII.B.4. See McCaffery, Being the Best, supra 
note 15; Edward J. McCaffery, The Political Liberal Case Against the Estate Tax, 23 PHIL. & 
PUB. AFF. 281 (1994) [hereinafter McCaffery, Political Liberal Case]; but see Rakowski, 
supra note 15; Deborah Geier, Incremental Versus Fundamental Tax Reform and the Top 
One Percent, 56 SMU L. REV. 99 (2003). 
198. Deborah M. Weiss, Paternalistic Pension Policy: Psychological Evidence and 
Economic Theory, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 1275 (1991). 
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V. IN PRACTICE: THE MESS WE'VE MADE, 
PART ONE - THE INCOME TAX 
885 
We now leave the comfortable towers of ideal theory, and descend 
into the devilish details of practice. The key insight of Andrews's 1974 
article was that the income tax was badly deficient when it came to 
getting at the savings component of the right-hand side of the Haig­
Simons definition of income, 
Income = Consumption + Savings. [1 )199 
Andrews argued for a more consistent treatment of savings, in the 
form of its systematic exclusion, on essentially second-best grounds: 
even if we should tax all savings, as a matter of ideal theory, the fact 
that we do so only erratically, as a practical matter, suggests that we 
abandon the attempt in the name of consistency and fairness. Andrews 
ran into trouble when he tried to superimpose a possible first-best 
justification for the logically concomitant shift to a consumption tax.200 
But there was no denying the facts of the matter: the so-called income 
tax was erratic in getting at savings, at best. Under the traditional 
understanding of tax, any failure to get at savings results in a 
consumption tax. Thus scholars and commentators, beginning with 
Andrews himself, began calling the existing tax a "hybrid" one, a mix 
of income and consumption tax elements.201 
The new understanding of tax shows that the conflation of prepaid 
and postpaid consumption tax models in the traditional view has 
limited the understanding of the status quo. Once we have come to 
understand that prepaid and postpaid consumption taxes are not 
equivalent under progressive tax rates, we want to know, specifically, 
what kind of consumption tax we have and should have, in whole or in 
part. The new understanding opens the door to a more nuanced 
critique of the present tax. 
Much of tax policy since the 1970s, and especially in the last few 
years, has involved a steady drift towards a specifically prepaid 
consumption tax. Tax falls fully on labor earnings as they come into 
199. Professor Andrews wrote: 
[T)he ultimate policy choice to be made is between achievable ends, not abstract ideals. 
Most of my prior article [Andrews, Personal Income Tax, supra note 8) was designed to 
show that the most intractable difficulties in the existing income tax arise from the virtual 
impossibility of achieving a satisfactory reflection of real accumulation in a practical income 
tax base, and that these difficulties could be readily avoided by pursuing the goal of 
consumption instead of accretion. 
See Andrews, Reply to Professor Warren, supra note 16, at 947. 
200. See Andrews, Personal Income Tax, supra note 8, at 1 167-68. 
201. The phrase was first used in Andrews, Personal Income Tax, supra note 8, at 1 1 17. 
See also Auerbach, supra note 42; McCaffery, Hybrid, supra note 23. 
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households, but any subsequent taxation on accumulated financial 
capital or its yield is easily avoided. Taxes on the yield to capital have 
become voluntary in important ways. This is a fact, and one we ought 
to be confronting far more forcefully in our practical as well as 
normative tax policy.202 Over time, the real fault line in practical 
income tax policy has become to preserve the tax as an effective wage 
tax, while making sure that the gaps on the capital side - holes that 
the system seemingly lacks the will, the way, or both, to fill up - do 
not spill over to engulf the labor side. The Tax Reform Act of 1986, 
considered at some length below, is the grand example of this 
phenomenon. We are slowly, seemingly inexorably, drifting towards a 
prepaid consumption or wage tax. We will wake up soon with a flat 
tax, seemingly against our very own wishes.203 
The traditional view of tax continues to argue for an "income" tax 
as if we have had, have now, or ever will have one, in opposition to the 
movement towards a prepaid consumption tax. But the real choice -
the only choice - is what kind of consumption tax to have. This Part 
aims to drive this point home, loud and clear. It canvasses what is 
wrong with the actual income tax as a practical matter. There are both 
structural and seemingly ad hoc deviations from the income tax's 
commitment to taxing savings. Ironically, it is the ad hoc deviations 
that point the way towards a better future for tax; the structural gaps, 
nightmares of tax past, haunt its present. We start with these 
deficiencies. 
A. Structural Gaps 
The problems with the "income" tax begin - and, to some 
considerable extent, end - with Eisner v. Macomber,204 a 1920 
decision of the United States Supreme Court that dealt with the timing 
of taxation, although the Court itself and the parties before it were 
slow to see the true stakes involved.205 
Mrs. Macomber, a shareholder in Standard Oil, had received a 
"stock on stock" dividend. To simplify the actual math of the matter, 
assume that this was a one-for-one stock "split." In other words, Mrs. 
Macomber, who one day held 100 shares of stock, found herself 
202. See Edward J. McCaffery, A Voluntary Tax? Revisited, Proceedings, 93rd Annual 
Conference of the National Tax Association, 2000, 268 (2001) (hereinafter McCaffery, A 
Voluntary Tax?); see also ROBERT T. KIYOSAKI & SHARON L. LECHTER, RICH DAD, POOR 
DAD (1997). 
203. Norquist, president of Americans for Tax Reform, notes that piecemeal tax 
measures are bringing us ever closer to a flat tax. See Norquist, supra note 109. 
204. 252 U.S. 189 (1920). 
205. For additional detail, see Majorie E. Kornhauser, The Story of Macomber: The 
Continuing Legacy of Realization, in TAX STORIES 53 (Paul L. Caron ed., 2003). 
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owning 200 shares the next day. Since every other shareholder 
received the same split, the occasion was not itself an accession to 
wealth. The number of outstanding shares of stock had simply doubled 
across the board and - minor frictions aside - the value of each 
share of stock, necessarily, fell by half. If each of Mrs. Macomber's 100 
shares had been worth $10 each before the split, she would have had 
200 shares worth $5 each after it. Mrs. Macomber's total value of 
Standard Oil stock holdings would be $1,000 before and after the 
paper transaction. 
The much-watched case made it all the way to the Supreme Court. 
It was clear that the government was having a hard time articulating 
its reasoning for imposing a tax on the unlucky Mrs. Macomber, and 
the case actually went through two hearings before the Court. 206 
Finally, the government got to the crux of the matter. Conceding that 
the actual stock dividend was not an accession to wealth, and that it 
was not the "new" shares of stock, per se, that it was attempting to tax, 
the government argued instead that the "income" had come from the 
antecedent rise in value of Mrs. Macomber's shareholdings, which the 
government could have taxed whenever it chose to; the moment of the 
stock on stock dividend was merely a "convenient" time to do so. This 
argument sounds in Haig-Simons income. The words Simons actually 
used to describe the savings component of income were, after all, "the 
change in value of the store of property rights between the beginning 
and end of the period in question. "207 Suppose Mrs. Macomber had 
purchased the stock some years ago for $200. It was now worth $1,000. 
Mrs. Macomber had "income" of $800 in the Haig-Simons sense - at 
some time - because of the "change in value of the store of her 
property rights." 
Unfortunately for the government, by the time it got around to 
making its argument, the Justices rejected all of its claims by a five-to­
four count. Mrs. Macomber would have no taxable income until and 
unless she "realized" the gain in her stock, as by selling it. The 
"realization requirement" announced in Macomber is simple enough 
to understand. Its logic is compelling, even: Why should taxpayers pay 
a tax without a transaction generating the cash with which to pay it? 
Why not wait until a sale or other disposition to get at the gain?208 The 
answers given to these rhetorical questions in the context of an income 
tax - that it was indeed alright to wait and see, and pay later - are 
devastating. The time value of money suggests that a tax paid later is 
206. Macomber was first argued before the Court on April 16, 1919, restored to docket 
for reargument May 19, 1919, and reargued October 17 and 20, 1919. The decision was 
handed down March 8, 1920. 
207. See SIMONS, supra note 29, at 50. 
208. See I.RC. § lOOl(a) (2004). 
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better, to a taxpayer, than the same tax paid sooner.209 Worse yet, the 
confluence of the realization requirement with two other structural 
features of the income tax combine to make any tax on the yield to 
capital, however and whenever used, voluntary. Macomber marked 
the end of the income tax, still in its first decade of existence; as 
Andrews later put the matter, the realization requirement was "the 
Achilles' heel" of the income tax.210 Recall that, with Achilles himself, 
the seemingly minor flaw proved fatal. 
1. Tax Planning 101 
The realization requirement has a simple, intuitive appeal: indeed, 
a postpaid consumption tax operates much along a realization model, 
deferring the time of tax until capital is converted into cash for 
consumption.211 The problem is that the realization doctrine given 
birth by Macomber did not spring into existence under a postpaid 
consumption tax. It was engrafted onto a theoretical income tax. This 
is a fatal flaw. 
Recall the income tax's principled nontaxation of debt. Combined 
with Macomber's realization requirement, this means that one can 
borrow - directly or indirectly using appreciated assets like Mrs. 
Macomber's stock as collateral and consume, tax-free. 
Consumption financed by debt backed by capital assets falls out of the 
tax base for an income-with-realization tax. Far from simply missing 
an element of savings, or the yield to capital, the actual income tax fails 
to reach the personal spending of the propertied classes. In such a case, 
there can in fact be no savings: if the borrowing to consume precisely 
offsets the rise in value of the assets - as it will in the numeric 
example set out below - there is no net accretion to wealth. There is 
simply consumption without taxation. The perverse result derives 
from the conjunction of two timing rules under the flawed income tax: 
first, the "wait until realization" doctrine of Macomber, and, second, 
the "wait until debt is repaid" doctrine inherent in the Haig-Simons 
definition of income. By using unrealized assets to help obtain debt 
financing now,212 the savvy taxpayer gets to have her cake and eat it, 
tax-free, too. 
209. CHIRELSTEIN, supra note 56, at 2-3; Andrews, Personal Income Tax, supra note 8, 
at 1123-24; see generally Halperin, supra note 73. 
210. See William D. Andrews, The Achilles' Heel of the Comprehensive Income Tax, in 
NEW DIRECTIONS IN FEDERAL TAX POLICY FOR THE 1980s, at 278, 280 (Charis E. Walker 
& Mark A. Bloomfield eds., 1983). 
211. For an interesting discussion of the realization requirement, see Terrence R. 
Chorvat, Perception and Income: The Behavioral Economics of the Realization Doctrine, 36 
CONN. L. REV. 75 (2003). 
212. Note that the result does not turn on any literal pledging of assets as security, 
though this might lead to more favorable credit terms. 
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Eventually, it would seem, things must work out and the books 
become balanced: the debt must be repaid, with nondeductible or 
after-tax dollars from fresh labor-market earnings or realized capital 
transactions, and a tax will be paid. Later is better than sooner, so the 
taxpayer has still gained an advantage from holding and borrowing, 
but at least a tax will get paid eventually. Yet "later" may never come 
when we add a third doctrinal feature of the status quo, not unrelated 
to the Macomber story: the "stepped-up basis" for assets acquired on 
death.213 This statutory doctrine provides that assets acquired from a 
decedent shall have a taxable "basis" equal to the fair market value of 
the property on date of death.214 This means that an heir, who acquires 
the property itself tax-free,215 can also sell it the next day, tax-free.216 
The stepped-up basis rule structurally follows from the realization 
requirement. Macomber alone gave taxpayers an incentive to acquire 
the kind of assets that rise in value without producing taxable cash, in 
the form of interests and dividends: Such disfavored assets walk head­
on into Mill's second tax, whereas the realization requirement gives a 
way to defer the government's second bite at the apple for non-cash­
generating property. The realization requirement destroys the source 
neutrality of an ideal income tax. Assets that go up in value via price 
appreciation alone, such as growth stocks, land, art, and so on, have an 
advantage over simple bonds and bank accounts that produce readily 
observable cash flows to their holders.217 In the wake of Macomber, 
the rich and well advised could be expected to acquire capital assets; 
the financial markets could be expected to generate such assets. They 
did. Further, Macomber gave wealthy taxpayers an incentive to hold 
onto their "winners," even as they could sell their "losers."218 The 
ability to borrow tax-free meant that holding onto appreciated assets 
need not entail any personal sacrifice in consumptive lifestyle. And so 
it came to pass, predictably enough, that the economy became full of 
assets with "built-in gain;" that is, assets that had a tax "basis" equal to 
their initial cost, but a fair market value far in excess of this historic 
213. See I.RC. § 1014 (2004). 
214. See id. For a definition of "basis," see MCCAFFERY, FAIR NOT FLAT, supra note 2, 
at 30 ("Basis means, in essence, after-tax dollars."). I prefer this definition to the often-used 
definition of "cost" in part because of the stepped-up basis rule. 
215. I.R.C. § 102 (2004). 
216. The stepped-up basis under I.RC. § 1014 (2004) means that the gain calculated 
under I.RC. § 1001 (2004) will be zero. 
217. See KIYOSAKI & LECHTER, supra note 202. The holders of appreciating assets that 
do not produce cash flows can simply borrow against the increase in value of such assets, 
thereby gaining access to cash without the tax liability of assets that generate realized 
proceeds. 
218. The tax benefits of this strategy are subjec�. to capital loss offset rules, discussed 
infra Part V.B.2. 
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figure. Just like Mrs. Macomber's stock, in the numbers given above, 
had a basis of $200 and a fair market value of $1,000. 
This built-in gain had to be preserved in the case of gifts among the 
living, or any taxation on capital assets would be trivially avoided. 
Mrs. Macomber could simply give her stock to her husband or child, 
who could sell it, tax-free, and perhaps later gift the cash back to her. 
Hence the law instituted a "carryover" basis regime for gifts, 
preserving the donor's basis in the donee's hands.219 But what of assets 
passed on after death? Heirs complained that it was unfair to saddle 
them with the inherent tax liability; it was also a practical nightmare to 
figure out the deceased's basis in the assets. The tax system 
compromised by putting in place a separate gift and estate tax to get at 
the net wealth of the truly rich decedents, and allowing everyone to 
acquire assets from a decedent with a basis equal to their then fair 
market value - the stepped-up basis rule.220 
As with the realization requirement, the stepped-up basis rule -
for those who can understand it at all - makes a certain sense, in 
isolation. Yet when put together with the realization requirement and 
the nontaxation of debt, one has all that she needs to understand "Tax 
Planning 101 ."  This is simple tax planning doctrine that tax students 
can learn on the first day of a course in basic federal income taxation 
- doctrine that underscores how easy it is for those with stocks of 





That is it. By buying capital assets that appreciate without producing 
taxable dividends; selling one's losers and holding one's winners; 
borrowing to finance present consumption; and continuing the game 
straight on to death, the rich and well advised can avoid all federal 
taxes. Tax Planning 101, as just set out, avoids income tax to the 
spender and to her heirs. It avoids the increasingly important social 
security or payroll tax system, as discussed in the next Part below, for 
its wealthy practitioners by the simple expedient of their never 
actually working. Tax Planning 101 avoids the estate tax because that 
is a net tax levied on assets minus liabilities held at death - but if Tax 
219. I.R.C. § 1015 (2004); see also Taft v. Bowers, 278 U.S. 470 (1929) (upholding 
carryover basis for gifts). 
220. See I.RC. § 1014 (2004). Joseph Dodge and Jay Soled have suggested that 
taxpayers may not even be waiting until death to avoid gain legally. Instead they seem to be 
inflating the basis of assets sold during life, knowingly or unknowingly cheating on their 
taxes. See Joseph M. Dodge & Jay A. Soled, Inflated Basis and the Quarter-Trillion Dollar 
Revenue Question, 106 TAX NOTES 453 (2005). 
221. See MCCAFFERY, FAIR NOT FLAT, supra note 2, at 32-33. 
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Planning 101 is taken to its limits, there is no net estate. Tax Planning 
101 means no taxes, notwithstanding a comfortable lifestyle for those 
with the assets in hand to play it. 
2. An Example 
To illustrate Tax Planning 101, consider the curious case of Artful 
Dodger.222 Imagine that Dodger somehow has $1,000,000 after taxes. 
How he got it does not really matter, although it is worth noting that 
he could have gotten it tax-free from his parents.223 With this stock of 
cash, Dodger buys assets. Not just any assets, but the kinds of assets 
that rise in value without producing taxable cash dividends: growth 
stocks, say, or land, art, sports franchises even. Dodger sells any assets 
that go down in value, taking tax losses when he can, carrying them 
forward when he cannot.224 
Suppose that the general return on investments is 10 percent. 
Dodger's $1,000,000, prudently invested, rises in value to $1,100,000 
after one year. He pays no tax on this "mere appreciation" under 
Macomber. This might appear to be all fine and good, because Dodger 
is continuing to save, and so should not be taxed under the logic of a 
consumption tax, and can await taxation under the logic of an income­
with-realization-tax. The trouble is, Dodger need not be saving at all. 
He could be consuming away. 
Dodger borrows $100,000. He pays no tax on this because 
borrowing is not income under the Haig-Simons definition. Dodger 
can spend away, living as well as a wage earner making $200,000, but 
subject to a 50 percent combined federal, state, and local income and 
payroll tax burden. At the end of Year 1 ,  Dodger's net worth is 
$1,000,000: his $1,100,000 portfolio minus his $100,000 principal debt 
balance. 
Dodger must pay interest on his debt. But he also has his assets, 
which he has maintained by borrowing.225 So, in Year 2, the $1,100,000 
portfolio goes up by another 10 percent, or $110,000, to a net of 
222. This example is borrowed from id. at 33-34. 
223. See I.R.C. § 102 (2004). Of course, his parents would have, at one time, paid tax on 
the initial labor market earnings, see Warren, supra note 13, at 934-41, unless they happen to 
have received these before the initial imposition of the tax. See Bittker, supra note 184. 
224. I.R.C. § 1211 (2004). 
225. Suppose, for example, that Dodger has $1 million worth of assets. He can sell the 
assets, pay the tax now, and spend what is left, say $600,000 with a 40% effective tax. Or 
Dodger can instead borrow against the asset and consume tax-free. If he borrows $600,000 at 
a 5% interest rate, he also retains the asset, worth $1 million and appreciating at its own rate. 
He can buy a "collar" or enter a "stop loss" order should his assets ever fall in value, which 
would leave him in the same financial position as he would have been in with an initial sale. 
But if the assets do not fall in value, he wins. The net cost of borrowing is i - r, where i is the 
interest on the debt and r the return on the asset. If r exceeds i, as it typically would, Dodger 
makes real value on the strategy. He has his cake and is eating it, too, tax-free. 
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$1,210,000. Dodger promptly borrows this $110,000. He uses $10,000 
to pay off the interest on his Year 1 debt, and $100,000 to consume. At 
the end of the year, his net wealth is $1,000,000: a portfolio of 
$1,210,000 minus $210,000 in debt. 
As long as his portfolio rises by the same amount as the interest on 
his debt, Dodger never pays tax, always has $100,000 of consumption, 
and always maintains his $1,000,000 net wealth. If he can borrow less 
principal than the rise in his portfolio - live at a $50,000 level, say, or, 
in the case of Bill Gates, a few billion - and if the appreciation in his 
portfolio exceeds the interest rate on his debt over time, he keeps 
getting richer. If he needs to diversify his portfolio, not to worry: 
clever tax lawyers and accountants have devised ways to do just that, 
such as by various "mixing bowl" transactions, tax-free.226 Too much 
risk? Not to worry: various financial instruments, such as "cuffs" and 
"collars" come to the rescue.227 Much simpler devices, such as 
universal life insurance policies, can do the trick as well.228 
Neither Dodger nor his estate, in this example, will ever pay any 
gift or estate tax. When Dodger dies, his heirs will inherit his assets 
income-tax free.229 They can sell them off for no gain because of the 
stepped-up basis rule.230 Then they can pay off Dodger's debts and 
keep whatever cash is left over. As long as Dodger has borrowed 
enough to bring his net estate below $1,500,000 or so - actually, 
below $3.5 million under current law, in 2009, or infinity, in 2010231 -
no estate tax will be due. 
This is all, of course, nice work - if you can get it. One can indeed 
get it - if she has wealth to start - under today's tax laws featuring a 
nominal income tax. 
3. The Practical Facts of the Matter 
How many rich Americans take Tax Planning 101 to its limits, 
avoiding all taxes, is an empirical question that is rather hard to 
226. For a discussion and explanation of mixing bowl transactions, see Louis S. Freeman 
et al., The Partnership Union: Opportunities for Joint Ventures and Divestitures, in TAX 
PLANNING FOR DOMESTIC & FOREIGN PARTNERSHIPS, LLCS, JOINT VENTURES & OTHER 
STRATEGIC ALLIANCES 117-22 (2004). 
227. See, e.g., James Bicksler & Andrew H. Chen, An Economic Analysis of Interest 
Rate Swaps, 41 J. FIN. 645, 652 (1986); Phyllis Plitch, Esoteric Tactic for Investors Grows 
Popular, WALL ST. J., May 27, 1997, at B 105B (describing the use of collars). 
228. See, e.g., Farhad Aghdami, Income, Gift, and Estate Tax Planning with Life 
Insurance, ALI-ABA's Direct-to-Desktop CLE Course Forms, at http://d2d.ali­
aba.org/_files/thumbs/rtf/ CK025-05AghdamiLifelns_thumb.pdf (last visited Feb. 1, 2005). 
229. I.R.C. § 102 (2004). 
230. I.R.C. § 1014 (2004). 
231. Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-16, § 
521, 1 15 Stat. 71 (2001 ). 
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answer. The very rich are relatively few, and their ways are more or 
less a secret.232 Certainly, plenty do follow Tax Planning 101, in some 
form; the advice is readily available.233 It is also apparent, from the 
facts that some estates pay estate taxes and that some among the living 
do indeed pay some capital gains taxes, that not all who could take the 
game to its limits do so. Quantifying the narrow bottom-line 
consequences is elusive. But these very questions (i.e., how many 
people avoid capital taxes?) form the analytic basis for a 
consequentialist defense of maintaining the status quo with its porous 
income tax.234 If few individuals actually take Tax Planning 101 to or 
near its limits, perhaps things are not so bad after all, contra to 
Andrews's and other critics' dire descriptions of the way things are. 
Yet things in tax today are bad, and for several reasons 
notwithstanding the intractability of the empirical questions over Tax 
Planning 101 's actual breadth. First, there can be no doubt - certainly 
none of the critics calling for more empirical analysis or pressing the 
consequentialist objection raise any doubts- about the analytic facts 
of the matter, that is, about the legal steps in Tax Planning 101 's 
buy/borrow/die advice. This is basic tax. Yet the mere existence of this 
legal structure raises troubling questions of both equity and efficiency. 
If some but not all who have capital take advantage of Tax Planning 
101 , in whole or in part, what does this tell us about the fairness of the 
tax system? The essence of the claim that tax for those with capital is 
voluntary is not that no one with capital pays taxes - people do 
voluntary things, even voluntarily pay taxes - it is rather that no one 
with capital has to do so.235 There are perfectly legitimate ways for 
people with property to avoid paying any federal taxes. This is not so 
- it is dramatically not so - for people earning labor wages, as we 
shall see. A system of tax that marks radical distinctions between the 
sources of present consumption, and that turns further on wealthy 
taxpayers' varying degrees of tax aversion and access to information 
- not even terribly sophisticated information, for the basics of 
buy/borrow/die are indeed fairly basic - is at best a highly suspect 
system. 
232. See Douglas Holtz-Eakin, The Uneasy Empirical Case for Abolishing the Estate 
Tax, 51  TAX L. REV. 495, 509-11 (1996) (discussing the difficulty in gleaning the motives and 
techniques of wealth transfers). 
233. The advice can be found readily enough, for example, in such bestsellers as 
KIYOSAKI & LECHTER, supra note 202; POLLAN & LEVINE, supra note 169; see also 
MCCAFFERY, FAIR NOT FLAT, supra note 2 (describing and referring to numerous popular 
tax planning books). Evidence from sophisticated econometrics that we collect little if any 
revenue from capital taxes also suggests the point. See Roger Gordon et al., Do We Now 
Collect Any Revenue from Taxing Capital Income? 89 J. PUB. ECON. 981 (2004). 
234. See Geier, supra note 197. 
235. See McCaffery, A Voluntary Tax?, supra note 202; Gordon et al., supra note 233. 
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Second, and central to the analysis to follow in this subsection, the 
mere analytic facts of Tax Planning 101 - and not the breadth of their 
actual incidence - constrain important matters of practical tax design. 
In the language of economics, features such as low tax rates on 
realization are "endogenous" to an income-with-realization regime. 
There is simply no very good way, under an "income" tax with the 
realization requirement as now construed, to heavily burden capital: If 
taxpayers are not flocking to advisers to avoid a 15 percent capital 
gains tax, might they not do so at a 40, or 50 percent level? Evidence 
that some taxpayers pay some capital gains taxes at the favorable rates 
that persist today does not contradict the fact that these are, indeed, 
favorable capital gains rates.236 The present structure of tax haunts the 
possibilities for tax's better future. 
Third, the discussion might be effete, lacking in practical urgency, 
if the present regime, with its income-plus-estate taxes, embodied the 
only meaningful promise of getting at capital and its yield at all. The 
most strident critics of any form of consumption tax insist on the yield­
to-capital norm, though they do not use this language.237 To such 
critics, getting some tax on some capital is better than getting no tax 
on any capital, which is what they take a consumption tax to offer. But 
this false dichotomy follows only from the flawed traditional view of 
tax. Once we understand that a progressive postpaid consumption tax 
gets at some of the yield to capital, and in just the cases in which it is 
most compelling to do so - and also as we come to see that the 
structure of a postpaid consumption tax changes the nature of the 
arguments over the rate structure, allowing for more, not less, 
progression in them - we are no longer left clinging to a porous 
income tax as the sole hope for reaching capital and its yield. On ideal 
terms, an income tax overshoots its mark by double-taxing all capital 
come what may; in nonideal terms, an income tax fails minimal 
standards of fairness and rationality by taxing the yield to capital only 
among those most willing to pay it, or unwilling or unable to plan 
around it. A better way exists. 
The balance of this subsection traces out a few of the analytic 
elements of the present income tax regime that have followed in the 
structural wake of Macomber. 
a. Capital gains preferences. The leading example of a provision in 
current law that follows from Macomber - a practical concession to 
the fact that we have an income-with-realization tax - is the 
preferential rate for capital gains.238 This is the tax rate that gets 
236. And see Dodge & Soled, supra note 220, for a suggestion that taxpayers are 
dramatically under-stating their true capital gains. 
237. See, e.g. , MURPHY & NAGEL, supra note 6; SLEMROD & BAKUA, supra note 7, at 
10-13; Alstott, supra note 6; Deborah A. Geier, supra note 197; Rakowski, supra note 15. 
238. l.R.C. § l(h) (2004). 
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imposed when and if a taxpayer sells or otherwise disposes of her 
long-held, capital assets.239 This rate has long been set at a fraction of 
the "ordinary" tax rates that fall on labor and the regular yield to 
capital in the form of interest and dividends. It is now capped at a 
maximum 15 percent, having been reduced from 20 percent in 2003 
tax legislation.240 
Of all the arguments mustered in favor of a capital gains 
preference, the only truly compelling one is brute necessity in the face 
of Tax Planning 101: Who would ever sell an asset and incur a 90 
percent, or 70 percent, or even 40 percent tax when she could borrow 
against it and spend away, tax-free?241 The realization requirement 
generates a so-called lock-in effect, set in motion by Macomber: a 
wedge between an owner's willingness to sell a given asset and a 
buyer's willingness to pay for it, all on account of the built-in tax 
liability. Suppose, for example, that Mrs. Macomber had a personal 
subjective valuation in her stock of $800; a third party buyer would 
willingly pay her $1 ,000. This is a deal that wealth (and welfare) 
maximizing suggests ought to happen. But if, on sale, Mrs. Macomber 
would have to pay $400 in taxes, her personal gain from the exchange 
would be only $600, less than her subjective valuation. Since Mrs. 
Macomber quite rationally cares only about her after-tax return, the 
deal does not transpire. At high enough tax rates, there are many 
deals that do not take place. The resulting lock-in effect threatens to 
shut down the economy: assets will not trade and, therefore, will not 
go to their highest and best use and users. This problem, in simple 
terms, is a function of the timing of tax: by making sales and exchanges 
trigger tax, an income-with-realization requirement deters sales and 
239. See l.R.C. §§ 1221 (2004), 1222 (2002) for a definition of capital assets. 
240. Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-27, § 301, 
117 Stat. 758 (2003). 
241. Other common arguments for a capital gains preference are simply not convincing. 
For example, there is an argument that much of the gain from the sale of an asset reflects 
compensation for inflation. This argument, made before general rate-bracket indexing, 
lacked a strong claim to fairness, because much of the return to human capital, too, 
compensated for changes in the inflation or monetary rate. After rate-bracket indexing 
became fully effective, the capital gains argument lacked much force. Further, indexing of an 
asset's basis for inflation is a far better reaction to the "problem" of inflationary gain than a 
crude discount to all assets held a year or more. Another argument is that capital gains can 
result in "bunching," or the temporary elevation of a taxpayer into a higher-rate bracket. In 
fact, the evidence on bunching of capital realizations is slim; and capital market transactions, 
such as installment sales, (see l.R.C. § 453 (2004)) can deal with the problem, as could a 
more targeted averaging mechanism in the tax laws. And again, it is unclear why there 
should be solicitude for the taxpayers with financial capital who suffer this problem, when 
there is no adjustment for those with human capital who also fall victim to bunching. This 
Article is an attempt to make the smoothing phenomenon general, and to be indifferent to 
the financial/human capital source of the problem. All that said, however, the lock-in effect 
is a compelling argument for a capital gains preference. See Edward J. McCaffery, Capital 
Gains: What's the Point, and Are We Missing It?, 43 TAX NOTES 223 (1989). 
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exchanges. This is not the case under a consistent postpaid 
consumption tax: sales or exchanges of any investment asset followed 
by reinvestment of the proceeds in other assets do not trigger tax -
think of making adjustments inside an IRA or 401(k) plan. All that 
triggers a tax under a postpaid consumption tax is the decision to 
spend resources on private preclusive use. 
Under an income-with-realization tax, some preference for capital 
gains is needed to lubricate the wheels of commerce, to keep the game 
going. All that is left is to haggle over the price, as the saying goes, and 
the political system is indeed constantly flirting with lowering the rates 
further. By deferring Mill's "second" tax, Macomber moves the system 
toward a prepaid consumption tax; by lowering the magnitude of the 
ultimate second tax hit, capital gains preferences - which follow from 
Macomber and the lock-in effect that a realization requirement 
generates - take us further in that direction. Of course, holding assets 
until death in the manner of Tax Planning 101 's buy/borrow/die 
strategy is the limiting case: Here, the second tax, like Beckett's 
Godot, never comes.242 
Capital gain preferences are a microcosm of what is wrong with the 
status quo. We have seen, with Vickrey, that the principal reason to 
have a comprehensive individual tax system is to make individuated 
judgments of the appropriate progressivity of effective tax burdens. 
But the low rate on capital gains, dictated by the flaws of an income­
with-realization tax, is a crude and across-the-board affair - it is not 
individuated at all. A capital gains preference is also source driven, a 
distinction based on the type of asset held and sold. It does not matter 
how one uses the proceeds - to smooth or to enhance, for oneself or 
another. Progressivity suffers, and individuation suffers, on the altar of 
the practical constraints of analytic tax system design. 
b. Corporate dividend preferences. The 2003 tax act - one of 
several leading exhibits in making out the case that practical tax policy 
is moving towards a flat wage tax - not only lowered the capital gains 
rate to 15 percent, as discussed above, but it also extended this rate to 
corporate dividends, which had traditionally been taxed at ordinary 
income levels.243 The lowered or nontaxation of corporate dividends is 
an intricate economic matter that turned out to be an intricate political 
one as well. For present purposes, two themes are important. 
One, this development plausibly follows from the structure of an 
income-with-realization tax. Just as Macomber generated a lock-in 
effect at the level of individual asset owners - generating a 
242. Dodge & Soled, supra note 220, suggest taxpayers aren't waiting for Godot, either: 
They are taking matters into their own hands, overstating basis and thereby understating 
gain. l.R.C. § lOOl(a) (2004). 
243. Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act § 302; see also, STEUERLE, supra 
note 9, at 224-25. 
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disincentive for them ever to sell their holdings - so too did it 
generate a lock-in effect, dubbed a "retained earnings trap," at the 
corporate level. Focusing solely on the individual tax consequences, a 
wealthy investor like Dodger would understandably look askance at a 
corporation paying him large cash dividends, taxable at ordinary rates 
that hit 90 percent and higher in the twentieth century. Better for the 
corporation to keep the cash itself and reinvest, so that the value of 
Dodger's shares would grow tax-free, like Mrs. Macomber's, until and 
unless he decided to trigger a realization event by a sale, at which time 
the tax would fall due at the much lower individual capital gains rates. 
The retained-earnings trap gave American corporations a good reason 
to hoard cash; at one point recently, Microsoft had $56 billion in cash 
on hand.244 One way to get corporations to disgorge their cash holdings 
- making companies smaller in the process - is to lower or eliminate 
the tax on corporate dividends at the individual investor level.245 
Two, the corporate dividend tax rate reduction is yet another step 
towards a relatively flat prepaid consumption tax. Tax Planning 101 
points the way for those with capital to avoid paying any further 
federal tax whatsoever.246 But for those with stocks of capital unwilling 
or unable to take this advice, life continues to get better, tax-wise, in 
any event. Virtually all subsequent taxes on capital are being 
eliminated or reduced. And as with the capital gains preference, an 
argument for the normative propriety of a corporate dividend 
preference is not an individuated argument at all: anyone who owns 
corporate stocks will see her dividends taxed at 15 percent, however 
wealthy she is, and for whatever use she puts the cash.247 
c. Other consumption-tax elements. Preference for those capital 
gains actually realized and corporate dividends received are just two 
tips of a large iceberg. As Andrews was well aware, consumption tax 
elements abound in the so-called income tax. But what has not been 
generally noticed, on account of the continued hegemony of the 
traditional view of tax, which has equated all forms of consumption 
tax, is how much of the current income tax is in fact a specifically 
244. Brier Dudley, Microsoft's $75 Billion Plan: Share Wealth with Investors, SEATILE 
TIMES, July 21, 2004, at Al; Gary Rivlin, Microsoft to Pay Special Dividend to Stockholders, 
N.Y. TIMES, July 21, 2004, at Al; see also Jonathan Fuerbringer, Companies With Cash 
Hoards Don't Necessarily Pay It Out, N.Y. TIMES, July 22, 2004, at C7. 
245. The incentive appears to have worked. See CHRIS EDWARDS, REPLACING THE 
SCANDAL-PLAGUED CORPORATE INCOME TAX WITH A CASH-FLOW TAX 23 (Cato Inst., 
Policy Analysis No. 484, 2003), at http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa-484es.html (Aug.14, 
2003). 
246. See supra Part V.A.1 .  
247. Del Jones, CEOs, Heirs to Stock Fortunes Win Big with Cut, USA TODAY, Jan. 9,  
2003, at 3B (noting that each of the five Walton heirs would save $197 million annually in 
taxes if dividends were tax-free). 
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prepaid consumption or wage tax model. Consider a few more 
doctrinal matters. 
In cash-value life insurance, a taxpayer overpays for the pure 
actuarial or "term" component of insurance. The insurance company 
then invests the excess, on her account. The taxpayer pays no tax, 
basically because of Macomber, on the "inside build up" of 
appreciation, even if the insurance company buys assets such as bonds 
that would produce ordinary income in her hands. When she dies and 
her heirs get the proceeds, these are income tax-free to them,248 and 
with rather trivial planning, the policy's value will not count in her 
estate for federal tax purposes.249 As with most instances of clever tax 
planning, this device does not work only for the altruistic or 
intergenerationally minded; taxpayers are free to borrow against the 
cash value of their policy, tax-free. In such a case, when the insured 
dies, the insurance company first pays itself off, and her heirs - if she 
has taken this game to its limit - get nothing.250 This is simply a one­
stop shopping way to play Tax Planning 101, buy/borrow/die. It is also 
prepaid consumption tax treatment: the taxpayer pays taxes on her 
wages, uses them to pay insurance premia, and never again pays tax. 
For a good many Americans, their most significant asset is a house. 
Although home mortgage interest is deductible, principal payments 
are not. The economics of home ownership work under a prepaid 
consumption tax model. One buys the asset with after-tax funds, but 
does not pay tax on its yield - the very important opportunity cost 
benefit of not having to pay rent. Further, when a married couple sells 
their house, they get to take away up to $500,000 of gain, tax-free.251 
That will cover most homeowners, of course; for those with larger 
shares of appreciation, there might be a 15 percent capital gains tax on 
the excess of gain over $500,000. The saga of the taxability of home 
sales under the income tax, like so much of tax today, owes much to 
Macomber. The realization requirement means that capital 
appreciation in personal residences gets ignored as it accrues, awaiting 
an ultimate sale or disposition. But here too there is a lock-in effect, 
deterring families from "trading up" to get larger homes, or moving to 
a different area for job-related or other reasons. To deal with these 
problems, the law employed a "rollover" provision for many years, 
allowing the built-in tax gain to follow the family's real estate moves.252 
248. I.RC. § 101 (2004). 
249. See generally I.RC. § 2042 (2004). 
250. Cf Knetsch v. United States, 364 U.S. 361, 364-66 (1960) (describing a scenario in 
which borrowing against a life insurance policy would have left a "relative pittance"). 
Although Knetsch lost his case, much sophisticated planning with life insurance persists to 
this day. 
251 .  I.RC. § 121 (2004). 
252. I.RC. § 1034 (1988) (repealed 1997). 
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But then the elderly had a problem: Once the kids had left the nest, 
and they wanted a smaller home or to relocate to a less expensive 
area, they faced an exploding tax time bomb. So Congress dealt with 
their problem, excluding gain when taxpayers older than 55 sold a 
residence.253 Perhaps mercifully, President Clinton swept away many 
of the subtleties, allowing the $500,000 per couple exemption 
discussed above. Each step in the story made some sense. But, 
sweeping all details aside, what we are left with is an important asset 
fully taxed for most taxpayers on the prepaid consumption tax model: 
houses are bought with after-tax dollars, and their yield is never again 
taxed. 
Retirement savings are a final and very important example of 
consumption-tax treatment. I shall discuss them below, as an ad hoc 
deviation from an income tax. For these provisions follow not so much 
from the structure of an income-plus-realization tax, as from conscious 
decisions to deviate from either an income or an income-plus­
realization ideal. It is noteworthy, however, that there has been a 
trend in the retirement savings area, which began on the postpaid 
consumption tax model, towards the prepaid one. Together with the 
basic tax planning of buy/borrow/die, lower tax rates on capital 
realizations and corporate dividends, cash-value life insurance, and the 
taxation of home-ownership, the new developments in retirement 
savings help to move tax towards a world in which citizens will pay 
taxes on their wages, under a compressed rate structure, and never 
again. This is the world of prepaid consumption, or wage, taxation. 
B. A d  Hoc Deviations 
This section discusses a variety of more conscious, deliberate 
prosavings provisions, such as pension plans and IRAs, that have been 
features of the income tax since the 1940s.254 Unlike the structural 
elements just canvassed, which followed from the income-plus­
realization tax in the wake of Macomber, these prosavings 
mechanisms have resulted from a deliberate rejection of the income­
tax model. Policymakers wanted to encourage savings and wanted to 
avoid Mill's double tax. They added statutes to achieve this effect. 
Significant technical problems follow from engrafting prosavings 
provisions onto an income tax, however, on account of the analytic 
253. I.R.C. § 121 (1988) (repealed 1997). 
254. The Revenue Act of 1942. Pub. L. No. 77-753, 56 Stat. 798 (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.) first made employer pension contributions tax deductible. 
IRAs were introduced in 1974 in the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 
(ERISA), Pub. L. No. 93-406, § 202, §§ Stat. 829, 958-66 (codified as amended at 26 U.S.C. 
§§ 219, 408 (2000)). See generally Steven F. Venti & David A. Wise, Government Policy and 
Personal Retirement Saving, 6 TAX POL'Y & ECON. 1, 37-38 (1992) (data suggests IRA 
program induces "substantial new saving"). 
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inconsistency. Because one can borrow tax-free under an income tax, 
there is no logical assurance that savings will, in fact, increase with any 
nominal prosavings provision within such a tax: a taxpayer can open 
up an IRA with $2,000, using one hand, and borrow $2,000 on a credit 
card, using the other. The evidence is mixed in terms of the empirical 
questions of how much various retirement and other savings 
provisions actually increase sayings.255 But the claim that the center we 
have chosen cannot hold is once again not a narrowly empirical one; it 
is not based on aggregate macroeconomic statistics and our varying, 
imperfect understanding of them.256 The critique is based instead on 
the analytic structure of tax, and what this says about tax's fairness, 
efficiency, complexity, and possible reform. It is simply a difficult and 
scattershot affair to try to encourage and reward savings within a tax 
system ideally designed to double tax savings. 
Still, the mere presence and persistence of the ad hoc deviations 
from an income tax, however ineffective, underscore the appeal of the 
ordinary-savings norm. The structural gaps followed, more or less 
from brute necessity, after Macomber. The ad hoc deviations, in 
contrast, have been repeatedly chosen, consciously and deliberately, 
by tax policy makers. This makes their implicit norms all the more 
compelling. 
1. Retirement Savings 
Retirement savings - which, with home equity, are the major 
assets for most Americans who have any assets at all (and many 
Americans do not)257 - are taxed primarily on the postpaid 
consumption tax model; a taxpayer gets a deduction when she puts 
money into a tax-favored account, and she pays tax when she 
withdraws funds. A growing trend in tax is to allow an option for 
taxpayers to choose a retirement savings plan structured under the 
prepaid consumption tax model, such as the Roth IRA, instead of the 
traditional postpaid approach. Under these variations, there is no tax 
deduction up-front, and there is no back-ended tax on withdrawal: this 
is an equivalent matter, assuming constant tax rates, as Ant and 
Grasshopper helped us to see. 
255. See Bell, Carasso & Steuerle, supra note 149 (reporting that tax incentives for 
retirement programs in 2004 cost the government $112 billion in 2004, while all personal 
savings were $100.8 billion that year); but see generally, Venti & Wise, supra note 254, at 25 
(suggesting IRA programs do induce new saving). 
256. Our understanding is imperfect in large part because the problems are intractably 
hard. There are problems of joint causation and a great deal of noise in the economic 
statistics. 
257. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 
2003, at 469, 742 (123d ed. 2003). Nearly half of all American families do not have a 
retirement plan while about a third of all American families do not own a primary residence. 
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The proliferation of retirement savings provisions resulting from 
the addition of a prepaid track to the longstanding postpaid one is 
another side effect of the influence of the traditional view, equating 
prepaid and postpaid consumption taxes, and it has added 
considerable complexity and confusion to tax. It is also not irrelevant 
that Congress gets its one tax today under the prepaid, Roth-style 
account model, and thus it has a short-term incentive under 
contemporary budgeting rules to prefer this approach.258 Prepaid 
consumption tax savings plans also avoid the arbitrage problem noted 
above: there is no reason to borrow funds with one hand in order to 
"save" with the other, since there is no immediate tax benefit to 
savings.259 There is also no reason to borrow in lieu of making 
withdrawals from a qualified account (or in lieu of realizing gains), as 
Artful Dodger might do,260 because there is no tax on withdrawal, 
aside from penalties for early withdrawal in some cases. And yet 
moving towards a prepaid consumption tax model has a cost, one 
obscured by the traditional view but recognized by the new 
understanding of tax. This model does not allow for smoothing. Recall 
Figures 1-3, above, representing the typical pattern of earnings and 
spending in a taxpayer's life. The single tax under the prepaid model 
falls due at the time of labor market earnings, typically in a worker's 
peak income - and hence most highly taxable - years. Because there 
is no way to escape the burden of wage taxation, prepaid consumption 
tax savings plans are in tension with highly sloping marginal tax rates, 
whereas a postpaid consumption tax gives taxpayers a mechanism for 
avoiding the burden of higher rates - save, do not spend. It is not 
therefore surprising that the contemporary conservative tax reform 
movement has been moving towards prepaid consumption tax savings 
plans - as a step on the path towards flat taxes. 
The general tax treatment of retirement savings, under traditional 
IRAs and pension plans such as 401(k)s, reflects the appeal of the 
ordinary-savings norm and the appeal of favoring (or not disfavoring) 
capital-smoothing transactions. The original idea was to take some 
otherwise taxable income out of a worker's high-earning, middle-aged 
years and move it backward to the time of retirement: backward 
smoothing, in the manner of Figure 2. As noted above, these 
structures lack coherence under an income tax. When a taxpayer 
borrows and also opens an IRA, there is no net saving, just a tidy tax 
deduction. This is yet another instance where we can now understand 
258. See MCCAFFERY, FAIR NOT FLAT, supra note 2, at 50; Elizabeth Garrett, 
Accounting for the Federal Budget and Its Reform, 41 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 187, 192-93 (2004). 
259. On the other hand, one can easily shift existing taxable savings into a prepaid 
account, eliminating capital taxes without new savings. See Roger Gordon et al., Toward a 
Consumption Tax, and Beyond, 94 AMER. ECON. REV. 161 (2004) .  
260. See supra Part V.A.2. 
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that the true problem with the status quo, which seems as if it lies in 
the inconsistent treatment of savings - where Andrews had seen its 
"worst inequity and distortion" - actually relates to the inconsistent 
treatment of consumption. The taxpayer who both borrows and opens 
a deductible IRA is able to consume today, without any savings, and 
pay tax tomorrow; so too with the taxpayer who borrows in lieu of 
withdrawing from her tax-favored account. In both cases, there is a 
deferral and a possible lowering of the ultimate tax rate, but no 
savings.261 
2. More and More 
There have been two important recent developments in the field of 
ad hoc, prosavings deviations from the income tax. First, these 
accounts have extended beyond retirement uses. There are now 
medical and educational savings accounts,262 and the Bush 
Administration has proposed further savings accounts unlimited as to 
their use.263 Second, the accounts are more and more likely to be 
structured on the prepaid consumption tax model. 
Consider, for two important examples of both trends, the 
Coverdell Educational Savings Accounts (ESAs), formerly known as 
the Education IRAs, and the Section 529 Qualified Tuition Plans 
(QTPs) .264 The former works along an IRA model, but one of the 
Roth or prepaid variety. An ESA can be set up for each "qualified 
beneficiary," or child, and persons can contribute up to $2,000 per 
year per account. There is, of course, the usual array of mind-boggling 
provisions, such as ceilings for those who make too much income, and 
rules for coordination with other proeducation features, such as the 
"Hope" or (not equivalently) "Lifetime Learning" credits.265 QTPs are 
more complicated still: they must be maintained by a state or a 
261. It is worth noting, however, that the taxpayer who plays this game, using traditional 
IRAs or pension plans, cannot escape tax altogether, as can the taxpayer with financial 
capital who plays Tax Planning 101: some tax must be paid on the withdrawal of funds from 
the IRA or qualified pension account, even if the taxpayer dies before the withdrawal. I.R.C. 
§ 691 (2004) (income in respect of decedent). This is yet another example of the system's far 
greater solicitude for taxing wages than the yield to capital. 
262 See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., PUB. No. 969, HEALTH SAVINGS ACCOUNTS AND 
OTHER TAX-FAVORED HEALTH PLANS (2004), at http://www.irs.gov/publications/p969/ (last 
visited April 5, 2005); INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., PUB. No. 970, TAX BENEFITS FOR 
EDUCATION (2004), at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p970.pdf (last visited April 5, 2005) 
[hereinafter TAX BENEFITS FOR EDUCATION]. 
263. See Daniel Altman, Taxes and Consequences: The Second Term Begins, N.Y. 
nMES, Nov. 7, 2004, § 3,  at 4 (discussing inter a/ia Bush Administration proposals for 
lifetime savings and universal retirement accounts). 
264. I.RC. § 529 (2004). 
265. See I.RC. § 530 (2004); TAX BENEFITS FOR EDUCATION, supra note 262, at 9-24, 
40-49. 
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"qualified educational institution," and their coordination provisions 
are intricate. Still, at the end of the day, QTPs have more generous 
contribution limits than ESAs. QTPs, too, work along the prepaid 
consumption tax model: taxpayers can put in large sums of money 
with after-tax dollars and rest assured that the investment yield will 
not be subject to any second tax on withdrawal, provided that the 
formidable terms and conditions of the statutory grant are met.266 
An interim bottom line is that the model of allowing savings to 
escape double taxation, begun in the 1940s for retirement savings, has 
continued to grow and develop under the so-called income tax, by 
conscious government policy. The theme now extends beyond 
retirement savings to medical- and educational-related savings. And 
there has been a dramatic shift, barely noticed by those working under 
the traditional view of tax, towards having the single tax fall at the 
time of initial labor market earnings, not the time of ultimate use. 
C. Tax Shelters and the Noble Failure of TRA 86 
Both the deep structural gaps and the increasingly ad hoc, pro­
savings provisions move the income tax towards a consumption tax, as 
Andrews and others have long pointed out. Further, in a distinction 
made salient by the new understanding of tax, the law is increasingly 
moving towards a specifically prepaid consumption, or wage, tax. All 
"second" taxes on the yield to capital are voluntary under Tax 
Planning 101; those that do fall are deferred and come due at low 
marginal capital gains rates - rates whose very existence owes to the 
presence of the structural gaps themselves. More and more ad hoc 
savings provisions add to the trend, especially as they are created 
more and more frequently on the prepaid consumption tax model. 
The other side of the coin in tax is what has been happening with 
labor market returns, or wages. The income tax per se makes no 
attempt to reach beneficent market returns,267 and we have just 
considered its seriously porous commitment to taxing capital market 
returns. If the taxation of wages were porous, too, there would be 
nothing left to tax. But it is not porous: Even as the so-called income 
tax system has weakened in its taxation of capital market returns, it 
has strengthened its commitment to taxing wages. Ad hoc savings 
provisions along the prepaid model do exactly this: by denying any 
current deduction, they ensure that wages are taxed, and taxed now; 
by not taxing withdrawals, they assure that the yield to capital is never 
taxed. On the other hand, nothing in Tax Planning 101 is relevant to 
266. See I.RC. § 529 (2004); TAX BENEFITS FOR EDUCATION, supra note 262, at 50-53. 
The terms and conditions may include making the withdrawals before 2010, when the law is 
presently set to expire. 
267. See I.RC. § 102 (2004). 
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citizens who must live off the yield to their human capital, that is, off 
of their labor market wages, often paycheck to paycheck. Indeed, for 
many who are building up such human capital by borrowing and 
schooling themselves - law students, say - a depressing reality lies in 
wait. These unlucky wage-earners-to-be will have to pay off their 
student loans with after-tax dollars drawn from their high bracket 
years ahead. Their chosen path through life makes them income 
bunchers, who must rely on capital transactions to smooth 
consumption - which neither an ideal income tax nor a prepaid 
consumption tax accommodates their doing. The actual income tax, 
meanwhile, accommodates smoothing only erratically, allowing 
backward smoothing to some extent, at a price of the complexity of 
the retirement and other ad hoc savings provisions, but not forward or 
anticipatory smoothing via debt at all. And as the actual income tax 
moves ever closer to a prepaid consumption or wage tax, even this 
accommodation for backward smoothing is at risk. 
Much of the history of tax planning in the United States has been 
concerned with the situation of high wage earners and their search for 
"tax shelters." The general strategy of a tax shelter (at least before 
1986)268 is to get some of the benefits that the propertied classes have 
long enjoyed under the basic structure of an income-with-realization 
tax as a wage earner: to hide or "shelter" one's wages from the tax 
collector. The propertied classes do not need shelters, by and large, 
because the realization requirement, and the simple steps in Tax 
Planning 101 that follow from it, serve to keep their material resources 
away from the tax collector perfectly, effectively, and legally.269 It is 
those with large labor market gains who need help. Prior to the 
epochal Tax Reform Act of 1986 ("TRA 86"),270 sheltering for such 
wage earners had become almost as easy as avoiding taxes for 
property owners: it was simple enough to play the game with other 
people's money, or, indeed, with no money at all. The gaps in tax 
opened up on the capital side had leaked over to the labor-market 
side, threatening the entire system as a revenue-raising vehicle. But 
slowly, systematically, as marginal tax rates have come down (a top 
rate of 70 percent when Ronald Reagan took office in 1981 has now 
268. In the 1990s, a new generation of "corporate tax shelters" arose to offset corporate 
income taxes, but also to shelter the large capital gains occasioned by the boom time 1990s. 
In the latter case, the corporate form exploited a gap in the coverage of I.RC. § 469 (2004). 
See Symposium, Business Purpose, Economic Substance, and Corporate Tax Shelters, 54 
SMU L. REV. 3 (2001). 
269. See generally DAVID CAY JOHNSTON, PERFECTLY LEGAL: THE COVERT 
CAMPAIGN TO RIG OUR TAX SYSTEM TO BENEFIT THE SUPER-RICH - AND CHEAT 
EVERYBODY ELSE, 1-19 (2003). 
270. Tax Reform Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 99-5511 ,  100 Stat. 7085 (codified as amended 
in scattered setions of 26 U.S.C.). 
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been cut in half271), and as the structural and ad hoc opportunities to 
avoid "second" taxes on the yield to capital have expanded, the means 
for sheltering wage income have dried up. This continues the central 
theme of the practical critique of the status quo: the so-called income 
tax system has morphed into an effective wage, or prepaid 
consumption, tax. To understand this point fully, consider the shelter 
game, then and now. 
1 .  Some Quick and Dirty Examples 
Let us reflect on the way things were, prior to the 1986 Act, in 
order to understand where we are and where we are heading. Simply 
to make the point, take four fairly basic tricks of the ancient trade of 
tax sheltering, here given evocative names and hypothetical taxpayers 
to illustrate. 
The interest dodge: Susie, who has no capital, is about to earn 
$100,000 a year as an associate in a large law firm. She borrows 
$1,000,000 at 10 percent interest. With an unlimited interest 
deduction,272 she offsets her $100,000 salary completely on her tax 
return. With her $1 ,000,000 in cash, she plays Tax Planning 101, just 
like the Artful Dodger. Susie buys capital-appreciating assets, such as 
growth stocks, and borrows against the appreciation to get cash to 
consume. She has no net wealth, because her liability offsets her 
assets. She consumes $100,000. She pays no income tax. 
The simple straddle: Joe is in the same boat as Susie: about to 
make $100,000 a year as a lawyer, with no cash in his pocket. He 
borrows $200,000 on a margin account, and buys perfectly offsetting 
stock positions - in essence, he puts $100,000 on each side of a "heads 
or tails" coin flip. (He can do this with a put and a call option on the 
same commodity, or by going long and short on the same stock.) One 
position is guaranteed to double in value; the other to become 
worthless. Joe sells and then writes off the worthless one, claiming a 
$100,000 loss that, with unlimited loss offsets,273 wipes out the tax 
liability on his salary from the law firm on his tax return. Joe holds his 
$200,000 winner, which precisely offsets his loan balance. Like Susie, 
Joe has no net wealth. Also, like Susie, he pays no income tax on his 
$100,000 salary. He, too, can consume away, tax-free. 
The classic shelter: Sara is graduating from medical school, and is 
about to start earning $100,000 with no assets in hand. She buys an old 
271. In 1981, the highest rate was reduced from 70 percent to 50 percent. Economic 
Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, 95 Stat. 172 (1981). Under the Jobs and 
Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act, the top rate was cut to 35 percent. 
272. Prior law I.RC. § 163 (1982) (amended 1986). 
273. The present law does not contain such unlinyted loss offsets. See l.R.C. § 1211 (first 
added in 1954, amended to current assets in 1986) (2004) (capital loss offset rule). 
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hotel in Arizona for $3,000,000, giving the owner a nonrecourse note 
for virtually the whole amount (no money down! ).274 Sara leases the 
hotel back to its owner, setting the rent she is owed on the hotel equal 
to the interest she owes on the note, which has a balloon payment due 
and payable in 30 years. Meantime, with a 30 year depreciation 
schedule, Sara gets $100,000 in ordinary income deductions each 
year.275 Sara, too, like Susie and Joe, has no net assets; the liability 
offsets the gross value of her holdings. Like her friends, she also pays 
no tax on her $100,000 salary. She will worry about what happens 
much later, in Year 31 .276 For now, she consumes away, tax-free. 
The kiddie shift: Torn is about to become a doctor, too, earning 
$100,000. He has four young children. Torn decides to buy a small 
office building, perhaps using debt financing, which would generate a 
nice tax deduction277 to sweeten his basic plan, and then gifts fractional 
shares of the building to his children. Torn then pays each of his 
offspring rent. The rent is a business deduction for Torn,278 bringing his 
taxable income down, and just so happens to fall in each of his 
children's "zero bracket." Tom and kin pay no tax on the transferred 
amounts, which Tom directs his children to use for their basic food 
and clothing - indeed, he can do this himself, as their natural 
guardian.279 
More elaborate examples of the ancient sheltering art could be put 
forward, but these four simple tax-planning strategies serve to 
illustrate the point perfectly well. All were alive and flourishing, in one 
form or another, for long periods in American tax law. The interest 
dodge, the classic shelter, and the kiddie shift were pretty much in full 
flower corning into the 1986 Act; either of the first two alone was 
sufficient, taken to its limits, to make the entire income tax voluntary, 
even for those without their own financial capital stakes to play Tax 
Planning 101. 
274. Facts based on Estate of Franklin v.  Commissioner, 544 F.2d 1045 (9th Cir. 1976), 
which did not work. But see Comm'r v. Tufts, 461 U.S. 300 (1983) (illustrating a simple case 
that did work). 
275. See I.RC. §§ 167, 168 (2004). 
276. Under Tufts, she will have capital gains of $3,000,000 - a small price to pay for 
$3,000,000 worth of tax-free ordinary income for 30 years. And, in any event, she can always 
find another shelter, holding them until she dies, thereby playing Tax Planning 101. See 
supra Part V.A.l. 
277. See I.RC. § 163 (2004); supra note 272 and accompanying text. Under an unlimited 
interest deduction, as generally obtained prior to 1986, even a loan to finance a gift would 
generate deductible interest. But see I.RC. § 265 (2004). 
278. See I.RC. § 162 (2004). 
279. See, e.g. , Brooke v. United States, 468 F.2d 1 155 (1972). 
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2. What TRA 1986 Did, and Did Not, Do 
907 
The traditional view of tax sees the choice of broad-based systems 
as one of income versus consumption. Andrews's important articles 
from the 1970s had opened up an attractive avenue for tax reform, in 
the form of a progressive postpaid consumption tax. The influential 
Blueprints for Basic Tax Reform had traced out the two perceived 
forks in the road, perfecting the income tax or moving towards a 
consistent consumption tax.280 TRA 86 ostensibly took the income-tax 
path.281 This epochal legislation's general strategy was to widen the 
income tax base, by eliminating scores of exemptions, exclusions, and 
deductions, in order to bring tax rates down. In particular, TRA 86 
shut down all the shelters mentioned above, with the exception of 
those already shut down.282 
There is thus no longer a general deduction for personal interest, 
and investment interest is subject to a "netting" rule:283 the interest 
dodge is dead. Susie can still borrow money, but she cannot use the 
interest to offset her salary for tax purposes. Pure straddles had 
already been attacked, and the capital loss offset rules generally limit 
the usefulness of Joe's simple straddle idea.284 The sweeping passive 
activity loss rules of section 469 effectively shut down the classic 
shelter in most of its incarnations.285 Susie can still run a rundown 
hotel, but she cannot use the tax losses generated thereby to subtract 
from her salary as a doctor on her tax forms. The "kiddie tax" killed 
Tom's clever idea, again in most instances, by putting children in the 
same marginal tax bracket as their parents for unearned income.286 
Tom can still give his office to his children and pay them rent, but he 
will find them paying the same tax he otherwise would. In sum, TRA 
86 was systematic in curtailing tax shelters, thereby stopping the 
bleeding in tax and enabling lower tax rates on a broader tax base. 
But - and herein lies the rub - the watershed TRA 86 did 
nothing about Tax Planning 101 or any of its three simple steps. TRA 
86 did not touch the realization requirement of Macomber, although 
280. See BRADFORD ET AL., supra note 8. Note that these are exactly the options that 
the Bush Administration, early in its second term, seems to be considering again, this time 
with a prepaid consumption tax model ascendant. See Altman, supra note 263. 
281. See BRADLEY, supra note 6. 
282. There had already been anti-straddle legislation, I.RC. § 1092 (added in 1981) and 
the "at risk" rules limited some shelter games. I.RC. § 465 (added in 1976). 
283. See I.RC. § 163 (2004), especially 163(d). 
284. See I.RC. §§  1211 (first added in 1954, amended to current limits in 1986), 1092(c)­
(f) (introduced in 1981, 2002) (anti-straddle provisions). 
285. I.RC. § 469 (2004). 
286. I.RC. § l(g) (unearned income of minor children, a/k/a "kiddie tax"). 
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Congress clearly has the power to do so.287 TRA 86 did not make debt 
taxable, or a deemed realization event for people with appreciated 
assets. TRA 86 did not alter or repeal the stepped-up basis rule for 
assets acquired on death. It is true that TRA 86 repealed the capital 
gains preference, which resulted in an interim rise in its rate. Capital 
gains had for a significant time been set at 40 percent of the ordinary 
income tax rate; thus, the top capital gains rate was 28 percent when 
Reagan took office with a 70 percent top ordinary rate bracket. When 
Reagan oversaw his first major tax-cutting bill, the Economic 
Recovery Tax Act (ERTA) of 1981, the ordinary rate fell to 50 
percent. The capital gains rate fell in step, to 20 percent. TRA 86, 
which instituted a marginal rate bracket of 28 percent on the highest 
incomes,288 eliminated any further and specific capital gains rate 
preference, thus, in essence, restoring the pre-ERTA rate of 28 
percent on capital gains. Interestingly, this created a natural 
experiment to see if capital transactions were elastic to the tax rate; 
there was, indeed, a spike in sales under the outgoing 20 percent 
regime. But recall that the capital gains rate, as argued above, is a 
reaction to the very existence of Tax Planning 101. Since TRA 86 left 
Tax Planning 101 unchecked, its elimination of the capital gains 
preference was fragile from the start. A preferential rate soon enough 
reappeared, with the elder George Bush maintaining the top rate at 28 
percent when ordinary income tax rates went up; Bill Clinton reducing 
it first to 20 percent, then later to 18 percent; and the younger Bush 
bringing it down to its current 15 percent. As this saga of capital gains 
preferences played itself out, the simple advice of buy/borrow/die 
lived on. 
What TRA 86 - one of the most sweeping acts of tax legislation 
ever passed, and the subject of laudatory volumes from the popular 
press289 - did was simple. It shored up the status of the "income" tax 
as a prepaid consumption or wage tax. Shelters for wage earners were 
shut down or drastically curtailed. Yet people with capital could still 
buy, borrow, and die to their hearts' content; tax remained voluntary 
for those with financial capital. 
287. See CHIRELSTEIN, supra note 56, at 73 (explaining that Macomber's realization 
requirement not constitutional, merely an administrative rule); see also I.RC. §§ 1271-1274 
(2002) (o.i.d. provisions) (instances of Congress's imposing tax without realization). 
288. See I.RC. § 1 (1986); see also McCaffery, Cognitive Theory and Tax, supra note 43, 
at 1898 (discussing TRA 86's rate "bubble"). 
289. See, e.g., JEFFREY H. BIRNBAUM & ALAN S. MURRAY, SHOWDOWN AT GUCCI 
GULCH (1987). 
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VI. THE MESS WE'VE MADE, PART Two: 
BEYOND THE INCOME TAX 
Tax policy typically suffers from blinders when it comes to taxes 
other than the income tax.290 The personal federal income tax is, 
indeed, the largest American tax. At least for the time being, the 
income tax also features relatively high marginal tax rates and rewards 
at least some sophisticated planning, even after the TRA 86 put a lot 
of tax shelters out of business.291 The income tax's size and malleability 
warrant its status as a relative staple in American law school 
classrooms. Yet, large as it is, the federal income tax accounts for less 
than one-half of all federal government revenues, and less than one­
third of all taxes in America, state, local, and federal combined.292 
Other taxes must be factored in to any general theory about fairness in 
tax today. 
The new understanding of tax helps us to see the larger context of 
tax today. For while certain taxes - most importantly the corporate 
income and gift and estate taxes - are meant to correct for holes in 
the income tax's commitment to taxing capital, they do not effectively 
do so. When we widen the lens of our inquiry to consider the state of 
tax generally in the United States, a surprise awaits: the principal 
theme advanced in the last Part only deepens. The American tax 
system, writ large, is moving, seemingly inexorably, towards a 
consumption tax - and specifically, under the new understanding of 
tax, towards a prepaid consumption tax - at relatively flat rates. What 
capital taxes remain are erratic in their operation, unprincipled in their 
conception, and - not unrelatedly - fragile in their vitality. 
This Part explains these comments, beginning with the critically 
important payroll tax system. 
290. This is beginning to change. See Deborah A. Geier, Integrating the Tax Burdens of 
the Federal Income and Payroll Taxes on Labor Income, 22 VA. TAX REV. 1 (2002) 
[hereinafter Geier, Integrating the Tax Burdens) ; Andrew Mitrusi & James Poterba, The 
Distribution of Payroll and Income Tax Burdens, 1979-99, 53 NAT'L TAX J. 765, 765 (2000); 
Deborah A. Geier, The Payroll Tax Liabilities of Low- and Middle-Income Taxpayers, 106 
TAX NOTES 711  (2005) [hereinafter Geier, Payroll Tax Liabilities). 
291. See Calvin H. Johnson, A Thermometer for the Tax System: The Overall Health of 
the Tax System as Measured by Implicit Tax, 56 SMU L. REV. 13, 45-50 (2003) ;  Michael L. 
Schier, Ten More Truths About Tax Shelters: The Problem, Possible Solutions, and a Reply to 
Professor Weisbach, 55 TAX L. REV. 325, 388 (2002). 
292. In 2002, federal personal income taxes raised just over $858 billion, or 46.3 percent 
of total federal receipts of $1.853 trillion, and 30 percent of total government receipts of 
$2.847 trillion. See OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, 
HISTORICAL TABLES: BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, FISCAL YEAR 2004, 
at 29-30, 293 (2003).  
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A. Payroll Taxes 
No normative analysis of tax today should ignore the payroll tax 
system. To begin with, the combined social security and Medicare 
system is indeed a tax: not only are the exactions from wages 
mandatory (the classic hallmark of a tax), but they are also untethered 
from any precise benefit or payback system - social security has long 
been on a "pay as you go" basis.293 This means that the benefits system 
of social security, which indeed has some elements of progressivity in 
it, can be separated from the contribution or tax part of the system.294 
The payroll tax is also big. The employee pays 7.65 percent of her 
pretax wages: 6.2 percent for social security, up to a ceiling presently 
set at $90,000, plus 1 .45 percent for Medicare, with no ceiling.295 The 
employer pays a matching share, but the real incidence is all on the 
employee: this is an employee-specific cost, one that a rational 
employer must factor into account when considering whether to hire, 
and how much to pay, an employee. Consider, for example, an 
employee earning $10,000. She must pay $765 out of her wages in 
payroll taxes, and her employer must pay a like amount. This means 
both that her employer considers her labor to be worth $10,765, and 
that $1,530 has gone to the government on account of her paid work.296 
The full amount of $1,530 - the total tax, including the employer's 
share - could go to the employee if Uncle Sam released his hold on 
293. See Geier, Integrating the Tax Burdens, supra note 290; Geier, Payroll Tax 
Liabilities, supra note 290; Edward J. McCaffery, The Burdens of Benefits, 44 VILL. L. REV. 
445, 453-58 (1999) [hereinafter McCaffery, Burdens]. Although payroll taxes have some 
relationship to benefits - as do income taxes, of course, in some way - I analyze them here 
solely in regards to their tax burden, on wages. 
294. The system is not unequivocally progressive. See MCCAFFERY, TAXING WOMEN, 
supra note 72, at 89-105; DANIEL SHA VIRO, MAKING SENSE OF SOCIAL SECURITY REFORM 
19-22 (2000).  
295. See Soc. SEC. ADMIN., PUB. No. 05-10024, UNDERSTANDING THE BENEFITS 8 
(2004), at http://www.ssa.gov/pubs/10003.html (last visited Mar. 7, 2005). The ceiling is 
$90,000 in 2005. 
296. Since the employee never sees the employer's share in her pay stub, it is in some 
ways more accurate to "gross up" her salary, and see that she has paid $1530 out of $10,765, 
a 14.2 percent rate. See, e.g. , DANIEL N. SHAVIRO, EMPLOYMENT POLICIES INST., 
EFFECTIVE MARGINAL TAX RATES ON LOW-INCOME HOUSEHOLDS, at 
http://epionline.org/studies/shaviro_02-1999.pdf (Feb. 1999). On the other hand, the $10,000 
- without any deduction for her share of payroll taxes paid - is what the employee must 
report to the IRS for income tax purposes, so the 15.3 percent figure used in constructing 
Table 3, below, is also accurate. On reported wages of $10,000, $1530 goes to the 
government. Table 3 thus does reflect the taxes paid on reported wages, although it does not 
precisely track take home pay: this is set at 1 minus the tax rate net of the employer's share 
of the payroll tax (so a taxpayer making $30,000, say, faces a marginal rate of 22.65 percent 
and gets to take home 77.35 percent of her next dollar in reported wages, considering the 
payroll and income taxes alone). 
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it.297 (The self-employed see this all much more directly, as they must 
themselves pay 15.3 percent of their wages up to $90,000, and are 
allowed an income-tax deduction only for one-half of the total payroll 
taxes they pay.) The net result is a flat, 15.3 percent tax on labor 
earnings, starting with the first dollar earned, and extending upwards 
to $90,000, after which the social security tax ceases and the payroll 
tax rate drops down to the 2.9 percent (two times 1 .45 percent) of 
Medicare alone. 
Table 3 puts together the payroll tax rate structure with that of the 
basic income tax, using 2003 rate brackets after tax reform.298 Such 
tables are difficult to construct with any precision, on account of the 
considerable complexity within the income tax: varying "zero 
brackets" based on whether a taxpayer itemizes or not299 and how 
many personal exemptions she has;300 inframarginal rate changes 
brought on by the earned-income tax credit and its phaseout;301 the 
loss of personal exemptions;302 the alternative minimum tax;303 and so 
forth. The table nonetheless gives the basic rate structure facing a 
single individual taking the standard deduction.304 It ignores the 
important EITC available for low-income taxpayers,305 and so 
understates the degree of progression in the total tax system, although 
the EITC also adds a burden onto lower middle class taxpayers.306 
Still, it gives a basic sense of the matter, while helping to illustrate why 
the EITC is so important. Most importantly, Table 3 shows how big 
the payroll tax system is, relative to the income tax. 
297. It is a mistake to think that simple supply and demand analysis affects this result. 
The employer is facing the full tax in his wage decisions; the tax works like a simple 
downward shift in the demand curve, as a per unit tax. The lower after-tax wage obtained by 
workers may indeed affect aggregate labor supply, but this does not change the fact that 
existing workers are paying the full burden of the tax. 
298. Up-to-date tax rate tables can be found at http://www.irs.gov. 
299. 1.R.C. § 68 (2004). 
300. I.R.C. § 152 (2004). 
301. 1.R.C. § 32 (2004). 
302. 1.R.C. § 68(c) (2004). 
303. I.R.C. § 57 (2004). 
304. It uses $5000 for the standard deduction and $3000 for the personal exemption, 
creating an effective "zero bracket" of $8000. 
305. For general discussion of the EITC. see Anne L. Alstott. The Earned Income Tax 
Credit and the Limitations of Tax-Based Welfare Reform, 108 HARV. L. REV. 533 (1995); 
McCaffery, Burdens, supra note 293, at 486-91.  
306. See MCCAFFERY, TAXING WOMEN, supra note 72,  at 145-48 (discussing EITC 
phaseout). 
912 Michigan Law Review (Vol. 103:807 
TABLE 3: PAYROLL, INCOME AND COMBINED TAX RATES, SINGLE 
PERSON, 2003 
Income Payroll Tax Income Tax Combined 
$0 - 8,000 1 5 .3 0 15 .3 
$8,00 1 - 1 5,000 1 5 .3 10 25.3 
$ 15,00 1 -36,400 1 5 .3 1 5  30.3 
$36,40 1 -76,800 1 5 .3 25 40.3 
$76,80 1 -90,000 1 5 .3 28 43.3 
$90,00 1 - 1 5 1 ,500 2.9 28 30.9 
$ 1 5 1 ,50 1 -3 19,500 2.9 33 35.9 
$3 1 9,50 1 and above 2.9 35 37.9 
An individual taxpayer begins to pay 15.3 percent in payroll taxes 
right away on her first dollar of wages, with no accommodation for 
family size, medical needs, or anything else. Thus, over the range from 
$0 to $90,000, a taxpayer's average or effective payroll tax rate - as 
well as her marginal one - is 15.3 percent. In contrast, a single person 
under the income tax would have to earn over $53,000 before her 
average income tax rate was as high as 15.3 percent.307 Given that the 
average annual pay in 2000 was slightly over $35,000 per worker,308 it 
should not be surprising to learn that between 70 and 80 percent (or 
higher) of families with positive taxes pay more in payroll taxes than 
in income taxes.309 Yet the payroll tax, alone among major federal 
taxes - the personal and corporate income and gift and estate taxes 
- has never been cut.310 
In any event, it is the aggregate of payroll and income taxes that 
matters to a rational taxpayer. Table 3 shows the rather compressed 
rate structure under the payroll plus income taxes combined. It starts 
at 15.3 percent, quickly hits 30 percent, peaks at $76,800 at 43.3 
percent, and then declines precipitously at $90,000, although it never 
falls below 30 percent or rises above 40 percent. Anyone who earns 
between $15,000 and infinity in wages pays federal taxes in this narrow 
band, between 30.3 and 43.3 percent, with the top endpoint at 37.9 
percent. 
Most important for the new understanding of tax, the social 
security or payroll tax is a canonical instance of a prepaid consumption 
307. The solution to the problem of $0 + .10($15,000 - 8,000) + .15($36,400 - 15,000) + 
.25(x - 36,400) = .l53x, where x is the income, and equals $53,505. 
308. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 
2004-2005, at 410 (124th ed. 2005). 
309. See Mitrusi & Poterba, supra note 290, at 772-74 (the authors find just over 70 
percent, but refer to CBO data indicating 80 percent). 
310. McCaffery & Baron, Humpty Dumpty Blues, supra note 49, at 231. 
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tax. Its single levy is applied up-front as money is earned in labor 
markets, and never again: no social security "contribution" is asked of 
returns in the capital or beneficent markets. Combined with the 
understanding that the nominal income tax is largely now a prepaid 
consumption or wage tax - the theme of the prior Part - this gives a 
dark spin to Table 3: the United States is evolving a steep wage tax, 
one that falls especially hard on the middle classes, at compressed 
rates. 
B.  Death - to the Rescue? 
The payroll tax makes no effort to collect any tax on the yield to 
capital or from beneficent transfers. The income tax also ignores 
beneficent transfers to the transferee, and, although it is intended to 
fall on the yield to capital, the actual income-plus-realization tax is 
erratic at best in living up to its theoretical commitment. In large part 
for this reason, defenders of the idea that capital ought to bear some 
positive tax burden - that is, supporters of what the new 
understanding of tax refers to as the yield-to-capital norm - have 
long advocated other, supplemental taxes to "backstop" the income 
tax, specifically in regard to the yield to capital.311 Chief among these 
addenda has been the gift and estate tax. 
There has been much debate of late about the estate tax, whose 
supporters seem to be losing: EGTRRA, the 2001 tax act, gradually 
weakens the tax, then altogether repeals it for the single year 2010, 
then brings it back in full force.312 Congress has repeatedly considered 
extending the repeal, to make the elimination of the tax permanent.313 
There is no need to rehash here the basic arguments over repeal, 
reform, or status quo. The main practical, descriptive point, for the 
new understanding of tax, is simply that the estate tax has been a very 
porous backstop to the income tax, indeed. The main theoretical, 
prescriptive point to see is that a gift and estate tax is not needed to 
311.  Most prominently, see Andrews, Personal Income Tax, supra note 8, at 1177-88; see 
also, Henry J. Aaron & Harvey Galper, A Tax on Consumption, Gifts, and Bequests and 
Other Strategies for Reform, in OPTIONS FOR TAX REFORM 106, 111-12 (Joseph A. 
Pechman, ed., 1984); Karen C. Burke & Grayson M.P. McCouch, Death Without Taxes?, 20 
VA. TAX REV. 499, 503-04 (2001); Harry L. Gutman, Reforming Federal Wealth Transfer 
Taxation After ERTA, 69 VA. L. REV. 1 183, 1 191 (1983) ("With a seriously eroded income 
tax base, a transfer tax . . .  serves as a 'backstop' to the income tax by taxing the wealth that 
taxpayers accumulate through tax-preferred income sources."). 
312. Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-16, § 
501, 115 Stat. 69 (2001). 
313. See Edward J. McCaffery and Linda Cohen, Shakedown at Gucci Gulch: The New 
Logic of Collective Action (draft on file with author) (hereinafter McCaffery & Cohen, 
Gucci Gulch]; Edward J. McCaffery, A Look into the Future of Estate Tax Reform, 105 TAX 
NOTES 997 (2004). 
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backstop a consistent, progressive postpaid consumption tax in the 
first place. 
Although, as with capital taxes under the income tax, decedents' 
estates do pay some tax, the yield is consistently small.314 Tax Planning 
101, discussed above, provides a roadmap for readily avoiding the 
estate tax, by dying with net assets under its generous exemption level: 
spending it all and dying broke being the limiting case. This is morally 
problematic, because it is far from obvious that the spending of the 
rich is to be encouraged, or is any less harmful than their passing on of 
wealth - and shortly we shall see that Tax Planning 101 can be used 
to pass on wealth, as well, if the wealthy person so desires. 
The use of Tax Planning 101 to avoid all federal taxes _; the estate 
tax in particular by dying broke, or nearly so - shows once more that 
the deep problem with the status quo is not, as Andrews put it in 1974, 
with its inconsistent treatment of savings or accumulation. Rather it is 
with the use of capital transactions to finance consumption, tax-free. 
This allows a restatement of a central theme in the new understanding 
of tax: All capital is not the same, from the perspective of the quest for 
individuated justice in tax. What matters, morally, is the use that 
individuals make of their capital, not the source of the yield to capital. 
Andrews saw the "worst inequity, distortion, and complexity" in the 
income tax's treatment of accumulation, or savings. Not seeing - or 
not wanting to see, under the influence of Mill - any way to split the 
difference, to make distinctions among the uses of capital (as he had 
made among the uses of consumption in his 1972 article), Andrews 
recommended going all the way, to the total nontaxation of capital. 
Under the new understanding of tax, a surprising insight arises. What 
is problematic about the status quo - what is its "worst inequity" - is 
not the treatment of accumulation or savings, in and of itself; it is, 
rather, the inconsistent treatment of consumption, the other term on 
the right-hand side of the Haig-Simons identity. Through its structural 
problems, beginning - but not ending - with its inconsistent taxation 
of accumulation, the income-plus-realization tax allows the 
consumption of the wealthy to escape taxation altogether. The estate 
tax is not at all a "backstop" to this problem - of consumption 
financed by capital - because its mere existence encourages it. A 
potential taxpayer who has amassed or acquired significant portions of 
capital need not pay any further tax, whatsoever, within her lifetime, 
no matter what her lifestyle. This is problematic. 
314. In 2004, the estate and gift taxes yielded only $25 billion, just over 1 % of federal 
revenues. Office of Mgmt. & Budget, Historical Tables, Budget of the United States, 
Government, Fiscal Year 2006 [hereinafter Historical Tables), at 43-44 tbl. 2.5, available at 
http://whitehouse.gov/ (last visited Apr. 3, 2005). GEORGE COOPER, A VOLUNTARY TAX?: 
NEW PERSPECTIVES ON SOPHISTICATED ESTATE TAX AVOIDANCE (1979); McCaffery, A 
Voluntary Tax?, supra note 202; Martin Sullivan, For Richest Americans, Two-Thirds of 
Wealth Escapes Estate Tax, 87 TAX NOTES 328 (2003). 
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Still, one might support the estate tax within the context of a basic 
consumption tax - even a prepaid consumption tax - model, as 
ensuring that a tax gets levied at least once per generation.315 
(Another, different way to support an estate tax under a consumption 
tax model is as a corrective to the large accumulations of "private" 
capital that a consumption tax allows, and even encourages; Andrews 
followed this rationale,316 and I shall address this argument later.) The 
idea is that wealth coming into an individual's possession - via labor 
market earnings or beneficent transfers - should be taxed once, and 
then all second taxes at the individual's level should be avoided, in the 
spirit of Mill. If such a system were to work, the pressure on the choice 
of prepaid versus postpaid consumption tax would lessen, because the 
greatest problems of socio-economic inequity tend to take place, as 
both Rawls and Robert Nozick, in their different ways, noticed, with a 
problem of iteration over time.317 The more generations go by without 
the corrective of a tax, the more the unfairness compounds. But so 
long as each generation is taxed once - the estate tax serving as a 
proxy for an accessions tax, making sure that a tax is paid before the 
receipt of beneficent transfers - the problem of iteration is held in 
check. If the gift and estate tax worked as planned, it would put labor 
market and beneficent market returns on the same footing - taxed 
once each generation of beneficial users - with only capital market 
earnings free of taxation, the latter in accordance with Mill's principle. 
The practical problem with this happy possibility is that the gift 
and estate tax does not work as planned. Even without further 
weakening - which seems all but certain to happen318 - the estate tax 
is simply not a very effective mechanism for levying a tax on second or 
subsequent generations. It has too many holes, and of such a sort, as to 
make it inherently defective for the task. Consider the following two 
gaps. 
One is the basic exemption amount, or so-called unified credit, 
now set at $1.5 million per person on death and $1 million for inter 
vivos gifts. A married couple, with proper planning, has $3 million -
scheduled to rise to $7 million by 2009 and to infinity, at least briefly, 
in 2010 - to pass on death, altogether tax-free. The $1 million amount 
can be given by any person, at any time, to any other person, without 
315. See Aaron & Galper, supra note 311 .  
316. See, e.g. , Andrews, Personal Income Tax, supra note 8. 
317. See JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM (1993); RAWLS, supra note 52; ROBERT 
NOZICK, THE EXAMINED LIFE: PHILOSOPHICAL MEDITATIONS 28-33 (1989). 
318. It seems highly unlikely that the exemption level, which is set to reach $3.5 million 
per person in 2009, will return to its pre-EGTRRA levels. Not only has the exemption level 
never been lowered in the history of the tax, but all current Senators, except for Russell 
Fiengold (D-WI), are on record as supporting at least a heightened exemption level. See 
McCaffery & Cohen, Gucci Gulch, supra note 313. 
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triggering a gift or estate tax.319 Standard, sophisticated estate planning 
allows a basic leveraging of the value, as by placing assets in a family 
limited partnership form.320 Wealthy parents with two children can 
transfer up to $2 million of prediscounted property to each child, 
altogether tax-free, and the children - or their financial advisers -
can play the Tax Planning 101 game to their heart's content. If the 
wealth is transferred when the parents are 50 years old, and invested 
at an 8 percent rate of return, it will grow to being worth over $20 
million per child by the time the parents reach 80. 
In addition to this unified credit or exemption amount, there is a 
second hole, the "annual exclusion amount,'' presently set at 
$11 ,000.321 This is a per-donor, per-donee, per-year amount that can be 
given altogether tax-free. Once again, standard, sophisticated estate 
planning allows the values to be doubled, with two parents, and 
perhaps quadrupled, with fractional share discounts. Two parents can 
give each of their children $30,000 or more worth of value each year 
- altogether apart from the exemption amount, just discussed, and 
also not including qualified medical and tuition expenses322 - tax-free. 
A pattern of such annual giving, begun at birth, can easily result in 
each child having $8 million, tax-free, at her fortieth birthday - a 
good stake for playing the Artful Dodger's game.323 Skillful use of 
perfectly legitimate estate-tax planning advice can get tens or even 
hundreds of millions of dollars out of one's estate, tax-free. So much 
for the once-per-generation norm. 
These problems with the estate tax follow from its structure; it is a 
back-ended wealth tax, typically imposed when someone dies, on the 
wealth she has left over on her deathbed. But death is a difficult time 
to tax. Given the incentives generated by the tax's high marginal rate 
structure, wealthy patrons can and do plan ahead to avoid it, making it 
the original "voluntary tax."324 Tax Planning 101 combines with Estate 
Planning 101 - give early, often, and in trust325 - to eviscerate the 
tax. It is a mistake to think that Tax Planning 101 need be practiced by 
narrowly selfish individuals. While dying broke is the simplest and 
319. EGTRRA keeps the gift tax exemption level at $1 million per person, so the higher 
numbers in later years refer only to the estate tax, as things now stand. 
320. Sullivan, supra note 314, at 332. But see Estate of Strangi v. Comm'r, 85 T.C.M. 
(CCH) 1331 (2003) (casting family limited partnership technique into some question). 
321. l.R.C. § 2503 (2004). 
322. Id. ; MCCAFFERY, FAIR NOT FLAT, supra note 2, at 68-74; INTERNAL REVENUE 
SERV., PUB. No. 950, INTRODUCTION TO ESTATE AND GIFr TAXES 4-5 (2004), at 
http://www.irs.gov/publications/p950/index.html (last revised Sept. 2004). 
323. At a 5% annuity rate, this sum can generate $400,000, tax-free, every year, for life. 
324. See COOPER, supra note 314; McCaffery, A Voluntary Tax?, supra note 202. 
325. See MCCAFFERY, FAIR NOT FLAT, supra note 2, at 68-73 (discussing "Estate 
Planning 101" and other techniques for avoiding or minimizing estate taxes). 
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surest way to avoid the estate tax, the borrowing in buy/borrow/die 
can be used to transfer wealth down to the next generation, as well. In 
such a case, there is no tax at all in the second (or later) generation(s). 
The problems of iteration can become severe. A dramatic illustration 
of the stakes and problems has been the recent trend, initiated by 
estate-planning practitioners, to have states repeal the hallowed Rule 
against Perpetuities, so as to allow wealthy benefactors to set up 
"dynastic" - that is, potentially infinitely lived - trusts.326 
As it has been argued in the past, it still may be argued that an 
estate tax, with all of its holes, is better than nothing. This is parallel to 
the consequentialist objection to income tax reform, considered 
above: the income tax may be rather ineffective at getting at capital, 
but at least it tries, and so we ought to retain it in the name of fairness. 
The support for the estate tax similarly follows from the implicit 
acceptance of the yield-to-capital norm: any taxes that get at capital 
are better than nothing. Within the traditional view, a consumption 
tax is the "nothing" in this choice set because it does not get at the 
yield to capital at all, and so advocates of the yield-to-capital norm 
cling to whatever is left of the income and estate taxes. 
Fortunately, we do not have to face the choice of an ineffective 
estate tax or nothing. The new understanding of tax changes things. 
When we get the fair timing of tax down right, we see that there is a 
better way - and a better time - to tax than either the moment of 
initial earnings or the time of ultimate death. 
C. Corporate Taxes Too 
The corporate income tax, like the gift and estate tax, has been 
defended as an important "backstop" to the personal income tax.327 
The argument is that the corporate income tax gets at wealth that is 
left in the corporation - a tendency aggravated by Macomber - and 
so cuts against the deferral of the realization requirement. The desire 
to have a backstop to the basic income tax reflects the normative 
commitment to taxing capital and its yield, and an understanding that 
the actual income tax falls far short of implementing this goal. Yet, 
even less so than the gift and estate tax, the corporate income tax is 
not a satisfactory backstop to the income tax. 
326. See, e.g. , Jesse Dukeminier & James E. Krier, The Rise of the Perpetual Trust, 50 
UCLA L. REV. 1303 (2003); Stewart E. Sterk, Jurisdictional Competition to Abolish the Rule 
Against Perpetuities: R.l.P. for the R.A.P., 24 CARDOZO L. REV. 2097 (2003). 
327. See, e.g., Kim Brooks, Learning to Live with an Imperfect Tax: A Defence of the 
Corporate Tax, 36 U.B.C.L. REV. 621, 672 n.51 (2003); but cf Roger H. Gordon & Jeffrey K. 
Mackie-Mason, "Why Is There Corporate Taxation in a Small Open Economy? The Role of 
Transfer Pricing and Income Shifting,'' in THE EFFECTS OF TAXATION ON MULTINATIONAL 
CORPORATIONS, 67 at 88 (Martin Feldstein, James R. Hines, Jr., & R. Glenn Hubbard, eds., 
1995) (corporate tax is a backstop to tax on labor, not capital, income). 
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To start with, like the gift and estate tax, the corporate income tax 
is porous and avoidable.328 But there is a much deeper problem with 
the corporate income tax. It is the problem of incidence - of who, 
really, ultimately bears the burden of the tax. Corporations are legal 
fictions; only real people pay real taxes. Thus the dollars remitted to 
the government on account of corporate taxes must come out of 
someone's pockets, somewhere along the line. There is a great deal of 
uncertainty on this matter among sophisticated public finance 
economists. There are two broad candidates for ultimate payors, and 
each is problematic in terms of the fairness of tax. Some models 
suggest that some or all of the real burden of the corporate tax falls on 
wages or consumption, adding to - not counterbalancing - the 
general bias of the status quo, towards a prepaid consumption tax.329 
The corporate tax becomes a wage tax in drag. Other models suggest 
that some or all of the corporate tax falls on capital. This burden on 
capital cannot be specific, however, as in a naive partial equilibrium 
model; it cannot be the case that the particular owners of particular 
corporations see the corporate income tax come out of their pockets. 
Capital is capital, and it seeks a competitive rate of return. Thus, 
pricing or capitalization effects equilibrate the markets after the 
corporate tax falls, so that all capital bears a competitive after-tax rate 
of return. In other words, the incidence of the corporate income tax, to 
the extent it falls on capital at all, must be felt rather generally in all 
accessible capital markets.330 
In this very generality lies a problem. Those who see the corporate 
income tax as an important "backstop" to the income tax see it as an 
important tax on capital. Yet the new understanding of tax has shown 
us that we do not want to tax all capital, all the time. This leads to a 
particular critique of the corporate tax: to the extent it falls on capital 
at all, it is not an individuated tax - it fails Vickrey's (and our) test 
for progression. The burden on capital makes it just as hard to engage 
328. The avoidance is partly due to the prevalence of corporate tax shelters. See 
generally, Mark P. Gergen, The Common Knowledge of Tax Abuse, 54 SMU L. REV. 131 
(2001); George K. Yin, Getting Serious About Corporate Tax Shelters: Taking a Lesson from 
History, 54 SMU L. Rev. 209 (2001); Lawrence Zelenak, Codifying Anti-Avoidance 
Doctrines and Controlling Corporate Tax Shelters, 54 SMU L. REV. 177 (2001). But the 
overall yield from the tax has dropped fairly steadily over many decades, from a high of 
7.2% of GDP in 1945, to 4.2% as late as 1967, to 1.6% in 2004. See HISTORICAL TABLES, 
supra note 314, 33-34 tbl.2.3. 
329. Arnold Harberger, an early advocate of the view that some or all of the burden is 
borne by capital, now feels it is mostly borne by labor. See Arnold C. Harberger, The 
Incidence of the Corporation Income Tax, 70 J. POL. ECON. 215 (1962) (the seminal piece); 
Arnold C. Harberger, Monetary and Fiscal Policy for Equitable Economic Growth, in 
INCOME DISTRIBUTION AND HIGH-QUALITY GROWTH 203 (Vito Tanzi & Ke-young Chu 
eds., 1998) [hereinafter Harberger, Monetary and Fiscal Policy]. See also Gordon & Mackie­
Mason, supra note 327 (incidence on labor, given small open economy (as in Canada)). 
330. See Harberger, Monetary and Fiscal Policy, supra note 329. 
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in the kind of ordinary-savings or smoothing transactions that ordinary 
moral intuitions favor, as well as in the kind of elevating, shifting 
transactions that these intuitions want to reach - it does not split the 
ordinary-savings and yield-to-capital norms. The corporate income tax 
also does not make any differentiation based on the level of the 
beneficial owner's income, consumption, or wealth; it is a crude one­
size-fits all tax, a flat tax in essence, like the current capital gains or 
corporate dividend tax. 
If corporate taxes are to be justified, it must turn on the political 
economy, or the psychological political economy, of hidden taxes,331 
and not on the principled taxation of capital. Corporate taxes are 
simply far too crude a mechanism to effect individuated fairness in 
getting at the yield to capital or anything else. 
D. State and Local Taxes 
Roughly one-third of all taxes in America are collected at the state 
and local levels.332 These, too, ought to play a role in any general 
theory about the fairness of tax. 
The three largest state and local taxes are sales (36 percent of 
total), property (29 percent) and income (27 percent) taxes.333 
At first glance, sales taxes are paradigmatic of the postpaid 
consumption tax. But here is a place where the traditional view of 
tax still holds. Because state and local sales taxes are flat taxes, 
they are indeed equivalent to wage, or yield-exempt, taxes under the 
traditional view, as Ant and Grasshopper helped us to see. The reason 
to care about the new understanding of tax is to preserve and, indeed, 
strengthen the tax system's commitment to progressivity in effective 
tax burdens. State and local sales taxes more or less moot the point. 
The remaining state and local taxes do not offer much of an 
antidote to what is happening on the federal side. State and local 
income taxes tend to simply, and by rote, track the federal income tax, 
and thus contain all of the holes in the commitment to taxing savings 
we have been exploring. This leaves state and local property taxes, 
which do indeed effect some degree of progressivity, being based on 
331. Jennifer Arlen & Deborah M. Weiss, A Political Theory of Corporate Taxation, 105 
YALE L.J. 325 (1995); McCaffery, Cognitive Theory and Tax, supra note 43, at 1874-86. 
332. In 1999, state and local governments collected approximately $816 billion in taxes, 
U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, supra note 308, at 272, whereas the federal government 
collected approximately $1.828 trillion. Id. at 308 tbl.454. Of the $2.644 trillion total, state 
and local taxes accounted for just over 30 percent. 
333. Id. at 272. The figures for income taxes seem to include corporate as well as 
individual taxes, and therefore overstate the effect of the latter. Compare id. at 272, with id. 
at 270. 
920 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 103:807 
the assessed value (or initial purchase price )334 of real or personal 
property. But real property taxes, by far the major part of property 
taxes, tend to finance local public goods,335 and often get "capitalized" 
into the values of homes. Without even factoring in the income tax 
deductibility of these payments, the equities of state and local 
property taxes are rather crude, at best. 
E. Summing Up: A Voluntary Tax 
Add together the so-called income tax, considered in the last Part, 
and the panoply of taxes considered in this Part, and this is what we 
have in America in the early years of the twenty-first century: a highly 
burdensome wage tax at compressed tax rates. The major tax is the 
federal personal income tax, but this is increasingly equivalent to a 
prepaid consumption or wage tax, at historically and relatively {since 
World War I) flat rates. The payroll tax is by far the second biggest tax 
in the landscape, and it does not even pretend to be anything other 
than a rather flat, even regressive wage tax. State and local taxes 
scarcely even try to posit a counter trend, and indeed tend to rely on 
flat sales taxes that feature yield exemption. The two federal taxes that 
aim at capital - the gift and estate and corporate income taxes - are 
scattershot affairs at best, small in their magnitude, fairly easily 
avoided, and in any event crude in their ultimate equities. 
In sum: taxes on beneficent transfers scarcely exist. Taxes on 
capital are easily avoided and virtually voluntary. Taxes on wages are 
high and inescapable. This is where we have come, guided by the 
traditional understanding of tax. Where to, next? 
VII. THE FAIR TIMING OF T AX 
Traditional tax policy endlessly debates between the income and 
consumption taxes, mistakenly equating both forms of consumption 
taxes, which it sees as exempting the yield to capital - or, sometimes, 
falling arbitrarily on it - by design and on principle. Under the 
traditional view, the only hope to satisfy both an ideological and an 
ordinary moral intuition to tax the yield to capital is to cling to an 
income tax. While one can blame special interest politics or other ills 
334. This is the case, for example, in California, under Proposition 13. CAL. CONST. art. 
XIIIA, §§ 1-6. 
335. Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416 
(1956). For discussions of Tiebout, see Bruce W. Hamilton, A Review: Is the Property Tax a 
Benefit Tax?, in LOCAL PROVISION OF PUBLIC SERVICES: THE TIEBOUT MODEL AFTER 
TwENTY-FIVE YEARS 85. 90-92 (George R. Zodrow ed .. 1983): George R. Zodrow & Peter 
Mieszkowski, The Incidence of the Property Tax: The Benefit View Versus the New View, in 
LOCAL PROVISION OF PUBLIC SERVICES: THE nEBOUT MODEL AFTER TwENTY-FIVE 
YEARS, supra, at 109. 
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for the failure of the current tax system to address its many gaps, 
another culprit lies close at hand, like Poe's purloined letter: theory, 
and most importantly, the traditional view of tax itself. 
When we take a closer look at the analytic muddle of tax, we 
understand that we do not have, have never had, and will never have a 
pure income tax, largely for the reason that we do not want one. What 
we have is a mishmash of income and consumption tax elements. 
The traditional view of tax would have us be forever doomed to 
some such uneasy compromise. For we are, it would seem, of two 
minds when it comes to the taxation of savings. With one mind, we 
want to tax the yield to capital, and hence we cling to the forms of 
income, corporate income, and gift and estate taxes. But with the 
other mind, we do not want to tax savings, and hence we riddle the so­
called income tax with exclusions and deductions, and lack the will to 
strengthen the structural flaws applying to the taxation of the yield to 
capital. 
The new understanding of tax liberates our minds from the grip of 
theoretical incoherence that dooms the present practice of tax. 
Normative reflection first identifies and then reconciles the ordinary­
savings and yield-to-capital norms. It turns out, mirabile dictu, that the 
people are of one, not two, minds - with two norms, not one - when 
it comes to the taxation of capital and its yield. It seems fair and 
appropriate to burden capital transactions when these facilitate or 
enable a better lifestyle, reflecting a greater "ability to pay" or more 
"benefits received" from the social compact. But it does not seem fair 
and appropriate to burden capital transactions when they are used 
simply and sensibly to move around in time uneven labor market 
earnings. These are ordinary moral intuitions that theory can easily 
accept, in a Rawlsian reflective equilibrium. The new understanding of 
tax shows us, analytically, that a consistent progressive postpaid 
consumption tax implements these two norms by design, simply, and 
at the same time. 
All that remains, though it has been anticipated, is a normative 
argument, that this is should become an ought, and the clearing up of 
some final loose ends. Those are the aims of this final Part. 
A. A Better, If Less Sophisticated, A rgument 
Andrews's "best, most sophisticated argument" for a consumption 
tax tracked Mill's earlier observation about double taxation, which in 
turn had roots as far back as Hobbes.336 Andrews's was primarily a 
horizontal equity argument, about preserving the pretax equality 
between present and deferred consumption, between spenders and 
336. See Andrews. Personal Income Tax. supra note 8; MILL, supra note 1, at 814; 
HOBBES, supra note 57, at 386-87; Fried, supra noter'ii' . 
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savers, Ant and Grasshopper. Mill had elegantly made the point at a 
time when taxes were few and rates were low. 
A century and a half after Mill, things have changed. We have a 
better understanding of capital markets. More importantly, tax has 
expanded greatly in scope, and high tax rates - certainly compared to 
any Mill himself contemplated - are here to stay. These changes 
ought to lead to a rethinking of the grounds for consumption tax. 
Under progressive marginal rates, a postpaid consumption tax does 
not feature yield exemption by design. Nor does such a tax operate 
randomly. Capital market transactions that elevate lifestyles bear a 
higher burden of tax; those that smooth or diminish lifestyles lower 
the burden. This pattern of effect on the yield to capital is not a reason 
to abandon postpaid consumption taxation or progressive rates. Far 
from it: on the better understanding of tax, it gives a reason to support 
each. It is the argument structure for a consumption tax, of the right 
sort, that needs repair. A progressive postpaid consumption tax need 
not preserve the pretax equality of savers and spenders, and need not 
increase savings or the aggregate capital stock at all. The tax needs a 
better if less sophisticated argument to justify it. Fortunately, this lies 
at hand, in common sense and ordinary moral intuition. 
The answer lies not far from asking the right question: the question 
of the fair timing of tax. Under the new understanding of tax, the great 
divide is between taxes on inflows and taxes on outflows. The income 
and the prepaid consumption taxes stand together on one side of this 
divide, opposed by the postpaid consumption tax. Prepaid 
consumption and income taxes each make their decisions about the 
fair burden of tax at the time of inflow into a household; the difference 
is that an income tax includes capital market yields (as well as, 
possibly, beneficent transfers337), whereas the prepaid consumption tax 
includes labor market earnings alone. But as Figures 1-6 illustrated, 
and common sense confirms, the pattern of inflows is, from a moral 
point of view, arbitrary. Predicating progressivity on inflows means 
that one's effective tax burden turns on matters of luck and whim vis­
a-vis the timing of inflows. This affects choices of life plans - it 
discriminates based on patterns of study, work, and leisure, having 
little or nothing to do with command over material resources, ability 
to pay, or benefits received. At the same time, the income tax 
constrains the progressivity in the design of the tax system, the very 
thing an individuated tax system ought to be facilitating. Progressive 
337. Douglas A. Kahn & Jeffrey H. Kahn, "Gifts, Gafts, and Gefts" - The Income Tax 
Definition and Treatment of Private and Charitable "Gifts" and a Principled Policy 
Justification for the Exclusion of Gifts from Income, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 441 (2003). 
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wage taxes can only be avoided by not working, which imposes a cost 
to the wider society without apparent benefit.338 There is no way out. 
A consistent progressive postpaid consumption tax, in contrast, 
makes its decisions about the appropriate degree of progressivity at 
the right - fair - time.339 It falls on outflows, or spending. Such a tax 
favors (or does not disfavor) capital smoothing transactions, but 
imposes a tax - in the form of the higher effective progressive rates 
- on lifestyle enhancing or capital upward shifting transactions. There 
is luck in what happens in capital markets - as there is luck, too, in 
labor market earnings and beneficence340 - but, importantly, this is 
luck that relates to the very reasons for deciding on the appropriate 
burden of taxation, luck that goes to command over material 
resources, ability to pay, and benefits received. It is not the morally 
insignificant luck over the timing of the receipt of material resources; 
it is the morally significant luck that goes to the extent of one's total 
control over such material resources. 
A consistent postpaid consumption tax is source neutral in an 
appealing sense; it falls equally on labor market, capital market, and 
beneficent transfers, provided that they are used to elevate a 
taxpayer's lifestyle. It does not matter what, exactly, supports an 
individual's standard of living. All that matters is that something did. 
Hence, the animating norm of the tax is solidly a vertical equity one, 
looking to a consistent, meaningful, observable, and comparable 
measure of interpersonal well being. Among many other practical 
virtues, the tax can finesse questions of the precise source of wealth or 
income - whether it was derived from labor, capital, or beneficence. 
This is a significant improvement on the status quo, in both theory and 
practice. Within lifetimes, much effort today goes into dressing up 
labor earnings in capital clothing, such as through the use of stock 
options. A consistent postpaid consumption tax does not mark the 
distinction. Across lifetimes, wealth can be transferred either by 
financial and physical capital, or by human capital - the children of 
the wealthy tend to get better (more expensive) educations, better 
338. I have speculated elsewhere that a society that wished to reduce its citizens' 
working hours might indeed welcome such an incentive. See McCaffery, Being the Best, 
supra note 15, at 623. But this does not strike me as a compelling reading of contemporary 
American norms. 
339. As I have put the matter in a different context: "Our current tax system taxes 
people when they work, when they save, when they marry, when they give, and when they 
die. These are wrong choices, all. We should tax people when and only when they spend." 
Edward J. McCaffery, Tax Reform to Die For, WALL ST. J., Nov. 21, 2003, at A12. 
340. See RAWLS, supra note 52, at 7, 326 ("natural lottery" distributes talents and 
abilities, while society's "basic structure" determines income, social standing and the like). 
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networks, more job connections, and so forth.341 The current regime, 
imposing a porous income-plus-estate tax, scarcely hits at 
intergenerational transfers of financial capital, although it does 
capture human capital ones, by wage taxation at the child's level. The 
postpaid consumption tax once again does not mark the distinctions. 
Financially privileged lives are taxed, on account of the privilege, 
however financed.342 The practical virtues coincide with a moral, 
theoretical appeal. 
At the same time, a consistent progressive postpaid consumption 
tax implements the other norm of capital, the ordinary-savings one. 
Capital transactions that smooth lifestyles, within or between 
generations, lower the aggregate burden of taxation. 
For the most part, taxpayers do smooth. But a consistent, 
progressive postpaid consumption tax as I have described it (that is, 
without a mechanism such as Vickrey's cumulative lifetime averaging 
to modify or define it)343 determines its level of progressivity on the 
basis of taxpayer's actual consumption patterns, whether taxpayers 
have smoothed or not. Just as such a tax system allows taxpayers to 
lower the burden of taxation by smoothing, it penalizes them, at the 
margin, for not smoothing. What is morally compelling about one's 
spending level, in general, and, in particular, about average annual 
labor market earnings in constant dollar terms? A consistent, 
progressive postpaid consumption tax makes its decisions of the 
appropriate level of taxation on the basis of the former, and allows 
capital transactions that effectuate the smoothing to the latter to lower 
the burden of taxes. Why? 
First, spending, as already suggested, reflects a fair and objectively 
observable measure of a taxpayer's standard of living, command over 
material resources, ability to pay, and benefits received. Spending 
turns on importantly voluntary, autonomous decisions, as Adam Smith 
suggested, rather than the impersonal, external factors that affect the 
timing of inflows.344 
Second, and related, capital transactions that smooth uneven labor 
market earnings do not reflect greater ability to pay, benefits received, 
or command over resources. They are simply the means by which one 
341. See John H. Langbein, The Twentieth-Century Revolution in Family Wealth 
Transmission,  86 MICH. L. REV. 722 (1988) (explaining that wealth transmission has changed 
from land to human capital in the 20th century). 
342. In this regard, a consistent, progressive postpaid consumption tax operates as a 
better, more practical "privilege tax" than the specifically designated tax discussed by 
ACKERMAN & ALSTOTT, supra note 103. 
343. See Vickrey, supra note 188. 
344. SMITH, supra note 54, at 777-78, quoted in note 57, supra. I have discussed the 
voluntariness of spending in McCaffery, Cognitive Theory and Tax, supra note 43; 
McCaffery, A Voluntary Tax?, supra note 202; Edward J. McCaffery, Why People Play 
Lotteries and Why it Matters, 1994 WIS. L. REV. 71. 
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finances her lifestyle through time, dealing with the particular patterns 
of human and financial capital realizations. Using a smoothed 
consumption line as an analytic baseline allows us to see two effects of 
a consistently progressive postpaid consumption tax in its interaction 
with capital market transactions. First, taxpayers who fail to perfectly 
smooth consumption can pay a price for their uneven spending profile; 
this was the "paternalistic push" of the system, noted above345 (though, 
again, it can be eliminated through cumulative averaging within the 
postpaid consumption tax system) .  But, second, and much more 
important, taxpayers who can do better, in material terms, than their 
average annual labor market earnings will see the value that enables 
them to do so - whether from capital market or beneficent 
transactions - taxed at a higher rate. If the combined present value of 
one's lifetime annual consumption exceeds that of one's aggregate 
lifetime earnings, something has happened to allow the taxpayer to 
elevate herself in material consumption terms. The smoothed 
consumption line accepts the best lights reading of Mill's argument 
against "double" taxation, and Andrews's case for preservation of the 
pretax equality of savers and spenders, while at the very same time 
conceding the most powerful criticism of these positions made by 
Warren and others, namely that those who receive a return to capital 
are better off, in terms of their command over material resources, than 
those who do not. If capital has made one richer, viewed in a wide lens 
of time, the yield-to-capital norm (and vertical equity generally) 
demands that we tax the yield; if capital transactions have merely 
moved resources around in time, the ordinary-savings norm (and 
horizontal equity generally) demands that we not burden its yield. The 
smoothed consumption line, as a baseline for choosing the level of 
progressivity imposed, is a principle imperfectly reflected in our 
present practices, most importantly in regard to retirement savings. 
The bottom line, normatively, is what strikes us all as fair.346 A 
prepaid consumption tax - like the current "income" tax - makes its 
judgments on the appropriate level to tax on the basis of labor 
earnings alone. It would ignore all the sources of enhanced lifestyle 
from capital markets or beneficent transfers and penalize those with 
temporally uneven labor market earnings. A progressive postpaid 
consumption tax makes its decisions about the appropriate level of 
taxation on the basis of outflows. This means that capital transactions 
that smooth out uneven labor market earnings will lower the burden 
of taxation; both capital market and beneficent transactions that 
finance greater lifestyles than one's own earnings would allow raise 
the burden. 
345. See supra Part IV.E. 
346. See McCaffery, Being the Best, supra note 15; see also Warren, supra note 13, at 
946. 
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The best, most sophisticated argument for a consumption tax of 
the right sort - a progressive postpaid consumption tax - is that this 
tax. makes its judgments about the appropriate level of taxation at the 
right time, allowing for a fairer, more enduring degree of progression 
in tax burdens in both theory and in practice, and differentiating 
between savings and investment activities that simply move around 
labor earnings in time and those that facilitate greater levels of 
consumption, alone among major comprehensive tax options. This is 
not as neat and elegant an argument as Andrews's "most 
sophisticated" one. It does not pivot on any simple, handy tum of 
phrase. But it is a better argument. It connects the fairness of the tax 
base question - income versus consumption, of both forms - to the 
issue of progressivity by means of the fair timing of tax. It thus not 
only reconciles the two appealing norms about the taxation of savings 
- the ordinary-savings and yield-to-capital norms - but it also allows 
for a better, fairer, more meaningful and enduring progressivity in tax 
burdens. This is true both internal to the tax system or base in 
question, and external to them. Internally, a consistent, progressive 
postpaid consumption tax tethers its decisions on the appropriate level 
of taxation to the objective, observable, meaningful variable of 
personal spending. Externally - as a matter of tax system design - a 
· postpaid consumption tax importantly allows for more progressivity in 
tax burdens.347 
347. I have simply posited this point throughout. It follows from my intuition that 
deterring high-end spending is more reasonable than deterring high-wage labor earnings. To 
some extent, this is simply a moral argument. See McCaffery, The Right to Waste?, supra 
note 24, McCaffery, Uneasy Case, supra note 165. For the empirical consequences, under a 
consistent, progressive postpaid consumption tax, we need to rethink the analysis of optimal 
taxation. It is not optimal income tax that we should model, but optimal postpaid 
consumption taxes. Of course, for most Americans, Jiving from paycheck to paycheck, the 
two converge because income equals consumption for those who do not save. And in all 
cases, the social-welfare maximizer will still be concerned with the elasticity of labor, a 
productive input. But under a consistent postpaid consumption tax, the nature of this input 
ought to change. High marginal tax rates on high-end consumption need not deter labor 
efforts, as opposed to spending decisions. Such taxes will deter those who earn only to spend 
on themselves - such people will rationally backward induce, and stop working today -
but they need not deter those building up wealth for other reasons, including 
intergenerational altruism (yet another reason not to engraft a wealth transfer tax onto a 
consistent postpaid consumption tax model, or to choose Vickrey's cumulative lifetime 
income averaging over a cumulative lifetime consumption averaging or the simpler general 
tax outlined here). To the extent the behavioral response to progressive spending taxes is to 
save, this can be a public good. The questions are technical, empirical ones, beyond the 
scope of the present effort. But they hold out an intriguing possibility - the very spirit 
behind the project of ascertaining the fair timing of tax. If we get the form of tax right - its 
timing and its base - we can, at Jong last, get its redistributive functions down right. The 
embarrassments of today point us to hope for a better tomorrow. I thank Kirk Stark for 
pressing these thoughts on me. 
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B. Transitions, Implementation, and Objections 
This Article has mainly been concerned to advance the new 
understanding of tax. I have addressed many of the practical issues of 
transitions to and implementation of a progressive postpaid 
consumption tax elsewhere, as well as noted the most frequent 
objections to the practical proposal.348 This section simply quickly 
canvasses some important themes, in the interest of at least noting 
them. 
1. Implementation 
As Andrews set out perfectly well in his 1974 and subsequent 
articles, a postpaid consumption tax is not difficult to implement. In 
particular, a consistent postpaid consumption tax does not entail 
adding up all the particular items of consumption. Rather it rests on 
the simple elegance of the Haig-Simons definition of Income, 
Equation [1] above. If Income equals Consumption plus Savings (/ = C 
+ S), then Consumption equals Income minus Savings ( C = I - S). All 
that is needed to implement a consistent progressive postpaid 
consumption tax is to systematically subtract savings from "income,'' 
measured just as we do today. This means, of course, adding in 
dissavings - including debt, to which we tum in a moment. 
There are hard cases, of course, of defining "consumption,'' but 
most of these already exist under the income tax (which after all 
includes consumption in its base, as well, as the Haig-Simons 
definition shows). The simplest way to get from the current system to 
a consistent postpaid consumption tax model is to repeal all limits on 
traditional IRA plans, and include debt as taxable "income." Then 
one could repeal preferential rates for capital gains and all rules for 
the "basis" of investment assets. 
2. The Role of Other Taxes 
One considerable practical advantage of a consistent, progressive 
postpaid consumption tax is that it at least lessens the need for both 
gift and estate and corporate income taxes. These taxes have been 
perhaps best justified as being important "backstops" to the actual 
income tax's flawed instantiation of the income ideal. Both taxes 
reflect a desire to get at some capital; the gift and estate tax might also 
reflect a norm to tax at least extraordinary, large amounts of 
beneficence. Under the traditional view of tax, the gift and estate tax 
in particular is often thought to be important in any movement 
towards a consumption ideal. This is either because a consumption tax 
348. See MCCAFFERY, FAIR NOT FLAT, supra note 2, at 117-60. 
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enables second and later generations to live off the fruits of a prior 
generation's capital, altogether untaxed, or because a consumption tax 
facilitates the building up of large stocks of private capital, as Andrews 
maintained. 
Under the new understanding of tax, things change. A consistent, 
progressive postpaid consumption tax does fall on the yield to capital, 
under the right circumstances, and at a compelling time. Such a tax is 
also individuated, meeting Vickrey's test. Second and later 
generations are taxed at the moment of expenditures, and the tax 
burden on the family will have increased if these descendants are in 
fact consuming at a higher level than their ancestors. Arguably, this 
incentive to redistribute wealth within extended families is a welfare­
improving one.349 In any event - and this is important - a consistent 
postpaid consumption tax would impose a far greater, far more 
systematic and principled burden on inherited wealth than what 
obtains today, under the flawed income-plus-estate tax regime. As 
things now stand, under the effective prepaid consumption tax model, 
both present and future generations living off the yield to capital need 
pay no tax. Relatedly, I shall consider below the theoretical issues 
involved with large stocks of private capital, which a postpaid 
consumption tax might be thought to make more likely and 
prevalent.350 But it is again worth pointing out, however, both that 
such large stores of capital can and do easily arise today, under the 
essentially "voluntary" tax on capital imposed by the income tax, and 
that stocks of private capital might well decrease under a conversion 
to a consistent postpaid consumption tax, because under it - unlike 
the status quo - consumption financed by capital will bear a positive 
burden of tax. 
A compelling case can be made, then, to replace the current 
income, corporate income, and gift and estate taxes with a consistent 
postpaid progressive consumption tax - and all to get at the yield to 
capital in a better, fairer, more individuated and progressive way. Such 
a tax consistently taxes people, including heirs, when they spend, not 
when they work or save. Aside from consistency, this principle 
comports with ordinary moral intuitions about fairness in tax. Still, 
justice might be thought to require some additional tax on inherited 
wealth, as a freestanding matter,351 either at the level of the transferor 
or in the hands of the transferee. It is worth noting, as a practical 
matter, that the latter might be effected by allowing earned-income 
349. See Kaplow, supra note 172; see also McCaffery, Uneasy Case, supra note 165, at 
319 (citing Joseph E. Stiglitz, Notes on Estate Taxes, Redistribution, and the Concept of 
Balanced Growth Path Incidence, 86 J. POL. ECON. S137, S146-49 (1978)). 
350. Andrews thought so. See Andrews, Personal Income Tax, supra note 8, at 1 1 18-19. 
351. Cf RAWLS, supra note 52. 
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allowances under the postpaid consumption tax, in effect isolating out 
those who live solely off of financial capital for higher tax burdens.352 
This adds complexity to the simpler proposal for a consistent, 
progressive postpaid consumption tax, and is perhaps inconsistent with 
its best spirit, but it can be done. Similarly, untethered from the idea 
that an estate tax is somehow needed to "save" the income tax, with 
its realization requirement and all, a wealth or wealth transfer tax, 
with broader bases and a much reduced rate structure, can isolate out 
some of the perceived harms of transferred wealth without the steep 
distortions of the status quo. 
Still, much of the normative attraction of the new understanding of 
tax rests on its more compelling instantiation of a source-neutrality 
norm. Persons with high salaries are benefited in many ways, by the 
natural lottery of their talents, education, connections, luck, and so on. 
A consistent, progressive postpaid consumption tax does not 
differentiate between and among sources of good fortune - own or 
other's labor market earnings, own or other's capital market yields. 
All that matters is how one lives in material terms. That is a fairly 
simple and compelling norm to implement. 
3. The New Achilles Heel 
To Andrews, and within the traditional view of tax, the realization 
requirement of Macomber was the Achilles heel of the income tax. 
And so it is, from the perspective of an ideal income tax. The 
realization requirement is the first and most important step in 
converting the so-called income tax into a wage tax. But from the 
vantage point of a consistent, postpaid consumption tax, the 
realization requirement gets it right: there is no need to tax until and 
unless savings or investments are cashed out and consumed on private 
preclusive use. 
Under the new understanding of tax, however, a new Achilles heel 
arises: the tax treatment of debt.353 It is the "borrow" part of Tax 
Planning 101 's buy/borrow/die that is problematic. This is the step that 
allows consumption to escape tax-free. 
The point is especially important because it is so poorly 
understood. Thus the USA Tax, the practical variant of a postpaid 
consumption tax that received serious legislative consideration in the 
mid 1990s, tragically neglected to include debt in its base.354 
352. Cf Andrews, Personal Income Tax, supra note 8; McCaffery, Uneasy Case, supra 
note 165. 
353. Compare Calvin Johnson, What's a Tax Shelter?, 68 TAX NOTES 879 (1995) 
(arguing that the prevalence of tax shelters arises out of the treatment of debt), with Hime, 
supra note 185 (analyzing the problem with current tax law treatment of debt). 
354. See SEIDMAN, supra note 88; McCaffery, Tyranny, supra note 192. 
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Theoretically, the treatment of debt is essential to the fair timing of 
tax and to providing symmetry to the taxation of capital market 
transactions by allowing forward as well as backward smoothing, in 
the manner of Figure 2. Practically, any postpaid consumption tax that 
does not include debt in its base is doomed to failure, on account of 
the ease of the arbitrage to avoid it. 
Hence it is imperative that any real-world postpaid consumption 
tax tackle the issue of debt. This is the single biggest practical 
challenge facing the tax. Other perceived obstacles, such as the 
problem of "pre-enactment basis," consumer durables, housing, and so 
on tend to be overstated.355 The proper treatment of debt is essential 
to getting tax right. 
4. Capital as Power 
This section picks up an important and long-bracketed issue. The 
capital norms central to the new understanding of tax are norms about 
cash flow - they are about how to account for and tax the yield to 
capital as it comes into and out of a household or a taxpayer's control. 
But capital has another dimension as well: its mere presence and the 
power and pleasure that this presence brings.356 What should the tax 
system do about the stock of wealth? It was this concern that led 
Andrews to recommend adding on a gift and estate tax to a consistent 
postpaid consumption tax, out of worries that private accumulation 
would grow unbearably great under a consistent consumption tax.357 
There are compelling reasons, of both a nonideal and an ideal 
nature, why this concern against a consistent progressive postpaid 
consumption tax is misplaced, and that in fact such a tax can 
adequately meet all of society's reasonable concerns over the private 
capital stock.358 But it is also important to see that these are, indeed, 
355. Preenactment basis is "[t]he basis in an asset held prior to the start of a new tax 
system." MCCAFFERY, FAIR NOT FLAT, supra note 2, at 164. For discussion of the 
preenactment basis of assets in the move from the current "income" tax to a consumption 
tax. see Louis Kaplow. Recovery of Pre-Enactment Basis under a Consumption Tax: The 
USA Tax System, 68 TAX NOTES 1 109 (1995). 
356. See MURPHY & NAGEL, supra note 6, at 1 14 ("It should be obvious that wealth is 
an independent source of welfare, quite apart from the fact that some of it may be consumed 
later.") I have long argued against the relevance of this fact to tax policy. See McCaffery, 
Uneasy Case, supra note 165; McCaffery, Political Liberal Case, supra note 197. More 
recently, Weisbach & Bankman, supra note 7, have made similar criticisms. 
357. See Andrews, Personal Income Tax, supra note 8, at 1169-70. 
358. I first pressed these arguments in 1994. See McCaffery, Political Liberal Case, supra 
note 197; McCaffery, Uneasy Case, supra note 165. I attempted to revise them again in 1996. 
See McCaffery, Being the Best, supra note 15. I now realize that this argument should not 
derail the case against comprehensive tax reform; a separate argument can be had out over 
wealth taxes, which can as easily accompany a so-called income as a postpaid (or, for that 
matter, prepaid) consumption tax. 
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logically distinct arguments. A tax on, or regulation of, private stocks 
of capital, at some quanta or in some cases, can accompany any 
comprehensive tax plan - income, or prepaid or postpaid 
consumption. This is an argument worth having out, but it need not 
derail the larger debate over comprehensive tax system design.359 
The practical arguments begin with the fact that the present 
income tax is not working well, at all, to monitor the situation of 
private stocks of wealth. The new understanding of tax gives a precise 
reason to understand why this is so: the current system is largely a 
prepaid consumption or wage tax that makes little serious attempt to 
fall on capital or its yield. It is therefore a mistake to consider that 
private stocks of capital will necessarily increase under any conversion 
to a consistent, progressive postpaid consumption tax. Such a tax will 
have two large and important base-broadening features. First, there 
will no longer be any need for special capital gains rates, or lower rates 
on corporate dividends and the like. Wealth that is consumed will all 
be taxed under a uniform rate schedule, just as now obtains, for 
example, for withdrawals from traditional IRAs and 401(k) plans. 
Second, consumption that is financed by debt backed by capital will 
now bear a tax. I have no ready way of quantifying the magnitude of 
this effect, but I suspect it to be large.360 Finally, the rate structure can 
also increase in its slope under a consistent postpaid consumption tax. 
One of the animating goals of getting the fair timing of tax down right 
is to increase the level of progressivity in the tax system, reversing a 
seemingly irreversible trend under the status quo, witnessed over a 
half century of tax policy changes. Spending can be taxed in a more 
steeply sloped fashion than can wages. 
These practical advantages of a postpaid consumption tax over the 
status quo add to the practical difficulties with any separate wealth 
tax, one that would apply to stocks of capital alone. Such taxes 
encourage consumption, of course, which seems inconsistent with the 
spirit of a consumption tax, but the new understanding of tax helps to 
show that things are not so simple. A consistent, progressive postpaid 
consumption tax is a tax on capital in important cases, after all. But 
taxes on static sources of wealth are problematic, difficult, and costly. 
Postpaid taxes on cash flows are far simpler to implement. 
None of these practical, nonideal concerns would carry much 
weight, however, if theory suggested a large and persistent problem 
with private stocks of capital. As I have suggested, this is not a concern 
that ought either to favor the status quo, or to prevent a conversion to 
a more principled and progressive postpaid consumption tax. Further, 
359. Rakowski, supra note 15; Shakow & Shuldiner, supra note 77; Shaviro, supra note 
103. 
360. I thank Bill Gale for related discussions. 
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even in the domain of theory, there are reasons to believe that the 
concern over capital as power is mistaken. A consistent, postpaid 
consumption tax already chills the use of "private" capital to fund 
private preclusive use at any point in the future, through its tax rate 
mechanism: the future tax operates as a present lien against potential 
consumption. Tax rates can - and I believe should - increase under 
the more principled tax system design. The further use of private 
capital to achieve private benefit can be affected far more by the 
regulation of private capital than by its taxation. A consistent postpaid 
consumption tax provides a mechanism to regulate wealth. As I have 
written elsewhere, a postpaid consumption tax importantly redefines 
property rights: it changes what it means for wealth to be one's own.361 
Society has a stake in the private savings accounts, and is justified in 
regulating them, just as it does now with IRAs and pension plans. 
Simply forbidding monies in tax-favored accounts from being used to 
finance personal political pursuits, for example, would go a long way 
- farther than the current tax system and farther than the current 
regulation of campaign financing - toward curtailing the power of 
private capital to influence politics. 
In short, the problems of private capital as private power, far from 
posing objections to a consistent, progressive postpaid consumption 
tax, seem to off er a powerful set of reasons for such a tax. 
5. Transitions 
Finally, it is often thought or written that transition concerns loom 
large in adopting any form of a consistent consumption tax. While any 
large-scale tax reform does indeed pose difficult problems of 
implementation and transition, the new understanding of tax helps to 
show that there are ways in which this usual and customary objection 
is overstated, or at least misstated. Practically, all that need be done is 
to repeal the limits on traditional IRAs and include debt as income. 
Taxing debt poses challenges, to be sure, but the rest does not; the 
move to a consistent postpaid consumption tax is mainly a simplifying 
one. Still, scholars fret that moving from a system that directly taxes 
capital - in theory - to one that does not will create problems. The 
concern is usually put in the terms of the traditional view of tax, that 
is, as if we were moving from an income ideal to a consumption one. 
In such a case, it appears as if "old" capital would suffer a fatal blow, 
whereas "new" capital would be blessed.362 
361. See McCaffery, The Right to Waste?, supra note 24. 
362. This leads to the problem of preenactment basis, a concern which I feel is 
overstated. See Kaplow, supra note 355. 
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But in fact, as the new understanding of tax shows, we do not have 
an income ideal. A good deal of capital has not yet been taxed under 
the existing hybrid. Further, as noted above and below, it is wrong to 
simply assume that any conversion to a consistent consumption tax 
would mean an increase in rates. A move to a consistent postpaid 
consumption tax would entail two major base-broadening features: the 
elimination of preferential rates for capital gains and other sources of 
capital income, such as dividends, and the inclusion of debt-financed 
consumption. These would be balanced against the more systematic 
deduction for savings, bearing in mind that much savings already 
escape tax. 
On another hand, the new understanding of tax points to a new set 
of transition issues. Whereas moving from an income tax ideal to a 
prepaid consumption model is simple enough - one gets there by 
repealing all second taxes on capital, as current policy seems bent on 
doing - and the transition from an income ideal to a postpaid 
consumption one has at least been well-studied, the new 
understanding argues for the replacement of a prepaid with a postpaid 
consumption tax model. While actual law has allowed conversions of 
IRAs in the other direction - from traditional to "Roth" style363 -
the converse can be tricky. The attendant problems warrant study. 
C. Common Errors About Income and Consumption Taxes 
We have come a long way, using many words, covering the 
intellectual history of tax, the status quo, tax theory and practice in the 
income and other taxes, and more. Now it is time to be brief, to list 
some lessons and final thoughts. Before concluding, this section simply 
lists and comments on some common mistakes in the popular 
understanding of tax systems based on the traditional understanding 
of tax that have been impeding better, more fruitful discussion about 
tax reform. The new understanding of tax helps to set things straight. 
1 .  We Have a n  Income Tax 
As the growing cognitive psychological literature shows us 
abundantly well, labels matter.364 The major comprehensive tax system 
in America is officially termed the "income" tax, and virtually all 
political discourse about it takes it as such. Yet the tax system we have 
is far closer to a consumption tax because of its many omissions of 
taxing capital and its yield. More specifically, under the new 
363. I.RC. § 408A(d)(3)(C) (2004). 
364. See Edward J. McCaffery & Jonathan Baron, Heuristics and Biases in Thinking 
about Tax, in Proceedings of the 96th Annual Conference on Taxation, 2002, 443 (2003). 
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understanding of tax, we are moving ever closer to a prepaid 
consumption or wage tax. Second taxes have become voluntary. 
2 .  The Principal Choice in Comprehensive Tax Policy Is Between an 
Income and a Consumption Tax 
A central goal of the new understanding of tax has been to show 
that the classic income-versus-consumption debate is moot. We do not 
have, have never had, and will never have an income tax. The real 
choice is and ought to be over what form of consumption tax to have. 
Here the stakes are large and dramatic. 
3. Consumption Taxes A re Flat Taxes 
This is a confusion present in certain popular political discourses, 
one that conservative politicians have used to their advantage. 
Further, it relates back to Mill and an important theme in the tax 
policy literature. If the reason for supporting a consumption tax is to 
preserve the pretax equality between savers and spenders - to effect 
yield exemption - then there is indeed something compelling about a 
flat-rate structure. That is why a large element of the new 
understanding of tax lies in establishing the idea that this horizontal 
equity argument is not the right reason for a consumption tax. 
4. A ll Consumption Taxes A re Created Equal 
All flat consumption taxes are indeed largely equal, except for the 
important points about infra-marginal returns to capital. But 
progressive consumption taxes vary greatly. A prepaid consumption or 
wage tax, even at progressive rates, features yield-exemption, by 
design; a postpaid consumption tax most decisively does not. 
5. Consumption Taxes Do Not Reach the Yield to Capital 
The dominant analytic point of the new understanding of tax is 
that, under progressive rates, a postpaid consumption tax reaches the 
yield to capital when such yield is the source of enhanced lifestyles, 
but not otherwise. 
6. The Best Argument for a Consumption Tax Is One of Horizontal 
Equity 
Here is where we can blame Mill, again, and take objection to 
Andrews's "most sophisticated" argument. Indeed and ironically, a 
very good reason for consumption taxes, of the right sort, is that they 
fall on the yield to capital under just the circumstances in which 
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ordinary moral intuitions suggest that this is the right thing to do. But 
there are other good reasons for a consumption tax, of the right sort, 
most importantly including that a consistent postpaid consumption tax 
opens the door to deeper, more-lasting progressivity in the allocation 
of tax burdens. 
7. The Case for Consumption Taxation Is One About the Importance 
of Capital, on the Individual or Aggregate Level 
Here is where we perhaps can blame Hobbes, and his 
"foundational" argument for consumption taxation based on the 
common pool of capital.365 Depending on the rate structure, there can 
be more, less, or the same amount of capital under a consumption as 
under an income tax. Indeed, in part because a consistent postpaid 
consumption tax facilitates more progressivity - a steeper slope in the 
rate structure - than we now have, it is possible that tax rates could 
decrease on the lower income classes while increasing on the upper 
ones. In such a case we might get less savings among the poor and 
more savings among the rich, which can be a compelling normative 
endpoint, especially given a basically just society that provides basic 
needs and goods to all its citizens.366 
8. Rates Would Have to Increase Under a Transition to a 
Consumption Tax 
The standard income-versus-consumption debate assumes that 
rates would have to increase under any conversion to a consumption 
tax, at constant revenue needs, because the consumption tax fails to 
reach an element of the income tax's base, namely savings. In fact, we 
do not have an income tax. In moving from the status quo - the 
flawed income-with-realization tax - to a consistent, postpaid 
consumption tax, there would be two large base broadening features. 
First, we could repeal the special rate preferences for capital gains and 
corporate dividends.367 Second, we would have a mechanism for 
picking up debt, and thus would add debt-financed consumption to the 
base. These two provisions could well offset the greater allowance of 
deductions for savings, especially as so little savings is taxed today. 
365. Hobbes, supra note 57; Fried, supra note 7, at 962 (calling Hobbes's argument 
foundational}. 
366. See RAWLS, supra note 52, at 90-95, 277. 
367. Because a consistent postpaid consumption tax eliminates the need for the concept 
of "basis," the base would also broaden by including gain now lost to the over-stated basis 
problem. See Dodge & Soled, supra note 220. 
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9. The Gift and Estate and Corporate Income Taxes Are Important 
Backstops to the Individual Income Tax 
The traditional view of tax sets an income tax against all forms of 
consumption taxes. Most tax policy scholars and makers through the 
years have favored the former, for they ascribe to the yield-to-capital 
norm. But the status quo individual income tax disappoints, for it fails 
to get at the yield to capital in many, and many of the most important, 
cases. Thus, the gift and estate and corporate income taxes are desired 
as "backstops" to the income tax, as some way of getting at the yield 
to capital. But in practice these taxes are porous in their application, 
and unfair in their incidence. Under the new understanding of tax, we 
can see that a consistent, progressive postpaid consumption tax does 
get at the yield to capital, in the right cases, in a principled and 
individuated manner. Thus, under it, and putting aside the analytically 
separable question of the problems of capital-as-power, these two 
additional taxes are not needed. 
10. Adopting a Consumption Tax Would Be a Radical Change 
If one believes that the great fault line in tax policy is between an 
income and a consumption tax, and that we have the former, then a 
change to a consumption tax seems radical. But it is not. We do not 
have an income tax, and the only real question is what kind of 
consumption tax to have. Adopting a consistent, postpaid 
consumption tax would entail only two major steps: (1) institute an 
unlimited deduction for savings, along the lines of traditional IRA 
plans; and (2) include debt as a taxable input. At the same time, we 
could repeal: (1) all preferences for capital gains, corporate dividends, 
and the like; (2) all rules relating to "basis" (as assets would have no 
basis, not having been taxed); (3) the corporate income tax; and (4) 
the gift and estate tax. While there are important transitional 
concerns, such as those over "pre-enactment basis," these tend to be 
overstated. 
D. Tax Matters 
Why does the new understanding of tax matter? Because tax 
matters. Tax represents the last battle line for any meaningful 
redistribution of material resources from the better able to the least 
well off.368 The traditional view of tax gives us an impoverished choice 
368. Or perhaps it does. There is also some hope for effecting redistribution through 
expenditure programs. See Bird & Zolt, supra 51 ;  see also Baron & McCaffery, Masking 
Redistribution, supra note 21 (experimental results showing that ordinary subjects fail to 
compensate in tax system for decline in redistribution attendant on "privatization" of 
formerly publicly provided goods and sources). 
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set, between a wildly unpopular income-plus-estate-plus-corporate­
income tax regime that is scarcely doing any real work in the cause of 
liberal egalitarian justice, and a flat consumption tax of some sort or 
another that cannot possibly do any such work. The new 
understanding of tax is essential to getting us out of this morass. 
The traditional view of tax pits income against consumption taxes, 
with income taxes, alone, on the side of liberal egalitarian justice and 
fairness in tax. Under its dim lights, liberals continue to cling to and 
argue for a porous income plus corporate income plus gift and estate 
tax regime, all unpopular and ineffective choices. Meanwhile, 
conservative forces opposed to redistribution have begun to see the 
light of the new understanding. They are arguing, not just for a 
consumption tax, but for a particular form of consumption tax: a 
prepaid one. To them, victory seems close at hand. With President 
Bush's reelection, prepaid consumption proponents have been 
speaking openly of their mounting piecemeal victories and the ever­
closer horizon of their promised land. The highly influential Grover 
Norquist, for example, notes of the four tax cuts in Bush's first term 
that "[p]eople looked at those and thought they were just catch as 
catch can. But every one of those tax cuts moved us toward a single­
rate tax system that taxes income just one time."369 Stephen Moore, 
president of the powerful Club for Growth, foresees not "a big 
grandiose plan, but rather incremental steps." Moore regards the flat 
tax as the "Garden of Eden . . .  [that requires] that every change we 
make with tax policy is moving us in that direction."370 The new 
understanding of tax would have helped to predict the ultimate effects 
of this gradual shift.371 Now that we stand on the brink of getting a flat 
wage tax, ordinary people are beginning to size up, comprehensively, 
where we are.372 
What they see is not bright. These are dark times for the great 
progressive spirit in America. We have, perhaps wisely, rooted out 
many vestiges of inefficient and haphazard redistribution from our 
general socio-economic laws and regulations, persuaded in part by a 
welfarist economic argument that. such redistribution is best left to the 
369. Warren Vieth, U.S. Tax Code May Be Facing a Full Rewrite, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 7, 
2004, at A27. I have been making this point for a while. 
370. Id. 
371. See Edward J. McCaffery, Ten Facts About Fundamental Tax Reform, 101 TAX 
NOTES 1463 (2003). 
372. See, e.g., Primer: Consumption Tax, WASH. POST, Nov. 7, 2004, at F3 (the 
Washington Post's basic explanation of the consumption tax). Tax scholars too are 
concerned. See, e.g. , Martin M. McMahon, Jr., The M�tthew Effect and Federal Taxation, 45 
B.C. L. REV. 993, 998-1012 (2004) (presenting data showing that the extremely rich are 
getting richer); William G. Gale & Peter R. Orszag, An Economic Assessment of Tax Policy 
in the Bush Administration, 45 B.C. L. REV. 1 157, 1-220-31 (2004). 
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tax system.373 But when we look at that tax system, whose very design 
once served as a shining light of progressive liberalism, we see a steady 
retreat towards something very different from where we started. More 
darkly still, we seem ill-served by our intellectual armament to halt the 
retreat. Most people pay little or no attention to the frightening details 
of tax, deterred and dismayed by its dizzying complexity. Those who 
do know, and care, are trapped in the traditional income-versus­
consumption debate. Progressives fight to maintain whatever vestiges 
of an income tax we have, and defend its adjutants, the corporate and 
gift and estate taxes, as the last best hope for justice in tax and, by 
extension, in society at large. Yet these very choices are giving comfort 
to the enemies of redistribution, for the income, corporate, and gift 
and estate taxes are wildly unpopular - and, ironically, wildly 
ineffective to boot. The tax system is drifting, seemingly inexorably, 
towards a flat wage tax. All hope for effecting redistribution from rich 
to poor may soon be lost. Amidst the darkness, dramatic change seems 
beyond the pale; the very tinkering that has gotten us into the state of 
tax we are in seems to be the only procedure for going forward. 
"People treat a plan as realistic when it approximates what already 
exists and as utopian when it departs from current arrangements. Only 
proposals that are hardly worth fighting for - reformist tinkering -
seem practicable."374 
But perhaps it is darkest before the dawn. By rethinking first 
principles in the analytics of tax, we can come to a new understanding. 
An income tax is not needed to advance the progressive cause, and in 
fact its very structure impedes it. Yet all consumption taxes are not 
created equal. While a prepaid consumption or wage tax does indeed 
let capital off the sodal hook altogether, a consistently progressive, 
postpaid consumption tax gets matters just right, by design. It 
comports with compelling ordinary moral intuitions about the taxation 
of capital and its yield, allowing people to lower the burden of taxation 
by ordinary-savings, but falling on the yield to capital when it 
facilitates a better, richer lifestyle. Such a tax, alone among feasible 
alternatives, allows for a structure in which a deep and meaningful 
progressivity in the allocation of tax burdens can flourish. It is not 
where we are headed now, but it could yet be where we end up - if 
we get our understanding of tax down right. 
373. See KAPLOW & SHA VELL, supra note 21. 
374. ROBERTO MANGABEIRA UNGER, FALSE NECESSITY 12 (1987). 
